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American novels of the early 1960s posed a direct challenge to the 
legitimacy and apparent objectivity of biomedical psychiatry. Taken together, 
my selection of texts by Richard Yates, Ken Kesey, Sylvia Plath and Joanne 
Greenberg question the scientific validity of diagnoses of mental illness, as 
well as treatments such as involuntary hospitalisation, shock therapies, 
lobotomy, and the use of psychopharmaceuticals. These novels suggest that 
biomedical psychiatry functions as a form of social control by regulating and 
enforcing the categories of ‘madness’ and ‘sanity’ on the basis of compliance 
with social responsibility and expected behaviours. Accordingly, themes of 
autonomy and self-determination run throughout these texts as a traditional 
cornerstone of American culture to which the increasing omnipotence of 
psychiatric power is considered as a threat. In each chapter, I match a novel 
with a psychiatrist of the same or similar historical period, reading the 
fictional text through the framework of each psychiatrist’s position on their 
own discipline. I thereby demonstrate how these fictional texts either 
anticipated the work of the so-called anti-psychiatrists or appeared almost 
simultaneously. In Chapter One, I read Revolutionary Road alongside David 
Cooper’s Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry and argue that both texts depict the 
mad individual as immediately delegitimised as a socio-political agent 
through psychiatric diagnosis. I also argue that Yates uses the figure of the 
madman to demonstrate the absurdity of socially expected behaviours, 
thereby presenting the ‘mad’ paradoxically as truth-tellers who seek to reveal 
the illusory nature of American middle-class freedoms (particularly with 
regards to consumerism).  
In Chapter Two, I step inside the asylum by reading Ken Kesey’s One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest alongside the works of Thomas Szasz. I argue 
that these texts staunchly position involuntary hospitalisation as both 
custodial and punitive, motivated by a desire to readjust the socially 
maladjusted for return to a rigidly controlled community. Both Szasz and 
Kesey reject the legitimacy of psychiatric diagnoses and understand the use 
of shock therapies and lobotomy to be acts of violence. Equally, Szasz and 
Kesey also prioritize individual self-determination over social cohesion, which 
again, like Yates’s Revolutionary Road, aligns psychiatric intervention with 
enforced conformity and the loss of civil liberties.  
In Chapter Three, I read Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar through the 
framework of R. D. Laing’s The Divided Self. I argue that Esther 
Greenwood’s psychotic illness manifests itself as a Laingian ontological 
insecurity, and that alter-egos like Elly Higginbottom function as part of a 
false-self system intended to preserve the outward appearance of normality. 
I also demonstrate how Esther experiences both self-alienation and 
psychiatric persecution as a direct result of her rejection of conservative 
gender roles and the social expectations therein. Finally, I reject Esther’s 
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ambiguous cure, positing instead that recovery is not possible within the 
society that caused Esther’s distress since socially expected gender roles 
are at the root of her trauma. 
 Chapter Four occupies a unique position, offering a humane 
alternative to biomedical psychiatry. I argue that Joanne Greenberg’s I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden, read in conjunction with works by Frieda 
Fromm-Reichmann, offers a vision of a different model of psychiatric 
engagement founded upon respect for patient autonomy and on self-
realization rather than adjustment. In this text, Greenberg demonstrates the 
potential for asylums to be curative places of self-development, but only 
under very specific financial and ideological conditions. I suggest that, while 
Greenberg’s fictional version of the real Chestnut Lodge represents a highly 
elite and unorthodox facility, its approach towards patient care is a direct 





































































Psychiatry Under Fire: Novelistic Challenges to Biomedical Psychiatry in 
American Fiction 1961-1964. 
The 1960s were a period of great upheaval and change across the Western 
world. In the United States protests and anti-authoritarian movements 
developed around an increasingly broad range of issues, including the 
Vietnam war, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Women’s Movement, all of 
which sought to change or otherwise impact upon the socio-political 
landscape of the American nation. Psychiatry, this thesis argues, became 
another target of this anti-authoritarian bent in postwar America, since in the 
years immediately following the Second World War psychiatry had become 
an ever-visible and increasingly powerful presence in American communities.  
Psychiatric authority grew in the postwar years as veterans returned 
to America and quickly overwhelmed existing care facilities. The government, 
in response, offered generous levels of sponsorship for psychiatric training 
programs that sought to match and contain this increasing high demand. As 
Roy Menninger and John Nemiah have pointed out, “substantial federal 
support for psychiatric training” began after the Second World War, and this 
policy was so effective that the number of psychiatrists grew “from 4000 (in 
1945) to more than 40,000” once the policy ended in the mid-1990s (74). 
Just as dramatically, Ellen Herman has pointed out that between 1940 and 
1970 membership of the American Psychiatric Association rose “760 per 
cent from 2,423 to 18,407” (2-3). 
10 
 
While on the surface this enormous increase in psychiatric personnel 
might appear to be a progressive shift towards better care for those 
diagnosed as mentally ill, a counter-narrative arose that challenged the 
scientifically objective and morally neutral appearance of psychiatric 
medicine, both with regards to diagnosis and treatment. These individuals, 
who, however disparately, rejected psychiatry’s therapeutic function as well 
as its position as a medical science and suggested instead that psychiatric 
authority was primarily a tool for the quashing of troublemakers (political or 
otherwise) and the socially maladjusted. These criticisms rose to a 
crescendo during the 1960s and 1970s, and included the voices of 
psychiatrists, sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural figures including 
authors and filmmakers, amongst others.  
Personal autonomy versus social conformity was a fundamental issue 
to the majority of these psychiatric sceptics, many of whom were either 
psychiatrists themselves or had spent time either being treated or conducting 
research in psychiatric facilities. To some, including Beat writer Seymour 
Krim, the danger of psychiatric authority to individual freedom was so 
immediate that he considered it the duty of all 
independent thinker[s] and artist[s]….to be resolute 
towards a subtle, socially powerful god-father who often 
drips paternalism: namely, the newly-enthroned 
psychiatric minority that has elevated itself to a 
dangerous position of ‘authority’ in crucial issues of 
mind, personality and sanity (65). 
I argue that this call to action is reflected in both the non-fiction works and 
the novels to be discussed in this thesis. The issues of particular concern to 
these writers, including those to be discussed in this thesis, were largely 
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threefold. Of primary importance across the board, as mentioned, was the 
tension between individuality and forced conformity at the heart of psychiatric 
interventions. Relatedly, concerns were raised about the reduced potential 
for individual protest under a psychiatric system that, some have argued, 
delegitimizes the concerns of those who cause socio-political disharmony. 
Another major concern was the perceived brutality, and ineffectuality, of 
many biological treatments including shock therapies, lobotomy, and early 
psychopharmaceuticals that, whether intentionally or not, reduced patients’ 
potential for autonomous self-governance and occasionally inflicted grievous 
harm (or even death). Each of these writers, with the exception of Joanne 
Greenberg and Fromm-Reichmann in Chapter Four, suggest that either 
mental illnesses (schizophrenia in particular) do not exist, or represent not 
sickness but protest against the cultural zeitgeist of the mid-twentieth 
century.  
These anxieties were not limited to the American context but were 
reflected in literary works across the world. Two international examples of 
anti-psychiatric fiction from the time include New Zealand author Janet 
Frame’s Faces in the Water, and British writer Jennifer Dawson’s The Ha-ha, 
both published in 1961.1 Despite their disparate geographical origins, these 
novels share a common concern with their authors’ respective personal 
experiences as psychiatric patients, including their depictions of electroshock 
                                                          
1 Interestingly this, according to Connie Ann Kirk, was the one of the last 
books Sylvia Plath read before her death in 1963. Kirk writes that Plath had 
asked a friend, Jill Becker, to retrieve The Ha-ha from her house at Fitzroy 
Road, London, for her to read while a guest in Becker’s home, immediately 
prior to her suicide (101). 
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therapy and its damaging side effects (including disorientation and amnesia), 
the ever-present threat of lobotomy, and rejections of the asylum as a 
therapeutic and rehabilitative setting. American novels too began to pose an 
analogously vocal counter-narrative to the characteristically teleological story 
of Western medical progress. Each of these narratives, including Richard 
Yates’s Revolutionary Road (1961), Ken Kesey’s One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (1962), Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar (1963), and Joanne 
Greenberg’s I Never Promised You a Rose Garden (1964), offered an 
unfettered view from a variety of perspectives of the American psychiatric 
crisis in the post-war years when diagnoses of mental illness were becoming 
increasingly common and effective treatments were severely lacking.  
Each of the novels to be discussed, in their own distinctive way, reject 
(or at the very least destabilize) the efficacy and legitimacy of psychiatric 
diagnoses and treatments. These actions, taken against the offending 
individual, can, for the most part, be understood as punitive rather than 
curative. Novels by Yates, Kesey, and Plath in particular interpret diagnosis, 
involuntary hospitalization, shock therapies, and psychosurgery as 
punishments for socially inappropriate behaviours (occasionally involving the 
refusal of gender roles) that masquerade as therapy. In addition, each of 
these texts demonstrates the socio-political influence held by the psychiatric 
profession and exposes the falsity of the culturally neutral position 
engendered by psychiatry’s inclusion within the medical profession. 
Although Greenberg’s narrative is very much part of this counter-
narrative, the singularity of the novel’s position within this debate should be 
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acknowledged: while Greenberg’s narrative rejects what she terms 
“mechanical psychiatry” – referring to shock treatments, psychotropic drugs, 
and psychosurgery– I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, unlike the 
others, does not reject the asylum as a place of authentic rehabilitation 
(Greenberg 220). Instead, Greenberg’s novel suggests that, if administered 
with respect for patient autonomy, and without shock therapies, the mental 
hospital can be a site of personal development, and, in tandem with intensive 
but respectful psychotherapy, of lifelong relief from emotional distress. It 
should also however be acknowledged that the facility Greenberg based her 
fictional asylum on was the elite psychoanalytic hospital, Chestnut Lodge, 
which offered a profoundly different experience to more orthodox mental 
hospitals where understaffing and underfunding were almost universal. Her 
more positive attitude towards the mental facility is therefore necessarily 
coloured by the privileged nature of care she herself received.  
Greenberg’s textual complexities notwithstanding, this thesis will 
examine literature’s position within what John Ehrenreich called the “cultural 
critique of modern medicine” in the 1960s (15). I will demonstrate how 
American authors participated in the wider counter-narrative of skepticism 
against biomedical psychiatry by directly challenging the culturally neutral, 
teleological, and benevolent status of psychiatry as a modern medical 
science (15). It should be acknowledged here that literature’s involvement in 
these debates has already been recognized by figures like historian of 
psychiatry Edward Shorter. In A History of Psychiatry, Shorter has claimed 
that though texts by those labelled “anti-psychiatrists”, including Michel 
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Foucault, Thomas Szasz, and Erving Goffman, were “influential among 
university elites” in fanning ire against the “whole psychiatric enterprise”, it 
was instead novels that “did most to inflame the public imagination against 
psychiatry” (especially One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest) (1997, 275). This 
thesis seeks to move beyond a simple acknowledgement of literature’s 
involvement in the anti-psychiatric counter-narrative of the 1960s, and 
instead examines each novel alongside the theories of psychiatrists at the 
forefront of the counter-cultural movement to explore the interdisciplinary 
dialogues developing at this time. This approach also reveals the extent to 
which novelists anticipated arguments anti-psychiatrists and other 
commentators would make throughout the 1960s and beyond.  
By reading the novels through this narrow theoretical paradigm, the 
highly political undercurrents of each fictional text are brought into the 
foreground and made apparent. This illuminates each authors’ skepticism 
surrounding psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, as well as emphasizing the 
impact of the social context upon the individual’s state of mind, contradicting 
or destabilizing biomedical psychiatry’s consistent prioritization of organic 
etiology (especially in cases of schizophrenia). These pairings between 
those labelled “anti-psychiatrists”, a term I will define in detail later, and the 
authors to be discussed are particularly interesting because each of these 
writers had first-hand experience of mental illness, whether as sufferer or as 
psychiatric staff, highlighting shared experiences of psychiatry from two very 
different perspectives. For instance, Yates suffered from psychiatric 
problems throughout his life and was hospitalized on several occasions, 
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while Plath and Greenberg both spent time in various institutions during their 
teenage years. Kesey had a slightly different perspective, derived from his 
time spent working as an aide in a psychiatric ward at Menlo Park VA 
hospital. It was during this spell that Kesey began to formulate working on 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, and where he concluded that, as he told 
Terry Gross, other than the colour of his uniform, “there wasn’t that much 
difference between me and those people they were locking up” (114).  
These first-hand experiences influence the fictional texts and 
demonstrate an uneasiness towards psychiatric treatments that mirrors the 
reported experiences of the so-called anti-psychiatrists themselves. For 
instance, in 1985 R. D. Laing recalled his growing discomfort as a young 
psychiatrist with treatment methods in psychiatric facilities. He wrote that  
I administered locked wards and ordered drugs, 
injections, padded cells and straitjackets, electric 
shocks, deep insulin comas and the rest. I was uneasy 
about lobotomies but unsure why (x).  
More disturbing for Laing however, was the fact that “[i]t looked the same as 
the rest of medicine, but it was different. I was puzzled and uneasy. Hardly 
any of my colleagues seemed puzzled and uneasy” (x).  
Continuing this theme, albeit more emphatically, David Cooper, wrote 
in 1974 of his distress during staff meetings at the psychiatric institution 
where he worked in the 1960s. Cooper claimed that he often 
experienced a total sense of unreality about what those 
well-trained-to-heel curators or cremators of the soul 
talked about and believed they were doing – not out of 
any sort of malevolence…but out of sheer mind-
blinded, honest-to-goodness professionalism (58). 
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 These colleagues, or “cremators of the soul” (a characteristically extreme 
turn of phrase for Cooper), were according to him, unable to think 
independently within their roles as psychiatrists and mental health workers.  
Chained to conformity, Cooper argues these colleagues were  
lost in the terror of seeing themselves alone in the 
world as autonomous human beings without the totally 
abstract institutional backbone that sustained their 
personal flaccidity (1974, 58).  
Cooper sympathized with the plight of patients treated by those who were 
unable to understand delusions and hallucinations as anything other than 
psychiatric symptoms to be treated, not explored. Indeed, Cooper suggested 
that the mad, contained in asylums and institutions, were simply more open-
minded than their conformist, ‘sane’ doctors and peers. This is a situation, as 
I will demonstrate, that is replicated in chapter one in the relationship 
between John Givings and the suburbanites of Revolutionary Road. Both 
Laing and Cooper here experience psychiatry as dehumanizing, and as 
Laing points out, different from other forms of medicine that focus on the 
body rather than the mind.  
These experiences are fascinating since they suggest that psychiatry 
is somehow separate from what we might understand as somatic medicine, 
but also because these individuals (Laing and Cooper) propose a connection 
between mental health care and enforced behavioural conformity. Each of 
the authors that I discuss touch upon these issues and these connections 
are doubly fascinating in certain cases where direct associations between 
the practitioner and the author exist. These include the famous therapeutic 
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relationship between Joanne Greenberg and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and 
correspondence between Ken Kesey and Thomas Szasz. These pairings 
demonstrate a verifiable connection that reinforces my argument that 
novelists, as well as “anti-psychiatrists”, occupied a central position in the 
postwar American counter-culture.  
In addition to these connections, each of the novels to be analyzed 
have been carefully selected on the basis of several practical criteria 
including the close timing of their publications, their shared American origins, 
and most importantly, their direct engagement with, and support of, the 
burgeoning cultural and political critique of psychiatry emerging in various 
fields simultaneously at the beginning of the decade. What is particularly 
compelling about these texts in combination, however, is the variety of 
standpoints and points of consideration they offer to the reader, broadening 
one’s understanding of these complex and highly political issues 
underpinning these diagnoses, and offering a blistering indictment of mid 
twentieth century psychiatric practice. For instance, Revolutionary Road 
offers a view of the psychiatric patient from the perspective of community 
members, family, and other onlookers, as well as from the “mentally ill” 
individual – John Givings.  
Thesis Structure: Chapter Overview 
In Chapter One I consider how the comprehensive nature of Yates’s 
overview of the suburban community, as well as the sophisticated use of free 
indirect discourse, allows the reader a clear picture of the way the mentally ill 
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are both stigmatized and politically delegitimized through community gossip 
and hearsay. Yates’s depiction of his characters’ delight in John Givings’s 
dramatic, perhaps psychotic, outburst in his parents’ house and his resultant 
involuntary hospitalization illuminates the reassuring function that the 
categories of madness and sanity played (and possibly continue to play) in 
American society for those without a diagnosis. The narrative’s distinctive 
style, read alongside David Cooper’s controversial psychiatric theories, 
forces the reader to question the validity of the categories of ‘sane’ and 
‘insane’, as well as casting doubt upon the authority and scientific objectivity 
of those who are socially empowered to enforce these distinctions.  
The flimsiness of these arbitrary polarities - upon which biomedical 
psychiatry rests - is exposed in Yates’s text most clearly through the 
similarities between John Givings and Frank Wheeler. These men voice 
almost identical opinions on issues like corporatization and the suburban 
landscape, but it is John who is diagnosed as insane and hospitalized after 
an outburst in the family home, while Frank Wheeler, at least outwardly, 
conforms to social expectations of the young husband and father and 
therefore escapes the same fate. This supports the argument that what 
divides madness and sanity can be reduced to the control of outward 
appearances and careful awareness of conduct within the public sphere.  
Sanity and conformity are similarly connected in the case of April 
Wheeler, who is accused of being mentally ill by her husband when she 
voices her unwillingness to have another child by him. This represents, 
according to Frank, a highly “unnatural” situation, and rather than listen to 
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April’s reasons for her seemingly rational decision, he instead tries to 
persuade her to see a psychiatrist. Frank’s actions confirm Nicholas Rose’s 
argument that, “the therapeutic worldview…invit[es] people to believe their 
problems lie in themselves, not in the world, and encouraging them to adjust 
their attitudes rather than fight against injustice” (11). April’s unorthodox 
rejection of motherhood directly contradicts the mid-century image of woman, 
particularly suburban woman, as a wife and mother; a potentially dangerous 
subversion of conservative gender norms. Frank’s knee-jerk response – that 
she is mad – aligns with Timothy Aubry’s and Trysh Travis’s statement that 
“any individual who violates social norms… will invariably be encouraged to 
see a mental health [professional]” (1).  In telling her, albeit indirectly, that 
she is mentally defective, Frank seeks to delegitimize April’s ability to protest 
against those norms and to escape the claustrophobic family unit.  
My reading of Yates’s narrative combined with the so-called anti-
psychiatric theories of David Cooper is highly original and has, to my 
knowledge, not been attempted before. Through this reading, I seek to 
combine an awareness of the anxieties of the socio-political climate of the 
mid-century, predominantly the dangers of conformity, corporatization, and 
weak masculinity upon the American psyche, with a specific interest in 
psychiatry’s powerful position within that control nexus. Cooper’s theories 
open up these areas of discussion, and also engage with anxieties around 
the nuclear family unit that are reflected in Yates’s novel, as well as the other 
texts I will be discussing in this thesis. Other figures of interest in this chapter 
include William H Whyte, Erich Fromm, C Wright Mills, and Michel Foucault, 
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whose discussion of Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon in Discipline and Punish 
(1975) is utilized to reimagine the suburban community as a panopticon-like 
social structure. I argue that the ubiquitous picture window of the suburban 
home creates a stage-like setting within the home that breaks down the 
public/private divide, forcing residents to internalize social codes of conduct 
in order to police their own behaviour. Those who fail, I argue in tandem with 
Cooper, are diagnosed as mad or otherwise ostracized from the 
manufactured idyll of the community.  
In Chapter Two, I show how One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest Kesey 
by-passes the community perspective and takes the reader directly into the 
asylum. It focuses less on the public perception of those diagnosed as 
mentally ill (although this is still important), and more on the impact of 
institutionalization upon patient identities, the barbarity of treatment 
methodologies utilized, and insidious power-play concealed in the application 
of the supposedly benevolent therapeutic community. Like both Yates’s and 
Plath’s novels, Kesey’s narrative is hugely concerned with the impact of 
social conformity on the individual, and the punitive nature of therapeutic 
treatments like shock therapies and psychosurgery, both of which function as 
methods of establishing and reaffirming control over patient behaviour. To 
this end, I demonstrate the connection, along with Ann Charter, between 
Kesey and the Beat writers of the 1950s, whose work can be, according to 
Seymour Krim, characterized as “protest writing” and whose works, such as 
Allen Ginsberg’s Howl (1956), often referenced psychiatric treatments as 
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cruel punishments for those who could be characterized as free thinkers 
(10). 
I read One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest through a Szaszian 
framework (although Goffman is also considered given the institutional 
setting), since there is a great deal of agreement between the ideologies 
inherent in the novel and in Szasz’s work. As mentioned, this pairing is even 
more appropriate since archived correspondence exists between the two 
men, written around the time One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest was first 
published. This demonstrates an awareness and even a relationship 
between Szasz and Kesey, which, when taken together, allows a deeper 
understanding of Kesey’s classic text. Given the political emphasis on 
nationality and masculinity in the novel, I have also included a consideration 
of the importance of Emersonian individualism to characters like McMurphy, 
to demonstrate the increasing tension at the mid-century between an 
increasingly conformist culture and the resultant challenge to the integrity of 
historic American individualism. Like Andrew Foley, I read Kesey’s choice of 
setting in a psychiatric ward as highly allegorical, where psychiatric 
diagnosis, treatment, and hospitalization functions as a political synecdoche 
that reflects the turn towards collectivism in the postwar years and forces 
reader to consider the impact of this shift on American identity.  
In Sylvia Plath’s The Bell Jar, considered in Chapter Three, several of 
these themes again come to the fore but again from different perspectives. I 
argue here that Esther Greenwood, Plath’s protagonist, understands her 
early exposure to psychiatry and shock therapy as both attempt at forced 
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readjustment (in her case to the conservative gender norms of the mid-
1950s) and as punishment for her failure to meet standards of feminine 
acceptability. I argue, alongside Tim Kendall, that Esther’s purported ‘cure’ 
by the novel’s end is also questionable, lacking credibility as anything other 
than a superficial compliance adopted to secure release from the institution.  
Plath’s novel is particularly interesting in the context of this thesis as it 
follows Esther as her psychological schism gradually develops, allowing the 
reader to make sense of her radical self-segregation from external reality, 
and her steady retreat into fantasy. Expanding upon research by Marjorie 
Perloff and David Holbrook, I read this novel in dialogue with R. D. Laing’s 
The Divided Self (1960) and this explanatory aspect of Plath’s work 
comfortably aligns itself with Laing’s explicit aim made clear in The Divided 
Self’s opening pages. The “basic purpose” of the text, as Laing saw it, was 
“to make madness and the process of going mad, comprehensible” (9). This 
is one of the singular benefits of the first-person perspective utilized by Plath: 
the reader tracks Esther’s interior splintering step-by-step, removing the 
frightening mystery surrounding mental illness that disturbs and 
simultaneously reassures the community onlookers of Yates’s Revolutionary 
Road through the false dichotomy perpetuated by categories of madness 
and sanity.  
This narrative style allows privileged access into the mind of the 
sufferer, which, although offering a helpful glimpse into the schizoid mind 
(the “divided self” to which Laing refers), also demonstrates the complex, 
multifaceted nature of the individual and his or her relationship to the outside 
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world and therefore complicates any straightforward interpretation of the text. 
For instance, I argue that Esther’s breakdown is a result of her railing against 
the tight confines of social expectations of the female gender, and that 
women of the mid-century, because of these roles, are necessarily co-opted 
into the adoption of a Laingian false-self system on a social scale to survive. 
It could be expected then that Plath’s novel consistently adheres to a feminist 
politics, anticipating the ideology of the women’s liberation movement to 
come later in the same decade, but careful reading demonstrates this not to 
be the case. Instead, I argue that the nuances in Plath’s narrative allow a 
complex dialogue to develop between a burgeoning feminist movement (kick 
started in the United States by the simultaneous publication of Betty 
Friedan’s Feminine Mystique in 1963) and the powerful urge that co-exists 
within Esther to conform to the mid-century feminine ideal.   
Ambiguity is a constant state in Plath’s narrative, both with regards to 
feminism and the efficacy and social function of psychiatry. This feminist 
ambiguity anticipates the later ambivalence similarly shown to the female 
cause by R. D. Laing and his colleagues, who, as Juliet Mitchell has argued, 
despite identifying the family as “the particular social institution that induces 
psychosis”, neglected to take this position any further and to identify the 
female role in patriarchal society as intimately connected to the mental 
anguish of women trapped within these roles as housewives, mothers, and 
daughters (xviii). Laing’s depiction of schizophrenic experience, as explained 
in The Divided Self, is necessarily dichotomous: he writes that,  
The term schizoid refers to an individual the totality of 
whose experience is split in two main ways: in the first 
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place, there is a rent in his relation with his world, and 
in the second, there is a disruption of his relations with 
himself. Such a person is not able to experience 
himself ‘together with’ others or ‘at home’ in the world, 
but, on the contrary, he experiences himself in 
despairing aloneness and isolation; moreover, he does 
not experience himself as a complete person but rather 
as a ‘split’ (1976, 17). 
The “split” Laing describes is the rent between the “false self” which “arises 
in compliance with the intensions or expectations of the other” (real or 
anticipated), and the inner self which becomes increasingly alienated. This 
situation, I argue, represents accurately what Esther refers to as the bell jar 
descending around her – an invisible separation between herself and the 
world. However, Laing’s description of the rent in the schizoid self is, I will 
argue, strikingly similar to the situation of women trapped within the confines 
of their gendered roles, and I will demonstrate this through close examination 
of Plath’s female characters and through comparison with Friedan’s The 
Feminine Mystique.  
Though my pairing of The Bell Jar and Laing’s The Divided Self might 
appear to corroborate Maria Farland’s view that Plath’s novel “echoes the 
anti-authoritarian rhetoric of the anti-psychiatry movement”, as well as 
offering a “trenchant social critique of psychiatric institutions”, this would be 
an oversimplification (245). While Plath’s narrative does indeed share a 
common perception of schizophrenic experience, as well as a shared 
understanding of the social etiology of the disorder, with R. D. Laing as 
depicted in The Divided Self, the novel ultimately remains too ambiguous 
towards the possibility of treatment within the asylum and through shock 
therapies to be understood as unflinchingly anti-psychiatric. In this chapter I 
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argue instead that Plath’s narrative offers a multi-faceted exploration of these 
issues from an often-detached perspective, allowing readers to come to their 
own conclusions regarding the credibility of Esther’s purported recovery. It is 
for this reason that I assert these novels collectively offer a cultural counter-
narrative to medical psychiatry, rather than, as Farland argues, locating them 
firmly within the often poorly-defined anti-psychiatry movement. Although this 
designation could comfortably be applied to both Yates and Kesey’s 
narratives, Plath’s and Greenberg’s occupy slightly more complicated 
positions on the anti-psychiatry spectrum and therefore require a more 
nuanced consideration, meaning the position of a counter-narrative is more 
applicable.  
In my final chapter I discuss Joanne Greenberg’s 1964 novel, I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden, another narrative that takes the reader inside 
the asylum. Like the three other narratives already discussed here, 
Greenberg’s novel incorporates some of the author’s personal experiences 
of mental breakdown and treatment into her text. Unlike the rest, however, 
Greenberg’s novel seeks to emphasize the rehabilitative potential of the 
mental hospital, and the importance of the therapeutic relationship between 
patient and psychiatrist. This might initially suggest that Greenberg’s novel 
represents a strange choice of text for this project, since at first glance these 
objectives appear in stark contrast to those of the novels mentioned above, 
and of anti-psychiatry more generally. Regardless, I Never Promised You A 
Rose Garden has been labelled “a thorn in psychiatry’s side” by Gail 
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Hornstein, as well as being the target of much ire from the psychiatric 
community in various articles in the years since its publication (382). 
This psychiatric criticism has been mainly targeted at Greenberg’s 
(and her fictional counterpart, Deborah Blau’s) reported diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, and her portrayal of successful treatment through 
collaborative psychotherapy that, as the name suggests, encourages equal 
participation and consent between doctor and patient, and is performed 
without the use of drugs, shock therapy or lobotomy. To illustrate this, I 
discuss responses to Greenberg’s novel by those like Remi Cadoret and 
Carol North, who reject Deborah Blau’s diagnosis and successful treatment 
through psychotherapy.   
Greenberg was treated by Dr Frieda Fromm-Reichmann at an 
exclusive psychoanalytic facility that shunned these forms of treatment, 
understanding them as detrimental to the patient’s ability to gain therapeutic 
insight (and therefore to recover), which placed Fromm-Reichmann and the 
staff of Chestnut Lodge in opposition to medical trends in psychiatry at the 
time (including the development of anti-psychotic drug chlorpromazine in 
1950, during the period Greenberg was receiving treatment at the Lodge). I 
argue in this chapter that given Greenberg’s rejection of biological treatment 
methodologies, and her emphasis on the place of interpersonal relationships 
in the development and treatment of psychoses, I Never Promised You a 
Rose Garden is a fundamental part of the counter-narrative that sought to 
destabilize comprehension of mental illnesses as biological in etiology and of 
shock therapies and psychosurgery as legitimate forms of treatment.  
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Anti-Psychiatry as an “onerous label”: Figures and Terminology 2  
Whilst I have used the term “anti-psychiatry” in reference to this 
skeptical 1960s counter-narrative throughout this introduction and this thesis 
more generally, the problematic nature of this label must be addressed.  
Characterizing anti-psychiatry as a cohesive campaign is almost impossible 
given the variant objectives, positions, and geographical origins of its central 
players. For this reason, Martin Halliwell has described it as a “transnational 
trend” rather than a movement as such (267). Defining the anti-psychiatric 
label is highly contentious and, with the notable exception of David Cooper’s 
attempts at classification in 1974, a satisfactory framework remains elusive. 
For example, in 1994 Norman Dain defined anti-psychiatry as  
[a] set of attitudes, opinions, and activities antagonistic 
to psychiatry, ranging from sharp, serious criticism of 
psychiatry to absolute denial of its validity and 
questioning the concept of mental disorder as a 
medical entity (415).  
Dain’s definition demonstrates the myriad perspectives that the anti-
psychiatry label struggles to contain, so much so that the term becomes 
almost meaningless in the encapsulation process. This nebulous and vague 
definition has often played into the hands of those who criticize the anti-
psychiatrists: for instance, Duncan B. Double has pointed out that the term 
“anti-psychiatry” represents a “general label that has tended to be used by 
the psychiatric mainstream to identify its opposition”, instead of the other way 
around (5).  
                                                          
2 (Cooper 1974, 54).  
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Thomas Szasz, often labelled an anti-psychiatrist himself, supports 
this argument and has written scathingly against the movement, referring to it 
in the title of his 2009 book as “quackery squared”. In this text, Szasz pointed 
out that the term was originally coined in 1908 by German psychiatrist 
Bernhard Beyer, who utilized the label to “stigmatize psychiatric criticism”, 
before the term died away after the First World War (emphasis mine, 4). The 
very roots of the term therefore held negative connotations that it could be 
argued precluded and automatically derailed serious efforts to construct a 
more holistic, humane psychiatry from the beginning. Aaron Esterson, co-
author with R. D. Laing of Sanity, Madness, and the Family wrote in 1976 
that “[t]he damage [anti-psychiatry as a label] has done to the struggle 
against coercive, traditional psychiatry is enormous” (70). Likewise, for 
Szasz, the term represented a “catchall” used to “delegitimize and dismiss” 
critics of what he termed “psychiatric fraud and force” (i.e. diagnosis and 
involuntary treatment) that proved highly detrimental to reception of his work 
(2008, 79). 
The most profound difficulty with the term stems from it being an 
oversimplified taxonomy that artificially groups together various critics of 
psychiatry who each approach the discipline from disparate and sometimes 
completely irreconcilable social or political positions. As Peter Sedgwick has 
pointed out, “it is quite erroneous to speak… of a ‘school of thought’ including 
Szasz, Goffman, Bateson, Cooper, and Laing”, figures often referred to as at 
the vanguard of the 1960s anti-psychiatry movement (22). Instead, Sedgwick 
argues that anti-psychiatry represents “a consistent and convergent 
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tendency of opposition directed against positivist method in the study of 
abnormal human behaviour” (emphasis original, 22). This positivism can be 
defined here as  
an approach towards the investigation of human 
pathology which, modelling itself upon antecedents it 
believes to be characteristic of the natural sciences, (a) 
postulates a radical separation between ‘facts’ and 
‘values’… and (b) suppresses the interactive 
relationship between the investigator and the ‘facts’ on 
which she or he works (Sedgwick 23).  
This positivist approach in psychiatry is precisely what this thesis refers to as 
“biomedical” psychiatry: the belief that mental illnesses can be understood 
and defined objectively and treated in the same way as conditions with an 
organic root: i.e. cancers caused by malfunctioning liver cells or brain cells. 
These psychiatrists, commonly referred to as anti-psychiatrists, demanded 
that the wider social (and familial) context of patients be taken into 
consideration, either as direct causes of mental disorders or as exacerbators 
of existing psychopathologies. They pointed out the social and cultural 
assumptions implicit in categories of normality and insanity, and, in the case 
of Szasz, even shockingly suggested that some individuals might 
consciously seek to be diagnosed with a mental illness in order to escape the 
responsibilities of life outside the asylum.  
The unfortunate anti-psychiatry epithet was resurrected in 1967 with 
the publication of David Cooper’s Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, although, 
as Cooper later admitted in The Grammar of Living (1974), his 1967 text 
neglected to explicitly outline a definition of the term anti-psychiatry, relying 
on examples to set out his position instead. Nevertheless, Cooper’s attitudes 
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towards psychiatry, involuntary hospitalization, and the legitimacy of the 
medical framework were made clear through his highly accusatory language. 
For instance, in the opening paragraphs of Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry, 
Cooper refers to those discharged from asylums as “institutional survivor[s]”, 
and admits that, as a hospital psychiatrist, he experienced a discomforting 
awareness that he was expected “to be numbed or engulfed by the 
institutionalizing processes of formal training and day-by-day indoctrination” 
(9). This troubling consciousness led Cooper to what he describes as a 
“germinal anti-psychiatry”, through which the very basis of psychiatric 
diagnosis and treatment would be examined and reassessed, and where the 
necessity of understanding the “actual human context” of the patient would 
be central (9). 
 In The Grammar of Living however, Cooper was even more acerbic in 
his criticism of biomedical psychiatry, connecting it directly with political 
repression: mental health care (in America and Russia in particular) was, 
Cooper asserted, “part of a policing operation by the state to suppress 
difference, originality, vision and to deny the… refusal of certain people to be 
made less than human in any way” (55). This charge rejected any illusion of 
benevolence in psychiatric care, depicting it instead as a both willing and 
knowing opponent of individual autonomy. While Cooper was the one to 
revive the anti-psychiatry label, a number of individuals came to be 
associated with the term, despite the great disparities in their respective 
positions and beliefs. Before beginning a discussion of the relationships 
between the fictional texts and each psychiatrist, it would be pertinent to 
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underscore the main theoretical points raised by each physician, thereby 
underscoring both the differences between them and any existent 
commonalities that can be teased from them.  
Hungarian-American psychiatrist Thomas Szasz was, throughout his 
life, a highly vocal opponent of biomedical psychiatry, meaning the 
psychiatric approach grounded in a belief that psychiatric disorders are 
organic in etiology and therefore treatable with drugs and other physiological 
methods like ECT. Szasz’s political beliefs were a fundamental part of his 
approach to psychiatric care, since, as a libertarian, the right to autonomous 
selfhood was at the pinnacle of his concerns. His book, The Myth of Mental 
Illness, was first published in 1961, and in it Szasz rejected the very 
foundations upon which psychiatry was built: namely, the existence of mental 
illnesses as medical disorders, and the ability to effect recovery from 
psychiatric illnesses through medical intervention. While Szasz’s 1961 
publication was not the first to challenge the legitimacy of psychiatry’s 
powerful position, The Myth of Mental Illness illicited a strong negative 
reaction from the mental health professions. Most scathing was the thinly- 
veiled criticism of Szasz’s position by the editor of Psychiatric Quarterly, who, 
in 1962, described him vitriolically as “a brassy leader of the flock who turns 
on his colleagues and students, hissing his intent for extermination” and 
lumped him in with the “extremely ignorant” who rejected medical supremacy 
with regards to the identification and treatment of psychiatric disorders (754).  
Unsurprisingly, what these establishment figures were protesting in 
The Myth of Mental Illness was Szasz’s wholesale repudiation of not just the 
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medical model of mental illness, where psychopathologies are considered 
organic in etiology. This is the therapeutic position that understands 
conditions like depression, schizophrenia, and hysteria to be analogous to 
somatic diseases like cancers, smallpox or any other bodily complaint rooted 
in a physiological pathology. Szasz suggests not only that mental illnesses 
cannot be classified in the same way as physical disorders, but that 
psychiatric illnesses simply do not exist. Szasz, therefore, posits that the 
term “mental illness” is fundamentally misleading, since it linguistically 
connects and reinforces the link between problematic persons and the 
medical profession: the term “mental illness” should, in fact, be considered 
as nothing more than a figure of speech, functioning as both “myth” and 
“metaphor” (1975, 11-12). 
Mental illnesses, in Szaszian terms, should more appropriately be 
understood as either “problems in living” or “moral and personal conflicts”, 
that often derive from difficult interpersonal situations where individuals might 
wish to have a troublesome family member or associate removed from the 
public sphere, or where an individual might seek psychiatric diagnosis in 
order to escape an uncomfortable situation (43 - 44).3 In these cases, 
                                                          
3 Szasz places the blame for this appropriation of so-called problems in living 
into the medical domain at the feet of neurologist Charcot and his 
colleagues, following their interest in hysteria at the Salpêtrière hospital in 
Paris in the late nineteenth-century. According to Szasz, “Charcot, Kraepelin, 
Breuer, Freud and many others lent their authority to the propagation of this 
socially self-enhancing image of what was then ‘hysteria’, and what in our 
day has become the problem of ‘mental illness’” (1975, 43). Szasz believes 
that Charcot’s depiction of hysteria as an illness, rather than as a form of 
malingering, helped individuals in emotional conflict “to be sick”, therefore 
“bestow[ing] on [them] the dignity of suffering from a ‘real illness’”, which 
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underpinning psychiatric diagnoses are what Szasz terms promotive 
assertions that, when broken down, reveal the real (often social or political) 
impetus behind the medical opinion. For instance, Szasz writes that although 
“the statement ‘John Doe is psychotic’ is ostensibly indicative and 
informative”, it can be “translated… as follows: Mrs John Doe does not like 
the way her husband is acting. Dr James Smith believes that men 
preoccupied by jealousy are ‘crazy’ and potentially dangerous”. Therefore, 
because of these conflated positions, Szasz reasons that both 
Mrs Doe and Dr Smith want Mr Doe to be confined in a 
hospital. Clearly, however, the indicative sentences do 
not have nearly the same promotive impact as does 
the… assertion that ‘John Doe is psychotic’ (1975, 
126). 
Whilst this example is unequivocally overly simplistic, and even absurd, it 
succinctly demonstrates Szasz’s position that diagnoses of mental illness are 
not objective, medical facts, but are instead subjective social judgements 
made upon patients and patient conduct by others, including family 
members, and medical practitioners licensed to do so because of their 
elevated social status.  
Szasz understands psychiatry as a “pseudo-medical enterprise” then, 
a position that automatically rejects the possibility of successful treatment 
within a medicalized framework through hospitalization or otherwise, since 
he argues that “if there is no disease, there is nothing to treat” (1976, 4). 
Throughout his long career and prolific list of publications, Szasz consistently 
maintained his hyperbolic position that the involuntary commitment, also 
                                                                                                                                                                    
confers both social advantages and disadvantages (predominantly 
stigmatization) (1975, 43).  
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termed “psychiatric incarceration” (1976, 3), and treatment of patients in 
mental institutions against their will represented nothing more than “torture” 
(1975, 12) and a “crime against humanity” in the same league as slavery 
(1975, 113).  
The Myth of Mental Illness was not the first place Szasz had made 
such pronouncements however: in a 1957 paper on the ethics of involuntary 
commitment, Szasz discussed this comparison in more detail. In analyzing 
language used in a 1955 psychiatric textbook, Szasz sought to demonstrate 
the analogous nature of the present moment for African-Americans and the 
mentally ill. He wrote that 
Even today, by substituting Negroes for the mentally ill 
and segregated social situations for mental hospitals, 
the text becomes indistinguishable from a southern 
white-supremacy manifesto (1957, 294). 
While the treatment of mental patients in state asylums was often 
horrendous at this time as Shame of the States and other journalistic 
exposés like “Bedlam 1946” demonstrate, this statement is both bizarre and 
absurd, but not unlike claims made by others included under the anti-
psychiatry umbrella. In 1967, for example, Cooper likened the gassing of 
Jews and other undesirables under Nazi rule to the “tens of thousands of 
mental patients” exposed to violent treatments like ECT and lobotomy in 
psychiatric institutions (29). These comparisons for some, including Adrian 
35 
 
Chapman, weaken anti-psychiatry’s position by illuminating the preposterous 
and unflinchingly ideological nature of their foundations.4  
Another related common claim by Szasz was that involuntary 
hospitalization of mental patients represented nothing less than a violation of 
the American constitution. In a 1983 discussion of on the topic of autonomy, 
Szasz wrote 
alleged mental illness… cannot be the ground…for 
depriving a person of liberty, even if the incarceration is 
called hospitalization, and even if the intervention is 
called treatment. I contend that such use of state 
power… is contrary to the… ideals enshrined in the…. 
Constitution (emphasis original 1983, 26). 
Hospitalization, in this view, represents an underhand way for the state to 
segregate troublesome individuals from wider society. To this end, Szasz 
writes that patients are “segregated not so much because they were ill as 
because they disturbed others”, and, one could argue, this disturbance could 
be social or political: one risked incarceration within the asylum if one broke 
social rules of acceptability (1975, 37). This is a point similarly identified by 
Michel Foucault, who wrote in Madness and Civilization (1964) that, 
historically, asylums performed an important civil role, offering “reabsorption 
of the idle and social protection against agitation and uprisings” (51). These 
statements demonstrate the social value of the institution in preserving wider 
                                                          
4 Chapman wrote of Cooper that his writing often “lack[ed] nuance… and 
tend[s] towards sloganeering” (2). Hugh Freeman’s 1967 review of 
Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry in New Society made a similar point, stating 
that Cooper’s statements were so extreme that “we must begin to wonder 
whether he is even being serious” (326). These propensities towards 
exaggeration delegitimized the general argument against psychiatric 
coercion and ultimately thwarted sensible consideration of the more rational 
complaints against biomedical psychiatry at the time.  
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harmony by subduing troublesome individuals and agree with David 
Cooper’s assertion that the goal of psychiatry (institutional psychiatry in 
particular) is a “workable conformism” (2001, ix).  
The linkage of conformity, the acknowledgement of medical power as 
socio-political, and the institution as a centre for readjustment/ the erosion of 
patient autonomy was further compounded in the same year (1961) by 
sociologist Erving Goffman. His book, Asylums, directly supported these 
arguments: Goffman posited, for instance, that within the “total institution” 
patients/inmates were systematically denuded of their offending outside 
identities and forced into an attitude of institutional conformity. The term “total 
institution”, which included prisons, orphanages, the armed forces, and 
asylums was defined as “a place of residence and work where a large 
number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society… together 
lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life” (1991, 11). Far from 
functioning as a place of mental rehabilitation the asylum, for Goffman, 
operated instead as a production line for social compliance. As he explained, 
the total institution’s objective was to “reset […] the inmate’s self-regulatory 
mechanisms so that after he leaves he will maintain the standards of the 
establishment of his own accord” (1991, 69). Goffman also ominously 
exclaimed that the asylum is “fateful for the inmate’s civilian self”, and that 
immediately upon initial entry into the institution, the patient’s or inmate’s 
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sense of self is fundamentally threatened by the very structure of the asylum 
itself (1991, 50).5  
In his contribution to The Dialectics of Liberation (1968), where he 
was first publicly labelled an “anti-psychiatrist” in Cooper’s introduction, R. D. 
Laing also offered a critical view of psychiatry, albeit much more emphatically 
than Goffman. In this collection, Laing refers to bio-medical psychiatry as 
“institutionalized, organized violence” (2015, 19); to treatment with shock 
therapies as “forms of destruction”; the “death of the soul”; and most 
powerfully, to psychosurgery (lobotomy) as “the final solution of cutting a 
person’s brain into two or more slices”, with deliberate connotations of the 
holocaust and state-sponsored genocide (2015, 18). Psychiatry, for Laing, is 
a “political operation”, and at the macro-level, the destruction of psychiatric 
patients’ interiority is likened to violence perpetrated by American forces on 
the people of Vietnam, who are being killed because they “have inside them 
the ‘wrong’ ideology” (i.e. communism) (2015, 19).  
Relatedly, in this piece as in previous writings, Laing questions the 
legitimacy of certain fixed ideological categories and beliefs (including sanity 
and insanity) that perpetuate the Western socio-political status quo. For 
instance, Laing writes that “People called brain surgeons have stuck knives 
into the brains of hundreds and thousands of people in the last twenty years”, 
                                                          
5 In 1956 Ivan Belknap made similar statements, when he wrote that the 
“extraordinarily rigid administrative structure” of state mental hospitals were 
found to “block communication and mobility between categories of staff 
members and communication between patients and staff”. Overall, he 
concluded, “forces within the hospital environment… tended to work against 
recovery for the patient” (8).  
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referring to the rise of lobotomy since the mid-century; those operated on, 
according to Laing, “may never have used a knife against anyone 
themselves; they may have broken a few windows, sometimes screamed, 
but they have killed fewer people than the rest of the population” (2015, 19). 
Here, Laing comes to the climax of his argument: these “people” – those 
diagnosed as mad – have murdered “many many fewer [people] if we count 
the mass-exterminations of wars, declared and undeclared, waged by the 
legalized ‘sane’ members of our society” (emphasis mine, 2015, 19). Along 
the same lines, Laing asserted that “[t]he perfectly adjusted bomber pilot may 
be a greater threat to species survival than the hospitalized schizophrenic 
deluded that the Bomb is inside him” (1977, 99).  By using the same 
hyperbolic vein as Szasz, Laing is demanding that we re-examine both the 
political structures that underpin psychiatric diagnosis and treatment and 
question the legitimacy of nationalist doctrines that skew and justify acts of 
mass violence against those construed as ‘other’ or as the ‘enemy’ for their 
difference. The “mad”, labelled through the objective purview of the medical 
profession to enforce separation from the “sane”, are in Laing’s estimation, 
far less dangerous than those in positions of social power.  
In this understanding, social compliance is essential to avoiding 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, and the fragility (and required social 
policing) of Western grand narratives is revealed. To that end, Laing claimed 
in 1964 that “I do not… believe that there is any such ‘condition’ as 
‘schizophrenia’. Yet the label is a social fact” (64). By this acknowledgement, 
Laing proffered a dramatic repudiation of medical authority in the case of 
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schizophrenia in a similar vein to Szasz’s three years earlier (although, it 
should be acknowledged, there are significant differences between each 
respective clinician’s views, which became particularly apparent as the 
1960s and 1970s progressed). Laing then took his admonition one step 
further, stating that schizophrenia, as well as being a social label, constitutes 
“a political event” to the extreme and potentially life-long detriment of the 
‘patient’ (emphasis original, 1964, 64). He argues that  
This political event [diagnosis], occurring in the civil 
order of society, imposes definitions and consequences 
on the labelled person. It is a social prescription that 
rationalizes a set of social actions whereby the labelled 
person is annexed by others, who are legally 
sanctioned, medically empowered, and morally obliged 
to become responsible for the person labelled… The 
‘committed’ person labelled as ‘schizophrenic’, is 
degraded from full existential status as human agent 
and responsible person… he is invalidated as a human 
being (1964, 64).  
By removing the process of psychiatric diagnosis from its supposedly 
objective medical framework, Laing insists upon resituating both doctor and 
patient within their cultural context, thereby directly addressing the socio-
political judgements inherent in the rituals of diagnosis. These assertions 
therefore lay bare the belief that psychiatry, in this reading, functions as an 
extension of the state, as an alternative police force that regulates social 
behaviours (and the concept of normality/social acceptability) not through 
threats of penal incarceration, but through psychiatric imprisonment, torture, 
and stigmatization.  
Not only does Laing believe that the mentally ill, as well as others 
variously labelled insane, do not represent the threat society believes them 
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to be, but he advocates in The Politics of Experience that psychiatrists can in 
fact learn from their patients’ experiences (particularly in the case of 
schizophrenics), and this is where the differences between Laing and Szasz 
become particularly clear. Although Laing rejects Harry Stack Sullivan’s 
position that “in the present state of our society, the patient is right, and [the 
psychiatrist] is wrong” as an “outrageous simplification”, he does suggest that 
“schizophrenics have more to teach psychiatrists about the inner world than 
psychiatrist their patients” (1977, 91). This position was hinted at in The 
Divided Self, when Laing suggested that the “cracked mind of the 
schizophrenic may let in light which does not enter the intact minds of many 
sane people whose minds are closed” (emphasis original, 1976, 27), but in 
this later text, Laing expands on his position. In The Politics of Experience, 
Laing agrees with Gregory Bateson’s hypothesis that some schizophrenics, 
through their psychoses, were in fact embarking on a “voyage of discovery” 
(qtd. Laing, 1977, 97) that takes the individual deep into the aforementioned 
“inner world” in order to begin a “natural healing process” (emphasis original, 
1977, 105).   
This inner world was a state of experience from which modern society 
had become alienated: as Laing points out,  
we are socially conditioned to regard total immersion in 
outer space and time as normal and healthy. Immersion 
in inner space and time tends to be regarded as anti-
social withdrawal, a deviancy, invalid, pathological 
[and]… discreditable (1977, 103).  
According to Douglas Kirsner’s reading of Laing’s mystical turn to this inner 
world, an appreciation of this “inner experience”, in conjunction with the 
41 
 
“outer”, is “essential to [a] sane, whole way of living” (77). The schizophrenic, 
according to Laing, should be encouraged to explore this transcendental 
interiority, before returning as a respected hero, akin to the “lost explorers of 
the Renaissance” (1977, 107). This could be, and has been, read as a kind 
of inversion of orthodox psychiatric ideology: one might suggest here that the 
mad achieve a heroic version of sanity on their journey through madness 
(the story of Mary Barnes, for example, is a case in point here).  
For this reason, amongst others, Szasz, in 1976 penned a blistering 
critique of Laing’s and Cooper’s anti-psychiatry. Szasz argued that Laing’s 
and Cooper’s positions are characterized by this fateful similarity to what 
they oppose. Szasz wrote that “In traditional psychiatry, 'We' are sane, and 
'They', who defy the norms and values of our society, are insane. In anti-
psychiatry, it is the other way around” (5-6). This, for Szasz, was a 
fundamental failing of anti-psychiatry: inverting the mad/sane dichotomy did 
not challenge institutional psychiatry, but simply changed the group of 
targeted individuals.  
Cooper, like Laing, focused his attention on schizophrenia, since it 
was both prevalent and chronic at the time, and he took the view that the 
condition was not organic or biological in etiology (and thereby contained 
within a faulty individual), but was instead the product of “disturbed group 
behaviour”, an idea that contained within it traces of Gregory Bateson’s 1956 
theory of the Double Bind. Cooper wrote that:  
Madness… is not in a person, but in a system of 
relationships in which the labelled patient participates: 
schizophrenia, if it means anything, is a more or less 
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characteristic mode of disturbed group behaviour 
(1970, 43).  
Under this rhetoric, those diagnosed as schizophrenic represented the 
persecuted scapegoats of a system that required the removal of those who 
refused to conform to social codes of normalcy. Cooper cites the example of 
Antonin Artaud, the French artist who wrote the polemical essay “Van Gogh: 
the man suicided by society” in 1947, in which he declared that the 
“madman” is he “whom society did not want to hear and whom it wanted to 
prevent from uttering certain intolerable truths” (485). As a result, Cooper 
ultimately summarized there “are no schizophrenics” (1970, 43).  
Madness, in Cooper’s opinion, is here aligned with the kind of 
penetrating insight that Artaud claims to glimpse in Van Gogh’s paintings. 
Artaud wrote that Van Gogh’s  
paintings were bursts of Greek fire, atom bombs, 
whose whole angle of vision… would have been 
capable of seriously upsetting the spectral conformity of 
the Second Empire Bourgeoisie… as well as those of 
Napoleon III (483-484).  
The Second Empire in French history was one characterized by censorship 
and authoritarian rule under the all-powerful Emperor; by depicting Van 
Gogh’s art in this way, Artaud is placing his work in direct opposition to the 
contemporary political and social status quo, as well as pointing out the 
essential nature of conformity to the continuation of state power (in addition 
to its flimsy constitution).  
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Cooper believed that conformity and familial relationships were at the 
root of diagnoses of schizophrenia. The family, in Cooper’s eyes, functioned 
as a micro-culture in which children were socialized to assimilate with the 
wider macro-culture, meaning society more generally. This situation meant 
that, to Cooper, schizophrenia could be understood as  
the existence of a person being sucked out of him by 
others or expressed from him by himself (in loving 
acknowledgement of the others’ rapacious ingestion) so 
that finally nothing of himself is left to himself since he 
is altogether for the other… we must conclude that, 
although being put in hospital represents a special fate, 
schizophrenia is nothing less than the predicament of 
each one of us (1970, 59-60). 
Schizophrenia, or the splitting of the ‘true’ self from the conformist outer self, 
to Cooper represents a common experience since this is how, according to 
this theory, Western societies function. One is diagnosed as schizophrenic 
however when one rejects their obligation to the collective, and instead 
seeks to act autonomously, as can be seen in my discussion of 
Revolutionary Road.  
Ultimately Cooper’s theories, although similar to Laing’s at first, 
became more and more extreme over time, until even Laing declared 
Cooper’s works and theories an “embarrassment” (Mullan 195). For 
example, as Cooper’s theories became wilder, he discussed sexual 
experiences he had with a woman, who, although not technically a patient 
(Cooper had renounced psychiatric practice by this stage), was still engaging 
in therapeutic sessions with him. This ties in with Cooper’s advocacy of 
orgasm as a form of self-liberation in The Language of Madness in 1980, as 
well as a rather extreme suggestion that “menopausal changes in women are 
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socially conditioned and should be socially-politically reversible”, since, 
Cooper asserts, it is “our human invention in terms of reproductivity of man-
power for the system of property” (1980, 68). Despite these later outlandish 
and ethically questionable stand-points, Cooper’s unerring interest in the 
wider socio-political context and its impact on the individual psyche, is what 
makes his work particularly interesting to this thesis. As Chapman 
commented,  
Cooper always insisted on the need to understand the 
symptoms of the individual not simply in terms of 
individual psychology or family dynamics, but also in 
terms of broader social, institutional and economic 
forces (2).  
My approach in Chapter One seeks to reflect this wider focus shared by both 
Cooper and Richard Yates in Revolutionary Road.  
Lastly, Fromm-Reichmann (and her fictional counterpart, Dr Clara 
Fried) have - rightly - never been included alongside those commonly 
labelled as anti-psychiatrists for several reasons. These include pragmatic 
criteria including temporality (Fromm-Reichmann died in 1957, ten years 
before David Cooper resurrected the term), alongside other theoretical 
misalignments, including Fromm-Reichmann’s belief that mental hospitals 
and hospital-based psychotherapy provided legitimate respite for those 
experiencing psychosis or other mental disorders. These positions were both 
rejected by Szasz for whom medical psychotherapy represented nothing 
more than a metaphorical treatment that, while able to provide comfort, is 
unable to affect a genuine recovery (predominantly because he also rejects 
the legitimacy of mental illness in the first place). In addition, asylums where 
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patients are held involuntarily are symptomatic of coercive psychiatry for 
Szasz, so much so that he refused to complete his psychiatric residency at 
Cook County hospital, Chicago, since he would need to work with patients 
who were, according to his superiors “seriously ill”, meaning in Szasz’s eyes, 
those “imprison[ed]” by psychiatry (2004, 21). 
 Laing and Cooper however both attempted to establish institutional 
settings more akin to Fromm-Reichmann’s form of in-patient facility at 
Chestnut Lodge, somewhere that, as Allen Beveridge points out, Laing would 
have been aware of through his familiarity with a 1954 book titled The Mental 
Hospital based on research carried out at the Lodge (206). Laing’s attempt to 
establish a more recovery-conducive setting resulted in what became known 
as the “Rumpus Room” at Gartnavel Hospital outside Glasgow in June 1954, 
designed to test whether the sparse, institutional surroundings of the closed 
ward were contributing to his patients’ anti-social behaviours. To begin the 
experiment, Laing separated out a group of female schizophrenic patients 
and selected nurses, placing them into more pleasant room away from their 
usual ward where they were free to interact with one another and occupy 
themselves in various activities like “sewing,” “knitting,” “drawing” and “wool 
making” amongst others (Beveridge 210). Nurses were asked to wear normal 
clothes, thereby encouraging communication and a more equal relationship 
between patients and staff, something also present at Chestnut Lodge. The 
experiment was initially judged a success, since, as Beveridge reports: 
After twelve months… there had been many 
improvements in the appearance and behaviour of the 
patients. They were no longer social isolates and they 
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took greater interest in themselves… the main factor in 
the improvement was not the change to a more 
pleasant environment, but that the nurses and patients 
had been able to get to know each other (219).  
This positive outcome was however tempered by Laing’s assertion that while 
“[w]ithin eighteen months all original eleven patients had left hospital…within 
a further year, they were all back” (1985, 155). Regardless of the eventual 
outcome of the venture, the fact of Laing’s belief that individuals being 
treated with dignity and a degree of self-governance are more apt to recover 
their sense of self than those held in what might be considered a traditional 
closed psychiatric ward is significant and suggests a correlation between 
Fromm-Reichmann’s therapeutic ideology and Laing’s. 
 In a similar, but more radical way, David Cooper’s Villa 21 experiment 
also sought to explore alternative treatment methodologies for schizophrenic 
patients that emphasized patient self-governance and equality within the 
ward structure, again operating under a similar ethos to that evidenced at 
Chestnut Lodge. Cooper believed that patients in “conventional psychiatric 
wards” were subjected to a “massive reinforcement of the invalidation 
process” (1970, 96) that begins with psychiatric diagnosis and gradually, in 
Cooper’s terms, eventually “murder[s]” individual personalities (1970, 109). 
To counter this effect, where patients could “take the easy exit into narrowly 
stereotyped self-definition [as schizophrenic]”, Cooper suggested the 
establishment of a unit separate from the rest of the psychiatric facility where 
younger, less thoroughly institutionalized schizophrenics could engage with 
staff and other patients more freely and with less emphasis upon staff/patient 
hierarchies than in the more traditional ward-setting (1970, 97).  
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Within Villa 21 there was a great push for ward members to reach 
decisions communally during scheduled and unscheduled meetings, and 
patients were allowed freedoms like deciding when to get up in the morning, 
without being coerced by nursing staff. For Cooper, this offered a 
“worthwhile” gain “in personal autonomy”, since his interpretation of 
schizophrenia’s causation was rooted in an inability for the individual to make 
decisions for themselves, without familial or societal coercion (1970, 102). As 
Chapman has stated, 
Cooper’s emphasis [at Villa 21] was on fostering an 
atmosphere in which people – not reduced to their roles 
as ‘patient’, ‘doctor’, ‘social worker’ and so on – 
supported one another, and where the prescription of 
drugs was kept to the minimum (4). 
 
This ethos is highly reminiscent of that followed at Chestnut Lodge, where 
patient autonomy was encouraged, and drugs rejected. Freedoms within 
Cooper’s group increased accordingly as lines between staff members and 
their various roles began to “blur” (1970, 104) and staff responsibilities were 
limited to “controlling the drug cupboard as was legally required” (1970, 105). 
Regardless of these freedoms and increasing equality amongst patients and 
staff (something that would be replicated and developed upon at Kingsley 
Hall during the Philadelphia Association’s tenure), the unit eventually fell into 
disrepute within the hospital as staff became increasingly anxious about the 
poor state of hygiene and cleanliness in the ward itself. Despite its 
disappointing results, Clancy Sigal, a volunteer at Villa 21 described it as a 
“noble failure” (Chapman, 4).  
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Each of these experiments borrowed aspects from the therapeutic 
ethos perpetuated at Chestnut Lodge by Fromm-Reichmann (albeit Villa 21 
took this permissive ideology to the extreme). This demonstrates a 
philosophical connection between Fromm-Reichmann and others classed as 
“anti-psychiatrists”, including Laing and Cooper that should be acknowledged 
to explain her inclusion in this discussion. Another parallel between Laing, 
Cooper, and Fromm-Reichmann (and her fictional alter ego Dr Fried), can be 
found in their clear belief in the functionality and intelligibility of schizophrenic 
psychoses: for Fromm-Reichmann and Laing in particular, psychosis can be 
understood as essentially functional for the sufferer. For Laing, psychosis 
represents the crumbling of the false-self system created to protect the 
vulnerable sufferer, while for Fromm-Reichmann, as will be seen in her 
therapeutic approach to Joanne Greenberg in Chapter Four, psychosis offers 
an escape from an intolerable situation for the patient. In the case of 
Deborah Blau, for example, her retreat into her fantasy kingdom, Yr, can be 
understood as an escape from an adolescence clouded by anti-Semitic 
bullying and family pressures.  
Fromm-Reichmann’s therapeutic ideology can also be related to that 
advocated by Szasz, since both she and Greenberg in I Never Promised You 
A Rose Garden consistently emphasize the importance of preserving patient 
autonomy and of collaboration between patient and psychiatrist in the 
therapeutic endeavour. While Szasz may not accept the ability of therapy to 
overcome psychosis, as Greenberg’s novel suggests is possible, he 
reinforced the importance of individual autonomy throughout his career. 
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Indeed, Szasz has commented that autonomy represents “a positive 
concept. It is freedom to develop one’s self – to increase one’s knowledge, 
improve one’s skills, and achieve responsibility for one’s conduct. And it is 
freedom to lead one’s own life” (1988, 22). I will demonstrate how 
Greenberg’s novel, and Fromm-Reichmann’s writings, both seek to pursue 
this end of self-realization through the therapeutic endeavour; a pursuit 
Szasz terms “autonomous psychotherapy”, whereby “the analyst must 
support the patient’s aspirations toward freedom from coercive objects” (39). 
This rejection of therapy as a tool of social adjustment, and the concurrent 
push towards patient self-development and the re-establishment of individual 
autonomy is central to I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, highlighting 
the similarities between aspects of Szaszian doctrine and Fromm-
Reichmann’s approach. 
Schizophrenia: A Cultural Label 
Before beginning my discussion of these novels and their paired 
psychiatrists, it would also seem pertinent to clarify what I mean by 
schizophrenia since it is a condition of primary importance to these texts, 
both fictional and psychiatric. Although it seems a straightforward diagnostic 
label, this is profoundly misleading as is hopefully already clear given Laing’s 
assertion that it represents not a legitimate and morally neutral disease 
entity, but a “political event” (1964, 64). During the postwar period there was 
an increasing division between those who believed that schizophrenia was 
caused by a biochemical flaw in the human brain, and those who either 
rejected this claim outright, or were beginning to question the possibility of an 
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organic etiology without conclusive evidence. As Thomas Scheff wrote in 
1966 “we can estimate that there have been at least five thousand papers 
reporting research on schizophrenia in the five decades since 1920” but, 
despite best efforts, “virtually no progress has been made” (7-8).  
What certainly did not assist in this desperate attempt to secure 
objective scientific agreement on the origins and manifestations of the 
condition, was the nature of “schizophrenia” as the psychiatric catch-all term 
of the time. As Robert Kendell explains, the American concept of 
schizophrenia  
degenerated into a vague synonym for almost any 
severe form of mental illness, applied indiscriminately 
to anyone whose behavior or speech were at all 
irrational, threatening, or difficult to understand (30). 
 
This incoherence, along with a lack of concrete physiological explanations 
despite enormous efforts, caused some researchers to begin to believe, 
according to Scheff, that “there is a considerable feeling that the problem 
itself has not been formulated correctly” (9). Instead of focusing on the 
medical model, which isolates the pathological individual, these individuals 
began to posit that a diagnosis of schizophrenia (in fact of any mental illness) 
was in fact the application of a social label with its roots in socially 
unacceptable or deviant behaviours. 
This is precisely the question the doctors and writers to be discussed 
herein all, to varying degrees, are engaged with: to what extent is 
schizophrenia (and mental illnesses more generally) a legitimate medical 
problem, or alternatively, does it function predominantly instead as a social 
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label used to delineate socio-political trouble-makers? Given the extremely 
vague parameters used to identity schizophrenia even by the 1950s, when 
the original DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) was 
published, there was little agreement on how schizophrenia manifested itself 
and how it could be effectively treated (something that becomes apparent in 
responses to Greenberg’s novel, as discussed in Chapter Four). A definition 
of schizophrenia is outside the parameters of this thesis, so instead I have 
taken my lead from the novels within and approached the condition as a 
cultural label that designates otherness and causes social ostracism, 
alongside other general diagnoses (either applied by medical professionals 
or the community) of psychiatric disorders. The importance of psychiatric 
diagnosis to collective perceptions of community members is particularly 
apparent in Chapter One, in the case of Richard Yates’s suburban ‘madman’, 

















Revolutionary Road: Mental Illness and Socio-Political Control 
Despite its anxious omnipresence in Richard Yates’s Revolutionary Road, 
madness has often been neglected as one of the text’s major narrative 
themes - an omission that this thesis intends to redress. Commonly, Yates’s 
novel has been interpreted as a treatise against the conformity of the mid-
century and as a blistering indictment of the suburban landscape that 
dominated postwar America. One reviewer for the New Statesman even 
described the novel’s subject as “the break-up of an exurban marriage in 
Western Connecticut” (Mayne, 460). Even Richard Yates himself did not 
consider madness to be central to the novel: the main character associated 
with madness, John Givings, was considered so marginal during the writing 
process that he was not even included until halfway through the initial draft. 
Yates admitted to Henry DeWitt that Givings materialized when Yates 
decided he needed “somebody in there to point up or spell out the story at 
crucial moments”, an important admission of Givings’s function as a truth 
teller and reflective outsider to the community (66). In order to situate 
madness, mental illness and psychiatry at the centre of the novel’s thematic 
considerations, I will read Revolutionary Road through the framework of 
David Cooper’s anti-psychiatric theories to reveal the underpinning and 
highly political questions surrounding the meaning of diagnosis and mental 
health care in a conformist society. 
By utilizing the work of those like Laing, Szasz, Goffman, and Cooper, 
who, despite their myriad differences, each view psychiatric intervention as a 
violent tool of delegitimization and socio-political repression, this connection 
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becomes wholly apparent. In reading John Givings’s and April Wheeler’s 
experiences through this psychiatry-skeptical framework, Revolutionary 
Road can be seen to destabilize the boundaries between what is considered 
sane and insane, whilst seeking to resituate these apparent medical issues 
within a socio-political context. Yates’s characters force the reader to 
examine the supposedly scientific nature of these diagnoses, and give 
credence to the possibility that, as Dana Cloud points out, mental illnesses 
are not a natural phenomenon, but an artifice invented “so as to enable 
society to intervene in the private lives of subjects, regulating their behavior 
and disciplining them for their transgressions” (11). In short, psychiatry, 
which experienced an explosion in social importance in the post-war years, 
rapidly became a way to monitor, adjust, and control social problems by 
reflecting them back upon the individual, thereby transforming socio-political 
issues into individual pathologies. This, I argue, is the position that underpins 
psychiatric involvement in Yates’s text. 
Subtly but pervasively, Yates’s narrative forces readers to confront the 
position of those labelled mentally ill in post-war America, asking us to 
question the basis upon which individuals come to be labelled as mad, and 
how society responds to, and perpetuates these labels and the cultural 
stereotypes affixed to them. As Michel Foucault has shown, historically those 
suffering from conditions classified variously as “insane, alienated, deranged, 
demented [or] extravagant” were locked away to safeguard familial 
respectability, rather than for the benefit of inmates (2001, 62-63). Yates’s 
narrative suggests that this situation remains in the mid-twentieth century: 
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psychiatric hospitalization is largely a solution for the benefit of families like 
the Givingses, who cannot bear the humiliation and shame of an 
unpredictable, purportedly ‘insane’ child.  
Likewise, Jeffrey Schaler has drawn attention to the unconstitutional 
nature of involuntary psychiatric detentions, arguing that “persons considered 
‘a threat to self and others’ effectively lose their entitlement to a trial without 
being tried” and are thereby “deprived of liberty by the state when committed 
to a mental hospital” (xvi). These misgivings are echoed directly in Yates’s 
narrative when, during a discussion on John Givings’s hospitalization, the 
narrator ponders “Could a man be forcibly committed to the nuthouse just 
like that? Didn’t it sound fishy somehow, from a legal standpoint?” (64). 
Revolutionary Road steadfastly engages with these ideas; confronting and 
challenging readers’ expectations and beliefs on the ethics and empirical 
reliability of psychiatric nosology and the forcible treatment of patients. 
Yates’s narrative ultimately creates a space for dialogue over the nature and 
human cost of a harmonious and functioning democratic society.  
David Cooper and the Creation of a Schizoid Self 
To open up this dialogue, I will read Yates’s first novel alongside the 
theoretical writings of David Cooper, the psychiatrist who reintroduced the 
term “anti-psychiatry” in 1967.6 Cooper’s work is particularly useful in 
decoding Yates’s narrative conceptions of madness since both men share an 
                                                          
6 According to Thomas Szasz the term “anti-psychiatry” was coined in 1908 
by Dr Bernhard Beyer, and so Cooper’s adoption of the moniker was in fact a 
recuperation of the earlier term (2009, 6). Daniel Burston agrees, although 
he argues the term was coined four years later, in 1912 (2018, 1).  
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awareness of the delegitimizing impact of psychiatric diagnosis upon the 
individual, as well as the dehumanizing pressures of capitalist economic 
systems upon the possibility for autonomous self-determination. Both men, 
as I will argue, ultimately locate psychiatry within a wider system for the 
enforcement of social conformity and political harmony.7 To this end, in 1974 
Cooper wrote that “[c]linical psychiatry…  
[represents] a small part of an extensive system of 
violence, of normalizing techniques that commence 
with the principal conformism-inducing instrument of the 
bourgeois state, the family, and run on… to produce 
and then reproduce an endless assembly-line of 
identical industrious creatures who all work for some 
Purpose which has long been lost sight of and which 
was never very visible in the first place (1974, 55).  
 
Yates’s narrative confirms this rather dystopian view of mid-century 
American medicine most prominently in the case of John Givings and, to an 
extent, April Wheeler, since April’s reluctance to bear children causes her 
husband, Frank, to conclude that she is mentally ill and requires psychiatric 
treatment. After listening to Frank allude to, but never directly state his 
opinions on the matter April surmises, “You mean I’m emotionally disturbed” 
(224). 
John Givings, on the other hand, is abandoned to a psychiatric 
hospital after he repeatedly embarrasses his mother by purposefully flouting 
social etiquette: Mrs. Givings tells his psychiatrist that “it’s quite out of the 
                                                          
7 Indeed, Cooper was, according to Laing, a “trained Communist 
revolutionary,” (Mullan 194) while Yates considered himself a “leftist” in 
political terms (Bailey 89). Although clearly these two political stances are not 
entirely analogous, they co-exist on a similar spectrum that suggests an 
awareness of issues caused by social inequality and the impact of economic 
forces upon the socio-political milieu.  
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question for us to ever think in terms of bringing him into contact with outside 
people again”, the term “outside people” emphasizing John’s difference from 
the sane population (333). In essence, Yates and Cooper both suggest that 
psychiatric diagnosis and hospitalization are punitive methods of control that 
obliterate the political agency of the affected individual by undermining their 
credibility and therefore ability to challenge the status quo.  
Furthermore, Cooper, like Laing and others including Gregory 
Bateson, understands psychiatric conditions, particularly schizophrenia, to be 
rooted in the family unit, rather than as being organic in etiology as 
advocated by biomedical psychiatry. Cooper denied the orthodox view of 
mental illness (schizophrenia in particular) as chemical in nature by stating 
that “there is not one shred of unequivocally credible evidence to support the 
inclusion of schizophrenia as a disease-entity in the field of medical 
nosology” (1970, 16). Instead of looking to the affected individual and 
aberrant brain chemistry for the root of their distress then, Cooper argued 
that when confronted with an apparently schizophrenic patient, he “assumes 
no primary defect in the patient” but rather suggests “there is a demonstrable 
failure in a microsocial field of persons in relation”, referring primarily to the 
patient’s family circle (1970, 16). This point, that families, as the “primary 
socializ[ers]” of offspring cause schizophrenia-like symptoms to develop was 
something that Cooper and others in the counter-culture, including Laing and 
mutual associate Aaron Esterson, espoused throughout the following 
decades (Cooper, 1970, 50). Indeed, by the time Cooper’s The Death of the 
Family was published in 1970 he was “really preaching to the choir”, 
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according to Michael Stuab, since this family-centric position was so 
ubiquitous by then (65).  
Conformity and Self-Alienation 
Cooper’s position on the family drew direct connections between 
schizophrenia, autonomy and conformity. Firstly, Cooper suggested that the 
purpose of childrearing by what he termed the “micro-culture” (i.e. the family 
unit) was to raise the child to successfully assimilate with the social, cultural, 
political, and behavioural norms of the contemporary moment (or, in 
Cooper’s terms, the “macro-culture”), a suggestion that reads as relatively 
uncontroversial (1970, 50). However, Cooper argues that in societies where 
the appearance of conformity and homogenization are particularly important 
(as was the case in the postwar American suburbs), then performance will 
define the parent-child relationship in place of a more genuine connection 
based on self-definition (a distinction Cooper draws in existential terms: 
being-for-oneself or being-for-others). In this case, then, Cooper asserted 
“the parent’s representation of an acceptable social role has priority over his 
presentation of himself to the child” (emphasis original, 1970, 50). This, in 
Cooper’s terms, requires the individual to “externalize himself in the world 
[by] empty[ing] his subjective reality into an object form of being-in-the-world, 
[before] reinternalize[ing] this objectification” (1970, 50). By this process, the 
individual’s own sense of self is replaced or overridden by an awareness of 
the social role the individual is duty bound to fulfil as father or mother: their 
being-for-others, in existential terms. 
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 Through this set of circumstances, the parent is understood to 
represent an unknown “absence” within the family, an absence that defines 
not only the individual’s relationship with his or her family, but also with his or 
her self, characterized as “self-alienation” (1970, 50). Those who experience 
this alienated state can go on to develop a deeper estrangement from self 
and others that leads to the continual perpetuation of this social illusion, a 
state one could compare to Laing’s idea of ontological insecurity and the 
false-self system. Children raised in this environment are taught by example 
that unyielding conformity to their social role, and the expectations of others, 
are strategies of fundamental importance to their successful development 
and acceptability within the community. This, in effect, results in a divided 
self akin to that pointed out by R D Laing in 1960: individuals are both bound 
to perform a social role, while simultaneously required to hide the interior self 
(or being-for-oneself). This suggests that most individuals within this social 
spectrum possess a split self that could be equated to the popular 
conception of the schizophrenic. Indeed, Cooper acknowledges this position, 
writing that “[t]here is a very real sense in which the schizophrenia problem 
and the problem of alienation and estrangement in families are identical”. 
The only difference he concedes is that families with schizophrenic members 
experience this schism in “a particularly intense form” (1970, 52).  
 Cooper’s words echo the problems of social character and conformity 
mused upon by writers including Erich Fromm and C Wright Mills amongst 
others during the 1950s. Mills particularly mourned the emasculation and 
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loss of autonomy for middle-class men as their work became increasingly 
salaried and corporatized. He wrote that the 
twentieth-century white-collar man has never been 
independent… He is always somebody’s man, the 
corporation’s, the government’s, the army’s; and he is 
seen as the man who does not rise. The decline of the 
free entrepreneur and the rise of the dependent 
employee on the American scene has paralleled the 
decline of the independent individual and the rise of the 
little man in the American mind (emphasis mine, xi-xii). 
Just as the child raised in a conformist society is forbidden to express their 
own desires if they run counter to what is socially expected of them, 
American men, according to Mills, are at great risk of losing their sense of 
autonomy or self-determination because of the social emphasis in the post-
war period. The rise of corporatization, for example, is according to Mills, a 
danger to the masculine population’s potency since it renders them passive 
and conformist. Salaried individuals, unlike business or land-owners, must 
perform a role to the satisfaction of their colleagues and seniors or risk the 
loss of livelihood for themselves and their dependents. This situation is, Mills 
argues, fundamentally damaging and highly claustrophobic, leading to a 
state where “[w]e need to characterize American society of the mid-twentieth 
century in more psychological terms, for now the problems that concern us 
most border on the psychiatric” (xx). Individuals experience, Mills suggests, a 
damaging splitting of self as a result of the need to suppress personal 
unhappiness or dissatisfaction with the corporate position to preserve 
employment and social status within the rapidly expanding American middle-
class. This both reflects and continues the emphasis on conformity 
engendered in children by parents and the community as they mature.  
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 In The Sane Society, sociologist Erich Fromm posited that this kind of 
conformity was a “socially patterned defect” that, if encountered on an 
individual level, would see that person labelled as unwell. He wrote that,  
if a person fails to attain freedom, spontaneity, a 
genuine expression of self, he may be considered to 
have a severe defect, provided we assume that 
freedom… [is] the objective goal (15).  
In the case of postwar America, Fromm argues that, as a result of increased 
pressure to assimilate with the social collective, individuals have abandoned 
the concept of personal autonomy and become more akin to “automaton[s]” 
who “never experience anything”. Fromm writes that, as a result of this 
change, individuals  
experience [themselves] entirely as the person [they] 
thinks [they are] supposed to be; whose artificial 
smile[s] ha[ve] replaced genuine laughter; whose 
meaningless chatter has replaced communicative 
speech (16).  
Cooper’s concerns with the prioritization of performance and being-for-others 
can be neatly assimilated with Fromm’s depiction of postwar Western 
civilization and together suggest that society itself, rather than psychiatrically 
labelled individuals, is sick.  
In Yates’s narrative, a sense of inner desperation and self-alienation 
resulting from the very behaviour Fromm highlights pervades the novel, 
despite Frank Wheeler’s unwittingly ironic assertion in the opening chapters 
that “the important thing, always, was to remember who you were” (Yates 
20). These feelings of estrangement impact, to varying degrees, upon each 
of Yates’s adult characters and illustrate the stultifying and suffocating need 
for assimilation alongside a desire to reject these social ties that bind. One 
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morning, for example, after an evening with neighbourhood friends (the 
Campbells), spent lambasting the suburban way of life, April asks herself 
rhetorically “how did everything get so awful… How did we ever get into this 
strange little dream world of the Donaldsons and the Cramers and the 
Wingates [?]” (emphasis original, 111). This momentary acknowledgement of 
the schism between April’s conception of her ‘authentic’ self and the 
community-minded mother and wife that she pretends to be demonstrates 
the splitting that concerns both Cooper and Fromm. This self-estrangement 
becomes even more pronounced when April tells Shep Campbell at the end 
of the novel that she doesn’t know him, despite their long-term friendly 
relationship (and their one-off sexual encounter), and even more 
dramatically, she admits “I don’t know who I am, either” (262).  
Conformity and the American Suburbs 
The anxiety over the psychological impact of conformity and 
assimilation as primary social values reached its height within the suburban 
milieu of the 1950s, and this is why, I argue, Yates chose to set his first novel 
in a suburban neighbourhood in 1955 in order to explore these concerns.8 
                                                          
8 Interestingly, however, Yates rejected the suggestion that the purpose of 
his novel was to "lambast" the suburbs. Instead, he argued that his intentions 
were to show that blaming the suburbs for problems of self-delusion and self-
alienation was the Wheelers' "delusion, their problem, not mine" (DeWitt, 66). 
Regardless, the fact remains that the novel has largely been accepted by 
readers and critics as a polemic against the suburban sprawl of the postwar 
years, and as an indictment against the psychological impact of the mass-
produced, man-made landscape upon residents. Scott Donaldson in The 
Suburban Myth disagrees however, locating the root of Frank’s unhappiness 
in a “desire for acceptance” exacerbated by an “unhappy childhood” and not 
“totally from the environment” (187). While both April and Frank Wheelers’ 
childhoods fall far short of ideal, other factual works like The Split-Level Trap 
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The postwar years were a time of great change, including the development 
of these suburban communities, and according to Ellen Herman the rapid 
changes of this period contributed to a sense of anxious alienation and 
uncertainty that prevailed throughout the decade. In particular, Herman 
highlights the “thinning of community ties” as individuals moved away from 
home towns into newly constructed suburban townships; as well as an 
increased and “vehement emphasis on the patriarchal nuclear family”, which 
saw women return to the home after working as part of the war effort during 
the 1940s9 (263). These shifts, alongside the rampant expansion of 
corporations in place of small businesses contributed to a “sense of 
depersonalization and a loss of self in huge corporate workplaces and other 
mass institutions” (Herman 263). This engendered a need to conform to 
precarious new social structures within communities in pursuit of security and 
well-being, as well as the growth of a disturbing sense of self-alienation and 
estrangement in Cooper’s terms as already discussed. The newly developed, 
mass-constructed American suburb became the quintessential synecdoche 
for this social claustrophobia and rampant psychological distress that came 
to characterize this carefully constructed landscape.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1962) and The Organization Man (1956), suggest that the suburban locale 
aggravates anxieties over belonging through the breakdown of established 
communities as increasing numbers of Americans entered the middle-class 
after the Second World War and moved into newly established suburban 
townships. Confusingly, however, Donaldson also admits that Yates’s 
suburbs “stifles those who live there”, seemingly contradicting his own 
argument (188). 
9 Psychiatrist Richard Gordon also noted the disorientating impact of this 
"mobility" upon newly uprooted families (on women in particular): he wrote 
that “It looks quite definitely as though life in our increasingly mobile world is 




 By utilizing the American suburbs as his setting Yates deftly reveals 
the mechanisms of social control that drive these conformist environments, 
and thereby exposes the illusory nature of freedom and autonomy existing 
therein. These communities were represented in starkly dichotomous ways 
by academics and the media in the post-Second World War era: 
housebuilders sold suburban homes as familial idylls, and on the promise 
that they offered an excellent deal financially to new buyers (often taking 
advantage of VA loans). Levittown, the first and largest of the American 
suburban developments of the time, was enthusiastically advertised in 
newspapers as the “most perfectly planned community in America”. 
Suburban living was understood as part of the American dream of self-
aggrandizement, and to that end, Robert Beauregard has commented that 
“life in the suburbs was a mark of American exceptionalism and a model to 
which all nations could aspire” (6).  
On the other hand, psychiatrists like Dr Richard E. Gordon, who 
penned best-seller The Split-Level Trap in 1962 with his wife, Katherine K. 
Gordon, warned that life in suburbia (or “Disturbia” as the Gordons labelled 
it) was in fact dangerous to residents’ mental and physical health (25). This 
assertion was backed up by comparing the number of patients seeking 
treatment for psychosomatic complaints in a suburban community and a rural 
town, and, in all cases the Gordons asserted that higher levels were seen 
across the board in the suburban settlement. For instance, in a rural hospital, 
“6.7 per cent of the patients were under treatment for high blood pressure” 
whereas in the suburban facility, “14.3 per cent” were being treated for the 
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same condition (23). The same situation was discovered in the case of 
“duodenal ulcers” and “heart attack” (23). While these three conditions are 
not psychiatric in nature, they are, according to the Gordons, “gauges of 
tension” where emotional distress can be readily assumed from the physical 
manifestation of symptoms.  
For the Gordons, one of the primary reasons for this increased mental 
and physical strain on suburbanites was the “unsettled” nature of these 
communities, where newcomers were a common feature and where 
residents generally stay only for short periods of time on their journey up the 
social ladder (12). This restless situation weakens, and indeed prevents the 
formation of, community bonds, resulting in a fundamentally isolated and 
hostile environment for families. This image of new suburban communities as 
in some way rootless and even unnatural is evident in the opening pages of 
Yates’s narrative in descriptions of the relationship between the landscape 
and the newcomers. For instance, when members of the “Laurel Players” 
amateur dramatics group leave their homes on their way to the theatre, 
Yates’s narrator describes how, from their driveways, they  
would see a landscape in which only a few, very old, 
weathered houses seemed to belong; it made their own 
homes look as weightless and impermanent, as 
foolishly misplaced as a great many bright new toys 
that had been left outdoors overnight and rained on (5).  
While Yates’s description may seem to focus on the physical, built landscape 
of these new suburban towns, this extract provides an insight into the 
emotional impact of these new communities upon recently settled residents. 
Yates’s narrator projects residents’ misgivings over belonging and 
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community onto the buildings rather than having individual characters truly 
engage with their misgivings over these new constructed townships that 
supposedly embodied American progress and prosperity.  
In direct contrast to emotional isolation, characterized by feelings of 
seclusion and perceived neighbourly hostility, physical isolation in suburbia 
was, however, not an issue: indeed, the opposite could be said to be true. 
The lack of privacy between neighbors living in closely erected houses was 
viewed as an anathema to individual well-being and subjective integrity. 
Researchers published texts warning of these various dangers, among the 
most influential of whom was William H. Whyte, a sociologist who published 
The Organization Man in 1956. Whyte was primarily concerned with the 
impact of the new corporate way of life coming to dominate America, 
including within the domestic sphere. Catherine Jurca has commented that 
the suburbs represented the “residential analogue of the corporation”, and so 
Whyte feared that these environments, as part of a new corporate culture, 
were reducing the autonomy of individual Americans (85).  
To this end, Whyte argued that suburbanites were “imprisoned in 
Brotherhood” (365), required to maintain strict adherence to the codes of 
responsibility that consumed all areas of domestic life; a situation that 
demonstrates the group to be both “tyrant” and “friend” since suburban 
community bonds depend on this assimilation (361). Group civic 
responsibilities were so deeply entrenched, and so central, to suburban life 
that, Whyte has suggested, even small infractions could lead to dire 
consequences like social ostracization and even being labelled mad. For 
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example, he wrote that “if a man were to paint his garage fire-engine red in a 
block where the rest of the garages are white, he would literally and 
psychologically make himself a marked man”, while “an unkempt lawn is 
another sign of malaise” (emphasis mine, 358).  While these examples 
appear trivial, they demonstrate the depth of conformity required to 
assimilate successfully within the suburban milieu, as well as the dangers of 
failing in one’s civic duties. 
It should be remembered that this period of history immediately 
followed on from the fever pitch of McCarthyism, the second ‘Red Scare’, 
and the House Committee on Un-American Activities as part of the U.S. 
government’s attempt to destroy insidious cells of domestic communism. As 
a result, paranoia about communists lurking in American communities was 
high, and private citizens were scrutinized intensely for signs of unusual 
behaviour or disloyalty to the American nation and its economic ideology 
(capitalism). This is particularly well illustrated by a story in the New York 
Times from 26 October 1963 which reports how suburban school children in 
Levittown were encouraged to report their teachers to their parents if they did 
not perform the “patriotic exercises” required at the beginning of each school 
day. Parents were asked to check each day “whether… his or her teacher 
observed the opening exercise approved by the School Board” and advised 
that “If at any time you discover that the opening exercise is not being 
observed, mail a post card to Post Office Box 242”. These exercises included 
repeating the “Pledge of Allegiance”, singing the “Star Spangled Banner” or 
reading from the “Declaration of Independence”.  
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Unsurprisingly, criticisms of these activities were rife. One critic 
mentioned in the New York Times article likened these requirements to 
practices observed in Germany during the “Third Reich”. Furthermore, Harry 
Truman called the investigatory activities of the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (latterly known as the Internal Security Committee), the 
“most un-American thing in the country today” as a result of infringements on 
American citizens’ freedoms (qtd. Whitfield 124). The political atmosphere 
these activities engendered, where individuals were encouraged to report on 
one another through fear, is another example of a kind of social panopticon, 
where one internalizes the rules and expectations of the collective in order to 
conform to required behaviour patterns and standards. 
As well as social ostracism for those suspected of being communist or 
even just different enough from their neighbours to raise suspicions, 
diagnoses of psychiatric illnesses or suspicion of pathology were a direct 
consequence of these supposed personal failings. These expected 
behaviours, as Whyte has shown, stretched to standards of maintenance of 
the suburban home: any failure on the part of a homeowner to keep their 
property to a high standard was understood as a public admission of 
personal deficiency. The consequences of this kind of neighbourly failure are 
prevalent throughout Yates’s narrative in petty examples like Mrs. Givings’s 
assessment of the Wheelers at the novel’s end as a “rather strange young 
couple”, in part because they failed to maintain their property to the standard 
expected of the neighbourhood. She laments that there were “[w]arped 
window frames, wet cellar, crayon marks on the walls… And that awful stone 
69 
 
path going halfway down the front lawn and ending in a mud puddle”, as well 
as plants she gifted the couple gone to seed in the basement (336). Each of 
these items, as Whyte suggests, indicate a pathology located within the 
individual because of their apparent difference from the collective. Yates’s 
narrative takes Whyte’s position further, and demonstrates how, when this 
difference becomes aggressive protest against the tyranny of the collective, 
psychiatry becomes fundamental in the repression of troublemakers such as 
John Givings.  
John Givings as Neighbourhood Scandal  
John Givings is a fundamentally revealing character, described by 
Jonathan Tran as a “dark hope, [the] one who authentically refuses the 
world’s terms” and who is delegitimized by psychiatry as a result (203). John 
was specifically included in the novel as a form of truth-teller, as Yates 
explained he needed “someone to point up or spell out the story at crucial 
moments” (DeWitt 66). In my reading however, John’s function is more 
important than as a useful plot device: instead, I argue that John’s apparent 
madness functions as a crucial contrast to the suburban conception of 
normality through his confident and direct challenging of conventions, and his 
confinement within a psychiatric hospital as a result, demonstrates 
psychiatry’s culpability in the removal of socially offensive individuals. As 
Szasz wrote in 1973, “we call people mentally ill when their personal conduct 
violates ethical, political, and social norms”, and Yates’s narrative, I argue, 
supports this statement (23).   
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John is first introduced to the text as the subject of community gossip 
and scandal. During an evening with the Wheelers, Milly Campbell, a 
neighbourhood friend, excitedly passes on a story she has heard second 
hand from the Givingses’ cleaning lady, which she describes as “fantastic” 
(62). Milly tells her enraptured audience that the Givingses’ son is “in 
Greenacres. You know…. The State hospital. The insane asylum”, where he 
has been for “the past two months” (62). The dramatic, deliberately drawn-
out way Milly passes on this information belies the taboo nature of mental 
illness (particularly in the orderly environment of suburbia), and her delight is 
palpable when she elaborates that “he didn’t just go to Greenacres. He was 
taken in and put there by the State Police” (63). 
 While the Campbells and the Wheelers all delight in the shocking 
details of the story, particularly in Givings being escorted to the asylum under 
duress, Yates careful undermines their faux sympathy for the family 
throughout this scene. The narrator emphasizes their delight in the delicate 
subject matter, and simultaneously depicts the foursome performing the 
appropriate and expected response by adopting a momentary attitude of 
sympathy and concern. For example, when Milly repeats the story a second 
time for emphasis, April comments ‘“The State Troopers. How awful”’, while 
the others, incredibly, “all shook their heads in solemn agreement”, despite 
their obvious delight in the tale (64). This artificial attitude of solemnity 
conveys the socially appropriate response, demonstrating the faux 
appreciation of the family tragedy at the heart of the scene, whilst 
71 
 
simultaneously offering a reassuring distance between the aberrant 
individual and his absurd parents and the avid, hungry community gossips. 
The contrast between this faux-concern and the giddy way the story 
brings the group together however highlights the need for communities to 
create and maintain boundaries between what is and is not considered to be 
acceptable behaviour within a collective context. John thereby occupies and 
performs a crucial social role: he, as the “real certified insane person” (in 
April’s terms) provides a comforting and reassuring contrast to the others in 
the community, securing them in the knowledge of their own sanity (182). As 
Cooper argued in 1974, madness exists as a form of “social stigmatization 
[where an] … inauthentically functioning group needs a victim, who can in 
due course be dismissed… to embody the negative aspects of everyone’s 
feeling” (62). This position locates madness within the social sphere, 
something readily made apparent in Yates’s text through the schizoid, 
superficial forms of social interaction his characters display; but it can also be 
readily applied to John Givings’s situation since his actions are replicated to 
some degree by others who escape the madness label. For example, Shep 
Campbell, once, during an argument, called his wife an “ignorant cunt” while 
she cradled their baby, cowering in fright, as he shattered “three bones of his 
fist against the wall” in protest against their dull, monotonous suburban life 
(140). 
 Likewise, Frank Wheeler, in his frustrated unhappiness with the 
unsatisfactory actuality of suburban life, barely controls his violent desires to 
destroy the home’s picture window, and by extension, the vacuous life it 
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represents. The narrator describes Frank’s feelings of “sinking helplessly… 
like a man in quicksand” while reading to his children, and his struggle to 
restrain himself from “doing what suddenly seemed the only thing in the 
world he really wanted to do: picking up a chair and throwing it through the 
picture window” (56-57). Frank’s barely contained desire to smash the 
window contrasts dramatically with the image he tries to cultivate with his 
children on his knee – that of the suburban home as a familial idyll, and of 
himself as a nurturing and loving father. When related to both Shep’s and 
Frank’s violent actions and desires, John’s outburst in his parents’ home can 
be read as occurring on the same spectrum, but both Shep and Frank are 
believed to be ‘normal’ and ‘sane’. This comparison reduces the distinction 
between madness and sanity to a question of comportment rather than 
psychopathology and suggests that diagnosis (particularly of schizophrenia) 
can be reduced to a punitive measure against witnessed misconduct, since 
the Givingses’ cleaner was present during John's violent outburst.  
Frank Wheeler: Sanity as Performance 
Other than John Givings, each of Yates’s other characters are largely 
preoccupied with creating and maintaining the right impressions through role 
performance. Performance, as defined by Goffman, can be understood as 
“the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to 
influence in any way any of the other participants”, such as the audience 
(2000, 26). While each of Yates’s characters engage in this kind of 
performance, with a desire to create an impression upon listeners or 
observers, Frank Wheeler, for whom, I argue, John Givings functions as both 
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double and as a cautionary example, is the most preoccupied and anxious 
regarding the cultivation of carefully curated appearances. The inauthentic 
nature of these performances is often made clear to the reader through 
Yates’s narrative layering, where free indirect discourse is regularly utilized 
to demonstrate the split between private thought processes and inauthentic 
performative actions. For example, in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to 
persuade April not to abort her third pregnancy, Frank begins a bizarre 
campaign of self-conscious behaviors intended to impress his wife with his 
affected masculine aura: 
when he lit a cigarette in the dark he was careful to 
arrange his features in a virile frown before striking and 
cupping the flame (he knew, from having practiced this 
at the mirror of a blacked-out bathroom years ago, that 
it made a swift, intensely dramatic portrait) (219). 
Frank complements this vision of manhood by “keeping his voice low and 
resonant” and being extra fastidious in his grooming to cultivate the required 
presentation, in the hopes that by doing so April will also recommence her 
gender role as wife and mother (219). This is an example of Yates’s use of 
free indirect style to convey the inner thoughts of the characters, and to 
destabilize their fabricated outward appearances. In the same passage, 
Frank admits to himself that “he found he had made all his molars ache by 
holding them clamped for too long for an effect of grim-jawed determination” 
and that he felt a “certain distaste” with himself “for having to resort to such 
methods” (219). Yates’s narrative style deftly deconstructs Frank’s created 
image and, in sharp contrast, demonstrates the polarity between him and 
John Givings who delights in disregarding required social niceties. 
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Where Frank and John demonstrate a striking similarity, however, is in 
their respective verbal criticisms of the suburbs. While both men rail against 
the cultural zeitgeist, John is punished by the system for his refusal to 
assimilate into polite middle-class society, while Frank remains, until the 
novel's climax, comfortably ensconced within his social milieu. The critical 
difference between the two men, I argue, can be reduced to verbal 
performance versus authentic protest since, while Frank may be an orator 
against the status quo, by his actions he continues to co-operate with, and 
even reassert, the social codes at play in the suburban context through his 
daily behaviors. This is apparent throughout the text, including during April’s 
and Frank’s roadside argument in the opening chapters, when Frank is ever 
mindful of the possibility of neighbours catching the couple fighting in public: 
“as the sound and the lights of an approaching car came up behind them, he 
put one hand in his pocket and assumed a conversational slouch for the 
sake of appearances” (25-26). Ever mindful of the need to preserve a 
superficial appearance of normality, Frank negates the possibility of genuine 
protest against the vapidity of the suburban environment.  
On the other hand, Frank is vocal in his derision of the suburbs, 
performing regular monologues in front of selected friends and family that 
both mirror and anticipate those spoken by John. During a party one 
evening, for example, Frank laments:  
It’s as if everybody’d made this tacit agreement to live 
in a state of total self-deception. The hell with reality! 
Let’s have a whole bunch of cute little winding roads 
and cute little houses painted white and pink and baby 
blue; let’s all be good consumers and have a lot of 
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Togetherness and bring our children up in a bath of 
sentimentality (66). 
Frank’s words are a direct and powerful critique of the post-war era, but they 
function solely as performance since Yates’s narrator consistently 
undermines Frank’s position as a socio-political dissenter: instead, he 
represents nothing more than what Morris Dickstein has termed a “would-be-
rebel” (218). The vapidity of Frank’s discourse becomes especially apparent 
when April offers to relocate their family to Paris to escape the 
claustrophobic culture vacuum of post-war suburbia: Frank has, the narrative 
implies, always thought of himself as an intellectual with a yet undiscovered 
artistic flair located “somewhere in the humanities” (22). April further bolsters 
this self-inflated confidence, based on nothing more than Frank’s 
“performance in… beery, all-night talks” (22) and that he is “intelligent-
looking” (7). However, when April offers to take a full-time job overseas to 
allow Frank to pursue this “exceptional merit” (21) in a more conducive 
environment, he baulks, fearing his inadequacies will be discovered and his 
masculinity destroyed by his wife’s financial independence: “he was trying to 
conceal from her, if not from himself, that the plan had instantly frightened 
him” (109).  
The revelation of Frank’s interior narrative here allows the reader 
privileged access to what is left unspoken throughout Yates’s text (and it is 
quite often these tacit thought patterns within Revolutionary Road that are 
the most revealing of characters’ true natures). Again, the employment of 
free indirect speech here swiftly undermines Frank’s superficially blasé 
response - “he chuckled and shook his head” - to his wife’s suggestion that 
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they undertake such a drastic move (109). Although Frank attempts to 
patronize his wife’s plans, brushing them off as unrealistic and impractical, 
Yates’s narrative perspective hints at Wheeler’s true reason for pooh-
poohing the suggested trip, allowing the reader superior access to Frank’s 
motivations and destabilizing Wheeler’s projected self-image. Yates’s 
narrator continues, describing Frank’s vision of himself “hunched in an egg-
stained bathrobe, on an unmade bed, picking his nose” (109) in a Parisian 
apartment as April returns home from work looking polished, accomplished 
and professional in comparison, highlighting Frank’s underlying awareness of 
his own shortcomings, and lack of belief in his constructed image of himself 
as the stifled intellectual.   
Instead of functioning as a call to action, the reader is aware that 
although Frank may criticize his environment, he does so to separate himself 
from those he views as inferior, and therefore to bolster and perpetuate his 
idea of himself as a quasi-intellectual (his bohemian past being one of the 
reasons April first found him attractive). For Tran this position is not 
uncommon for suburbanites since, “people who live in the suburbs often 
fancy themselves better than suburbia, having themselves transcendentally 
adjudicated the emptiness of [its] false promises” (199). The reassurance 
that they, the Wheelers and their friends, alone “‘get-it’” produces seductive 
“pleasures of knowing” that bolster and gratify this false sense of superiority 
(Tran 190).  
One could also ally Tran’s “pleasures of knowing” with Cooper’s 
framework for progress through the various “metanoias”, meaning 
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transformations or conversions of the self from passivity to autonomy (13). At 
the bottom of this conceptual framework Cooper suggests, are those 
characterized by what he terms “Eknoia”: these passive individuals, 
according to Cooper are the “well-conditioned, endlessly obedient citizen[s]” 
who are “estranged from every aspect of [their] own experience” and from all 
“possibilities of awakening change” (1971, 13). These individuals, who might 
be viewed generally as sane and whom Yates represents via characters like 
Mrs. Givings, Cooper suggests are, in fact, “out of [their] mind[s]” due to their 
stringent, unthinking assimilation with the collective (emphasis original, 13). 
The next stage in this chain progressing from self-estrangement to existential 
awareness is termed “paranoia” which, for Cooper, should not be viewed as 
a “morbid state of existence” (1971, 22) but which represents instead “the 
beginning of active existence with the possibility of life for new projects” 
(1971, 14). Cooper’s understanding of paranoia suggests a deeper 
awareness of oneself and one’s position within the structures of power that 
bind individuals to both their families and the wider social context. Therefore, 
it could be suggested that Frank Wheeler’s vocal derision of the suburbs 
functions as a movement towards this state of self-awareness: Cooper states 
that “If eknoia means being out of one’s mind, in paranoia one is at least next 
to one’s mind” (emphasis mine, 1971, 14). By flirting with the next position on 
Cooper’s spectrum of self-estrangement to self-discovery, Frank essentially 
acknowledges his awareness of the psychological landscape of the suburbs, 
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but through his complicit actions, he retreats back into the safety of the 
eknoia position.10 
For Tran, the social permissibility of these episodes of performative 
dissent is crucial to the security of the dominant ideology of the time: 
It is the ruse of freedom… that makes life ‘tolerable’, 
the condition sin qua non that renders life amongst the 
powers at least palatable, while disguising power’s true 
genius (195).  
The true genius of this dominant power is that no one can escape its 
mechanisms: one may recognize the social, political, and economic 
structures that bind and perpetuate it, but ultimately one cannot bypass it. 
The satisfaction this produces functions as a form of pressure valve: instead 
of protesting against the impossibility of personal fulfilment through 
consumption and suburban conformity, these citizens continue to thrive in 
their present environment without posing a threat to the longevity of the 
status quo through genuine dissent (in the form of peaceful protest or violent 
resistance). In times of frustration, the Wheelers engage in this kind of vapid 
discourse, then return sated to their quotidian lives within the community they 
verbally railed against.  
 
 
                                                          
10 Cooper’s spectrum inverts the categories of madness and sanity one might 
traditionally expect, defining eknoia (which might be viewed as normality) as 
the loss of one’s mind, and anoia (which can be defined as an extreme 
mental deficiency) as an enlightened state of self-awareness and existence. 
These positions suggest that individuals labelled as mentally ill by psychiatry 
are, in fact, more ‘sane’ than their ‘normal’ counterparts (1970, 14-15).   
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The Picture Window as Suburban Panopticon: Control and Surveillance 
Frank is almost singularly concerned with constructing a façade of 
exceptionalism around himself and his family, but the narrative consistently 
demonstrates this to be nothing more than artifice. When the family move 
into their new suburban home, described as “a sweet little house”, Frank is 
instantly on the defensive, seeking to deflect the curse of suburban banality 
from their new family home (29). The Wheelers install a bookshelf directly in 
front of the picture window to give passers-by the impression that therein 
resides a learned and cultured family, set apart from their stultified 
neighbors: “their solid wall of books would take the curse off the picture 
window” (30). Again, the narrative undermines this surface image by 
continuing to state that the only well-used corner of the living room was the 
“province of the television set” that alone “showed signs of pleasant human 
congress,” and that the bookshelves remained neglected (31). Again, this 
demonstrates the importance of projecting a false-self to others that 
communicates a desired statement of selfhood to neighbours looking into the 
home through what novelist John Keats described as the “vast and empty 
eye” of the picture window (21).  
These floor-to-ceiling windows, according to Bärbel Harju, were a 
“central design element of the suburbs” originally intended to create a sense 
of spaciousness and a pleasing continuity between the family home and the 
outside world (65). This blurring of boundaries between the inside and 
outside, or private and public spheres, resulted in what Spiegel has called 
the “central dilemma” of the suburbs by creating a “land of ‘fishbowl’ houses” 
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where easy visibility threatened individuality and favoured the development 
of conformist behaviour (1-2). This “central dilemma” between privacy and 
visibility is fundamentally important to the suburbs and to their representation 
in popular culture: as Robert Beuka has pointed out, in novels and films the 
picture window came to represent the suburb’s “heightened sense of 
visibility”, while “tawdry behavior viewed through the picture window was to 
become a staple image in critiques of the suburban lifestyle” (92).  
Indeed, the transparency conferred by the picture window effectively 
created a scene for the outsider looking in by framing the goings-on within 
the family home, particularly at night, something that novelists of the post-
war years regularly touched upon. For instance, the possibility of neighbours 
witnessing transgressive behaviour, and the risks contained therein, formed 
part of the climax of John Updike’s novel Rabbit Redux (1971), when an 
unidentified individual appears at the picture window and witnesses an 
interracial sex act being performed in Rabbit’s livingroom between Harry, 
Skeeter, and Jill. This violation of the inner-outer, and private-public divide 
facilitated by the large living room window is understood as a threat by those 
inside the house (Jill “screams” upon seeing the disembodied “face”), while 
the voyeur’s eyes are likened to sinister “cigarette burns” that pierce the 
darkness (Updike 298). Updike’s likening of cigarette burns with the 
spectator’s eyes also connects the incident directly with the devastating fire 
that destroys the Angstrom home almost immediately after the incident 
occurs. This connection reinforces the linkage between the picture window, 
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conformity (meaning the policing of the self), visibility, and social control 
within the suburban context.  
The picture window then allowed neighbors to conduct fleeting 
surveillances of their peers in their own homes. The resultant liminal space 
was understandably considered disturbing by those who prioritized privacy 
and the sovereignty of the American individual. Within the suburbs, Whyte 
commented, “privacy has become clandestine” as the picture window 
became a talisman for this new style of communal living with its emphasis on 
the presented image or façade that is so central to Frank Wheeler (353). The 
constant and easy visibility conferred by the picture window could be aligned 
with the ideology behind Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the panopticon. As 
Foucault explained in Discipline and Punish, the panopticon was a structure 
designed to “train or correct individuals” including psychiatric patients, 
prisoners, or schoolchildren by conferring the power of easy and constant 
monitoring (or the suggestion of constant monitoring) to staff held at a central 
point (204). The physical lay-out of the panopticon required supervision from 
a central position (such as a circular tower) over a myriad of smaller cells set 
out around the periphery of the observation post. These smaller cells have, 
Foucault explains, “two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the 
windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the 
cell from one end to the other” (1977, 200). With this set-up, individuals held 
in each of the smaller cells are easily and constantly viewable by those in the 
central tower, although inmates should never be allowed to know at any 
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given time if they are being watched or not – instead, the assumption must 
be created that monitoring is constant.  
This ambiguity over whether an individual is being supervised or not at 
any given moment effectively internalizes the mechanisms of power invested 
in the supervisory relationship and leads to individuals policing their own 
behaviour to align or conform better to collective requirements or 
expectations. As Foucault writes,  
[h]e who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who 
knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of 
power; he makes them play spontaneously upon 
himself… he becomes the principle of his own 
subjection (1977, 202-203). 
While in a more contemporary society we might draw connections between 
this form of power structure and the rampant use of closed circuit television 
cameras (CCTV) as a strategy of crime prevention, it could be argued that 
these power relations can also be found in the transparency of the suburban 
picture window. These windows forced suburbanites to become more 
conscious of their conduct and of the fragility of the basis of their assimilation 
within the community.  
As well as functioning as pseudo-panopticonic cell, the suburban 
home’s picture window also, as Barbara M. Kelly points out, formed within its 
borders a framed image of “the house, which gradually became more and 
more like a stage – or… a television – setting” (84). This opportunity to 
effectively manage the vision presented to neighbours is what Frank Wheeler 
seeks to capitalize upon by placing the bookshelves directly across from the 
window, and by hiding the much more frequently utilized television set from 
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view. Frank therefore attempts to curate the image his neighbours have of 
him, and that he has of himself as a pseudo-intellectual. This reinforces the 
primacy of appearance in suburban communities as well as revealing the 
power structures at play in controlling and policing individual conduct within 
these neighbourhoods. Psychiatric interventions that destroy individual 
credibility through diagnosis and treatment function on this spectrum, just as 
the fire that burned down Rabbit Angstrom’s home, as punishment for those 
who transgress community expected codes of conduct.  
John Givings and the Importance of Appearance 
John Givings is the most crucial character in the novel when it comes 
to discussion of madness, conformity, and the importance of superficial 
appearances. Before their first meeting, April nervously refers to John as a 
“real certified insane person” (182), and comments to her husband that, 
without his guidance, she would have treated John “like an animal in the zoo 
or something” during the visit (emphasis mine, 192). These comments belie 
April's view of those labelled mentally ill as less than human, while the 
emphasis she places on John’s position as “certified” is extremely revealing 
and connect Yates’s text with Cooper’s position on psychiatric diagnosis as a 
form of “subtle violence” perpetrated on the chosen individual (Cooper 1970, 
32). This violence should be defined not in physical terms but in terms of the 
subject’s invalidation (although Cooper also charges biomedical psychiatry 
with direct violence against patients through shock therapies and the use of 
antipsychotics, which he, rather grandly, refers to as the “Abortifacients of 
the Spirit” (1974, 56)). Cooper argues that psychiatric diagnosis represents a 
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“social invalidation” of the chosen individual, whereby “almost every act, 
statement, and experience of the labelled person is systematically ruled 
invalid”, both past, present, and future, by the label of mental patient (10). 
Yates makes this connection when he has Frank Wheeler exclaim to his 
wife, after John forces them to confront uncomfortable truths about 
themselves, 
 “Don’t tell me; let me guess… Everything That 
Man Said Is True, Right? Isn’t that what you’re going to 
say?... Don’t you see how wrong that is?”  
“No, why is it wrong?”.  
“Because the man is insane… The man… is 
insane” (289). 
When Frank cannot face the truths that John refuses to allow them to ignore, 
Frank’s only response is to delegitimate John and his criticisms, however 
accurate, through an appeal to his position as a diagnosed madman. April’s 
more ready willingness to agree with John’s statements, however 
unpleasant, demonstrates her greater desire to renounce the postwar 
suburban middle-class lifestyle (even if her fantasy of living and working in 
Paris is highly romanticized).  
The profundity of the psychiatric label is also considered by Erving 
Goffman in his text, Asylums, which was published the same year as Yates’s 
novel. Goffman, a sociologist, argued that diagnosis with a mental condition 
required the linear reconstruction of one’s history to manufacture a 
retrospective teleology that incontrovertibly led to the moment of diagnosis.  
He wrote that a “case-history construction” results from scrutiny of a patient’s 
“past life, this having the effect of demonstrating that all along he had been 
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becoming sick, that he finally became very sick” and that “hospitalization” 
was both inevitable and in the patient’s best interests (1991, 135). Cooper, 
likewise, extends this grim connection between psychiatric diagnosis and 
social invalidation by suggesting that mental hospitals are where the force of 
this labelling process becomes truly effective. He writes that patients 
admitted to psychiatric wards “met with a massive reinforcement of the 
invalidation process that had commenced prior to their admission”, and, as a 
result experienced “the ritual of initiation into the ‘career’ of being a mental 
patient” there (1970, 96). John Givings plays upon the “mental patient” label, 
to which April Wheeler explicitly refers, through behaviour that correlates 
both with this diagnostic teleology and with community expectations of the 
“mad” individual's conduct. Since these offending characteristics are based 
solely on appearance and demeanor, Yates’s narrative forces readers to 
question the supposedly objective, scientific basis of biomedical psychiatric 
diagnostics, thereby challenging the legitimacy of binary categories of 
madness and sanity.  
The first impressions the Wheelers have of John is that he is 
somewhat grotesque in appearance, and that his behaviour is both bizarre 
and possibly threatening. For example, when he arrives at the Wheeler 
home, Yates’s narrator describes him almost as a caricature of one’s 
impression of a madman. He writes that John bounded up to the Wheelers, 
shook their hands and then 
his face burst into an astonishing grin. His cheeks drew 
back in vertical folds, two perfect rows of big, tobacco 
stained teeth sprang out between his whitening lips, 
and his eyes seemed to lose their power of sight (183).  
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This highly gothicized account dehumanizes John by reducing him to a roll-
call of facial parts, each of which, in this hyper-focused, isolated description 
sound both confronting and terrifying (particularly the ghoulish white lips and 
the unseeing eyes). This impression is further conveyed by the narrator’s 
description of John’s expression as a “monstrous parody of a friend-winning, 
people-influencing smile” (184). Yates’s narrator, I suggest, consciously 
constructs this inhuman vision of John to both mirror the Wheelers’ 
apprehensions, as well as to enhance readers’ expectations of John as the 
“other”, the mental patient.  
Other than his parodic smile, John’s most striking feature, to the 
Wheelers, is his choice of dress. The narrator describes his clothing thus, 
beginning with John’s “cloth cap” that 
Wasn’t the kind of jaunty little back-belted cap that had 
lately become stylish; it was wide, flat, old-fashioned 
and cheap, and the rest of his drab costume was 
equally suggestive of orphanage or prison: shapeless 
twill work pants and a dark brown button-front sweater 
that was too small for him. From a distance of fifty feet, 
if not fifty yards, you could tell he was dressed in items 
drawn from state institutional clothing supplies (183).  
The homogenous way that institutions are banded together in this description 
(be they orphanages, prisons, or psychiatric facilities) of John’s clothing is 
significant because it suggests there is a lack of substantive difference in 
functionality and objective between differing types of establishment. 
Goffman’s Asylums examines the analogies between these organisations, 
including the army, mental hospitals, prisons, and monasteries amongst 
others, and labels each a “total institution” in reference to the all-
encompassing nature and impact of their structure upon individuals 
87 
 
ensconced inside. In Chapter Two, I will develop Goffman’s idea of the total 
institution more fully in relation to Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, 
but the significance of his theories is relevant in the case of John Givings as 
well. The refusal of qualitative differences between prisons and healthcare 
facilities repudiates the therapeutic justification for psychiatric hospitalization 
on curative, medical grounds, and instead suggests that asylums function as 
warehousing for society’s undesirables.  
John’s insistence upon wearing his hospital clothes during visits 
home, which his mother deduces he does for “spite”, can be read as 
inherently political (185). Goffman has argued that by stripping a new patient 
of their own clothes, cosmetics, and other belongings with which they 
routinely maintain their appearance, the institution (the asylum or otherwise) 
is deliberately causing a “personal defacement”, through which the patient’s 
autonomous identity is drastically reduced or even debased (29). This can be 
seen in Mary Jane Ward’s The Snake Pit (1946), when the novel’s 
protagonist, Virginia Cunningham, is required to don a dirty gentleman’s 
overcoat in place of her own garments, which, she is advised have “gone”, 
without further explanation (199). The ward nurse, Miss Green, “throws” a 
pile of coats on the floor and instructs the women to put any of them on. 
Virginia is initially appalled at the treatment of the clothes but is even more 
horrified by the condition of the items she, and the other women, are being 
forced to wear:  
[w]hen she started to button the coat she noticed that 
the front was covered with some sort of dried paste, 
not, she hoped, gravy that had been eaten and 
regurgitated, exactly what it looked like (198-199).  
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The soiled and unsuitable appearance of the coat, along with Miss Green’s 
refusal to answer Virginia’s question, reflects the social status of mental 
patients in American society as both dehumanized and devoid of a basic 
right to dignity.  
   All of this suggests therefore that the garments, or uniform, provided 
by the institution in place of the patient’s own clothes diminishes their 
subjectivity, shared as it is with countless others, ultimately constitutes a 
metaphorical violence against personhood. For Cooper, this is precisely the 
situation within the asylum setting: he argues that “individual personalities 
are murdered” in psychiatric hospitals as persons are forced to conform to 
the role of mental patient (1970, 109). While this statement is characteristic 
of Cooper’s often hyperbolic style, Yates’s narrative supports Cooper’s 
conclusion: by resolutely wearing his hospital issue clothing outside the 
institution, John is demonstrating this attack on his personal integrity, and the 
wider artifice of political freedom that exists within American society. John's 
clothing choice is dually significant since it both makes manifest his position 
as the “sacrificial scapegoat” of the community by forcing others to witness 
the violence socially sanctioned against him (Szasz 1971, 267).  
In addition, however, as Tran has commented, John's sartorial 
choices also suggest that “freedom [is] an illusion… and institutionalization 
[is] the ineluctable condition of being” (203). This posits freedom and 
meaningful self-determination as impossibilities during a time that requires 
close behavioural conformity in order to maintain the appearance of 
American progress and exceptionalism. Whilst the Wheelers and their 
89 
 
neighbours have, on the surface, more liberty than John, his clothing 
functions as a signifier and reminder of pervasive structures of control that 
underpin the ideological moment whether one is incarcerated, hospitalized, 
or at 'liberty'.  
In spite of his deliberate, and at times violent, rejection of polite 
society, John is in fact integral to its longevity. Aware of his inability to 
escape the cultural ideology of the time, John relishes his outward 
representations of the prison experienced by all. Instead of residing in a well-
maintained suburban home and being confined by social codes of 
acceptability, John dramatizes the impossibility of ever fully relinquishing the 
chains of responsibility through his clearly visible punishment. In his rueful 
acceptance of the lunatic role, John in fact helps to perpetuate the system he 
seeks to protest against, and ultimately to escape. In his introduction to 
Foucault’s Madness and Civilization, Cooper explains that our understanding 
of madness requires “others [to be] elected to live out the chaos that we 
refuse to confront in ourselves” and this is precisely the function that John 
undertakes within Revolutionary Road (viii). Instead of confronting and 
working to understand the contradictions Frank labels as “self-deceptions,” 
these doubts and anxieties are instead externalized onto the figure of the 
madman, who is punished for everyone’s secret transgressions (Yates 65). 
Givings functions as a warning to readers of Revolutionary Road of what 
may happen if one steps out of line, while simultaneously demonstrating the 
impossibility of a real alternative. Either one is “imprisoned in Brotherhood” 
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as Whyte puts it, or one is physically institutionalized as mad for protesting 
against the suffocating status quo (365).11 
John Givings: The Madman as Truth-Teller 
Despite their reservations about meeting John in person, April 
describes him, much to her surprise, as “sort of nice… intelligent… brilliant… 
He’s the first person who’s really seemed to know what we’re talking about” 
(192). Indeed, the Wheelers and John have a striking amount in common, 
particularly in their views on rampant consumerism, suburbanization, and 
conformity. For example, John denounces the vapidity of the contemporary 
moment, arguing that: 
You want to play house, you got to have a job. You 
want to play very nice house, very sweet house, then 
you have to get a job you don’t like. Great. This is the 
way ninety-eight-point-nine per cent of the people work 
things out… Anyone comes along and says ‘Whaddya 
do it for?’ you can be pretty sure he’s on a four-hour 
pass from the State funny-farm (187). 
John’s assertion both cuts right to the core of capitalist ideology and directly 
reflects and replays the various monologues that Frank Wheeler performs in 
front of the Campbells and his wife. Both men point out that, in pursuit of 
consumer pleasure, one must sacrifice oneself in the process, submitting to 
a corporate lifestyle where one’s individuality is consistently eroded in lieu of 
greater economic attainment.  
To perpetuate this system, individuals who feel empty and unhappy 
because of their unfulfilling employment or lack of autonomy must be 
                                                          
11 John Givings explicitly refers to himself and his fellow patients as 




persuaded, through advertising and other consumerist ideology, that 
pursuing material wealth and purchasing unnecessary or luxury goods 
(including, one could argue, the procurement of therapeutic services) will 
replace this inner sense of despair. Cushman has claimed that this position 
was key to the post-war years, characterized by a “striving for self-liberation 
through the compulsive purchase and consumption of goods [and] 
experiences”, and, it could be argued, this ability and drive to consume came 
to define American ideals of progress and attainment (211). To that end, one 
could cite the famous so-called kitchen debate between Richard Nixon and 
Nikita Khrushchev in 1959, in which both men engaged in an impromptu 
verbal exchange on the merits of Capitalism and Communism respectively. 
Cushman has written how, during this debate, Khrushchev  
baited Nixon by saying, in effect, 'You think your kitchen 
gadgets are so good? Ours are as good as yours'. 
Nixon retorted by saying, in effect, 'Oh yeah? Our 
country is better than yours because our housewives 
can choose what gadgets to buy. But the choices of 
your housewives are limited and controlled by your 
government! The greatness of America lies in its 
freedom of consumer choice!' (emphasis mine, 222). 
This exchange, however crudely, reveals the paucity of American liberty by 
demonstrating how, despite the national emphasis upon political and 
individual freedom, Americans under capitalism are functioning under an 
ideology as much as their Russian counterparts (except for being able to 
choose a favoured brand of toothpaste or detergent).  
This position lays bare the falsity of political narratives created during 
the twentieth century: as Richard Ohmann points out,  
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Both the war and the Cold War fostered a… polarized 
conception of the world. They were totalitarian 
monsters; we were an open society of free citizens 
pursuing a way of life superior to any other, past or 
present (emphasis original, 211).  
John’s comments however cut through the false ideology of American 
exceptionalism as laid out by Ohmann and reveal the superficial nature of 
the American illusion of meaningful political freedom: the divisions between 
communism and capitalism are revealed to be false exaggerations. As 
Cushman points out, in the post-war years, "[c]onsumer choice had become 
a measure of the ultimate good", the meaning of freedom in place of "political 
freedom" (222). John draws the Wheelers' attention to the futility of their 
continual struggle for personal satisfaction in such a context.  
By pointing out these political illusions and misrepresentations, John 
has been described by Morris Dickstein as a “mad seer” more suited to “the 
Laingian counterculture of the sixties” than the American suburbs of the 
1950s and a Yatesian mode of realist style (220).12 Dickstein is correct to 
point out that several of the so-called anti-psychiatrists, including Laing, 
Cooper, and Foucault argued during the sixties that the mad (usually 
schizophrenic) individual was possessed of a keener perceptive ability than 
their ‘sane’ counterparts. For instance, Laing wrote in The Divided Self that 
“the cracked mind of the schizophrenic may let in light which does not enter 
                                                          
12 This is a valid claim: when Yates engages with mental illness in other 
novels (such as Disturbing the Peace, published in 1975), the character in 
question, such as John Wilder, is depicted as increasingly and 
unquestionably unwell, experiencing hallucinations and psychotic 
breakdowns that are fundamentally different to the way John Givings is 
represented in Revolutionary Road. There is no suggestion in Disturbing the 
Peace that Wilder could be anything other than mentally unstable; there is no 
super-perception evident, only gradual breakdown.  
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the intact minds of many sane people whose minds are closed” (27). In 
addition, Foucault suggested in Madness and Civilization (translated by 
Laing and Cooper in 1961) that since the end of the Middle Ages, the ‘mad’ 
individual in literature and plays has often represented the archetypal 
“guardian of truth” whose function is to “remind… each man of his truth” (11). 
John Givings can be directly related to this archetypal ‘mad’ figure, whose 
function is to destabilize and disturb those apparently sane around him or 
her.  
Cooper also offered an interesting position on the inversion of 
madness and sanity between the ‘sane’ and the psychotic individual by 
characterizing psychosis as an attempt to escape the claustrophobia of a 
social system based on appearances, self-alienation and estrangement. 
Acknowledging the audacity of his comments, Cooper mused that  
One is even tempted to ponder on the daring 
hypothesis that in ‘psychotic’ families the identified 
schizophrenic member by his psychotic episode is 
trying to break free of an alienated system and is, 
therefore, in some sense less ‘ill’ or at least less 
alienated than the ‘normal’ offspring of the ‘normal’ 
families” (emphasis mine, 1970, 52) 
This is an interesting interpretation of the mentally ill individual (particularly 
the schizophrenic) as the last bastion of a sanity based on individual 
autonomy and the ability to break free of the conformist zeitgeist (no matter 
how ill-fated such an attempt might be). This kind of statement demonstrates 
the hyperbolic nature of much of Cooper’s work, something he was criticized 
for throughout his career. For instance, Adrian Chapman has commented 
that Cooper’s statements on mental health and the wider social context often 
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“lack[ed] nuance… and tend[ed] towards sloganeering” (2).  Regardless of 
Cooper’s audacity, Yates’s positioning of Revolutionary Road’s ‘insane’ 
character, John Givings, functions precisely in this way as a truth-teller who 
seeks to undermine the self-annihilating impact of suburban experience on 
American citizens.   
That John is punished so harshly, through hospitalization and 
repeated shock therapies, for occupying this role raises grave questions for 
the psychiatric profession. John’s character forces readers to reassess the 
central assumption of psychiatry and medicine more generally - that illnesses 
are scientific facts and immune from cultural or political influence. As Timothy 
Aubry and Trysh Travis explain, for those who challenged this assumption 
(like Cooper) “categories designed to identify mental illnesses were not… 
neutral scientific descriptions of actual pre-existing conditions” (9). These 
pathologies are not, this argument maintains, simple and irreducible facts, 
but rather symptomatic of a wider and “coercive, ideologically motivated 
taxonomy designed to extend legitimacy and legal rights to those who 
adhered to social conventions while marginalizing those labelled [as] deviant 
or subversive” (Aubry and Travis, 9). In this reading one could assert that 
psychiatric diagnoses are in fact being utilized to justify the incarceration or 
treatment of anyone who challenges or seeks to subvert dominant power 
structures.  
Accordingly, John Givings is acutely aware of the political nature of his 
diagnosis, and his proclamation to Frank that “[a]nyone comes along and 
says ‘Whaddya do it for?’ you can be pretty sure he’s on a four-hour pass 
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from the State funny-farm”, clearly highlights this cognizance (187). John 
relishes his revelatory position, knowing that under the guise of insanity he is 
able to pose disruptive questions and behaviors that would otherwise be 
unthinkable, giving him an air of authenticity that others (the Wheelers and 
the Givings alike) fundamentally lack. As a “madman” John is uniquely able 
to behave as he chooses because this unpredictability and recklessness is 
accepted as part of his mental illness. He has no credibility as an apparently 
free agent and so, ironically, his delineation as insane affords him a greater 
political freedom than his “sane” counterparts.  
Manners, Miscommunications, and Family Ties: The Givingses 
John Givings takes full advantage of this dichotomous position as both 
the freest and simultaneously most overtly institutionalized in Yates’s cast of 
characters. In addition to voicing his belief in the futility of personal 
happiness under the capitalist system, John delights in horrifying his mother 
with his flagrant disregard for manners and decorum. Mrs. Givings, it should 
be acknowledged, is especially attuned to the nuances of social niceties and 
affected gentility and who, as a real estate agent, continually sells the vision 
of the suburbs as an American idyll to new buyers. On one occasion, for 
example, John asks for his sherry to be served with ice in a high-ball glass 
during a visit to the Wheelers’ home; a request that makes his mother, rather 
dramatically, “want […] to die” with embarrassment (Yates 185). During the 
same visit, John takes great pleasure in relaying his mother’s assessment of 
the Wheelers’ plan to move to Paris as “very strange” to April and Frank, 
again in an effort to embarrass her by undermining her agreeable façade by 
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making her duplicitous and gossipy nature obvious (187). John’s delight in 
tormenting his mother is, I argue, a localized expression of his revulsion with 
the social superficiality, and his impatience with the lack of real 
communication or human connection in the suburbs. All of the relationships 
Yates portrays are, to varying degrees, characterized by misunderstandings 
or abortive attempts at communication that consistently fall short, and this is 
what John consistently rails against.  
Furthermore, it could be argued that this pattern of miscommunication 
is so embedded in Yates’s characters that often characters become 
alienated from themselves, unable to authentically communicate their inner 
emotional turmoil to others as Cooper’s concept of self-alienation and 
estrangement suggest. This leads to, in Castronovo and Goldleaf’s terms, 
characters becoming so “[c]aught up in managing impressions of 
themselves, [these] characters lose their identities” (50). In the case of Mrs. 
Givings, this unbroachable division between her feelings and her affected 
outward appearance comes sharply into focus when she bursts into tears in 
her bedroom, distraught over the loss of her youth and the possibilities that 
went with it. She cries because “she was fifty-six years old and her feet were 
ugly and swollen and horrible; she cried because none of the girls had liked 
her at school and none of the boys had liked her” (165). This short moment is 
relatable and honest, demonstrating a human vulnerability that Mrs. Givings 
rarely displays in front of others. Instead, Mrs. Givings predominantly 
presents a polished and highly affected image of herself, delivered in a voice 
that is often depicted as disembodied, demonstrating the schism between 
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her inner and outer selves. For example, when telling April and Frank about 
John, Yates’s narrator switches between Mrs. Givings’s inner thought 
processes, and the speech her voice is apparently performing autonomously: 
the narrative is peppered with terms like “her voice assured them” and “[t]he 
voice went on and on” (161). This dramatizes the split between what Laing 
might have termed the false-self system (to be discussed in Chapter Three) 
and her inner, more authentic self that remains conscientiously hidden from 
view. 
Mrs. Givings prioritizes the preservation of her polished veneer even 
in her own home. Back in her bedroom, as soon as her tears stop, the 
narrator tells us that “all she had to do was go into the bathroom and blow 
her nose and wash her face and brush her hair” to regain her outward 
composure (165). Her sadness remains private and is never communicated: 
she goes downstairs “jauntily” to join her husband (who has turned off his 
hearing aid) and avoids any discussion of her outburst or of her emotional 
state more generally (165). Again, the narrative utilizes free indirect style to 
expose the superficiality of Mrs. Givings’s apparently sunny disposition in this 
moment since the reader is given a privileged insight into her thoughts and 
secret actions. In order to increase the inauthenticity inherent in her 
deportment, the narrator mimics her speech patterns, destroying her thin and 
nervously guarded attempts to keep her dissatisfaction with her life a secret. 
For example, the narrator reports her “high, high hopes” and that she was 
“terribly, terribly, terribly disappointed” when the Wheelers declare their 
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intention to move, mirroring her tendency toward unnecessary exaggerations 
and even shrillness (165).  
Mr. and Mrs. Givings function as a warning of what will become of the 
Wheelers if they remain in the suburbs: a warning that April Wheeler in 
particular heeds by the end of the novel through her fatal escape from her 
biological destiny. The older couple are entirely estranged from one another, 
existing in the same physical space but sharing no real emotional 
connection, nor any real sense of connected or discrete selves. During any 
conversations depicted between the two adult Givingses, misunderstanding 
and miscommunications are rife. For example, as mentioned, Mr. Givings 
often turns off his hearing aid when his wife is speaking, preferring the 
“thunderous sea of silence” to her inane chatter (337). On one occasion 
when Helen Givings is telling him about April and Frank moving to Paris, he 
tries to listen but is distracted by a story in the newspaper: “his eyes kept 
drifting down the newspaper in his lap. A twelve-year-old boy in South Bend, 
Indiana, had applied for a twenty-five-dollar bank loan to buy medicine for his 
dog, whose name was Spot” (163). The narrator’s inclusion of the details of 
the story means that the reader follows Howard Givings’s train of thought, 
until his wife’s voice creeps back into his consciousness, and he realizes that 
“he had lost the thread” of her conversation (the reader only knowing the 
subject of her monologue from the previous scene with the Wheelers) (163).   
This pattern of missed communication and emotional estrangement is 
typical of Cooper’s conception of the middle-class family in the twentieth 
century, something he refers to acerbically (and outrageously) as a “fur-lined 
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beartrap” (1971, 6). He wrote that “[t]he bourgeois nuclear family unit… has 
become… the ultimately perfected form of non-meeting” (1971, 5-6). While 
Cooper’s meaning here is focused on the family as the site of socialization 
and control, rather than specifically referring to failed communication as 
demonstrated above, the correlations between Yates’s emphasis upon 
families and partners as strangers to one another, and Cooper’s take on the 
family structure as inherently alienating to individual members each pertain 
to similar positions. The family, according to Cooper, forces individuals to 
perform their social roles as ‘mother’ ‘father’ etc., rather than encouraging 
open interaction out with this framework, and seeks to curb each member’s 
autonomy in the process. Autonomy, as defined in this situation, is, for 
Cooper,  
laying down the law for oneself, self-rule, and this 
implies an act of rupture by which a person breaks and 
breaks out of an imprisoning system in which his role, 
like that of each other’s, is only that of embodying the 
projections of another and then vicariously living out 
these vague hopes [and] ambitions (1967, 50-51).  
Through Cooper’s definition of autonomy, John Givings’s psychotic break 
and his continued spiteful campaign of bullying against his mother represent 
clear attempts at rupture and self-rule denied to him by his family and by the 
wider social sphere.  
To that end, Cooper warned in 1971 of the developmental dangers of 
stilted or failed autonomy in young children. He wrote that  
[i]f one does not discover one’s autonomy in one’s first 
year of life and if one does not discover it… in later 
childhood, one is either driven mad in late adolescence, 
or one gives up the ghost and becomes a normal 
citizen (17).  
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John’s anger towards his parents, particularly his overbearing mother, can be 
read as a Cooperian hangover from an overly controlling family, and, by 
extension, conformist society that hinders the development of individual 
autonomy. John is punished by society for his desire to protest the familial 
chains of the suburbs and cultivate self-control by psychiatric diagnosis, 
since, as Cooper points out, psychiatry is a tool of “family defense against 
autonomy on the part of its members” (1971, 11). John’s destruction of the 
family home and his resultant forced removal to the asylum clearly 
demonstrates this connection between psychiatry, the traditional family unit, 
the suburban home, and social codes of acceptable behaviour.  
April Wheeler: Unnatural Wife + Unwilling Mother = Mentally Ill? 
 If John Givings’s only alternative to this chronic and lifelong self-
delusion is imprisonment in madness, April Wheeler’s fate is perhaps even 
bleaker. Fundamentally dissatisfied with her dual roles as wife and mother, 
April views both as an impediment to her independence and the reason for 
her squandered potential. Like Esther Greenwood in Sylvia Plath’s The Bell 
Jar, she rails against the traditional family structure and of gendered 
behaviors expected of women during the post-Second World War years. To 
that end, April refers to the practice of ‘settling down’ once children arrive as 
an “enormous, obscene delusion” and as the “great sentimental lie of the 
suburbs” (112). April depicts herself, and her husband, as essentially trapped 
within the cultural expectations of their neighbourhood: she offers up the idea 
of the trip to Paris supposedly to allow Frank to achieve his intellectual 
potential, but the reader realizes long before Frank does that the real 
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impetus behind her plan is to allow her to adopt the role of breadwinner, free 
to leave the house and children behind. When April tells Frank “it’s your very 
essence that’s being stifled here. It’s what you are that is being denied and 
denied and denied in this kind of life”, the reader is aware that it is really 
herself and her own squandered potential she’s referring to, since the 
narrator points out the hollowness of her belief in Frank’s abilities (emphasis 
original, 115).  
The suburban landscape, therefore, is conflated with female 
subservience and passivity. For Deborah Chalmers, this oppressive, 
patriarchal power structure is integral to the very design of the suburban 
community: indeed, she writes that “the built environment [of suburbia] tends 
to institutionalize… patriarchal relations” (87). These communities, according 
to Chalmers, were  
not simply a response to the rising patterns of 
consumption [in] an expanding economy. [They were] 
also a material and cultural expression of the ideology 
of feminine domesticity: woman as homemaker (87).  
Within the suburbs, women were effectively segregated within the domestic 
sphere as housewives and mothers, whilst their men commuted further and 
further distances into towns and cities for work. Robert Fishman agrees, 
arguing that “the new suburban house of the 1950s… existed precisely to 
isolate women and the family from urban economic life” (195). April feels this 
isolation keenly and bitterly regrets relocating to the suburbs. Whether 
accurately or not, April places the blame for both her and Frank’s 
unhappiness in the claustrophobic landscape that, according to Gordon et.al. 
lead to a high proportion of suburban women experiencing psychiatric 
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distress. In one survey of adult psychiatric patients in Bergen county (the 
Gordons’ selected suburban site), for example, the Gordons reported that 
“[t]he number of disturbed young suburban wives is more than half again as 
big as the number of young husbands, and more than three times as big as 
any other group” (26).   
In 1963, two years after Revolutionary Road was first published, Betty 
Friedan published her study into the overwhelming dissatisfaction with the 
domestic role experienced by thousands of housewives nationwide. In The 
Feminine Mystique Friedan wrote that although women were leaving college 
earlier than ever before in an enthusiastic pursuit of marriage and 
motherhood, the domestic bliss they envisaged never materialized, and 
reality was far more grueling than anticipated. Friedan interviewed many 
women who reported losing their sense of self during this process, with one 
saying she had: 
[N]ever had any career ambitions. All I wanted was to 
get married and have four children. I love the kids and 
[my husband] and my home. There’s no problem you 
can even put a name to. But I’m desperate. I begin to 
feel I have no personality. I’m a server of food and a 
putter-on of pants and a bedmaker, somebody to be 
called on when you want something. But who am I? 
(10). 
This frightening and disorientating experience was repeated over and over 
again in Friedan’s research, and was so prevalent and insidious that she 
referred to it as the “problem with no name” (11). April Wheeler is a classic 
example of this bored and unsatisfied suburban housewife. A reluctant 
mother and an unhappy wife, she deludes herself that she is satisfied and 
that her husband is the remarkable man she convinced herself he was when 
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they met. By the end of the novel, however, this façade crumbles and she 
tells Frank that he is nothing more than a “wonderful talker”, cutting through 
his deluded and rapidly eroding sense of self as an intellectual (290). April 
realizes the error she made in marrying Frank, understanding finally that she 
had acquiesced in a sentimental and overly romanticized vision of their initial 
flirtation that should have ended long ago, and now “all honesty, all truth, 
was… far away [and]… hopelessly unattainable” (304). The finality of this 
statement ultimately suggests that April’s late-term home abortion could be 
read as a suicide, with the violence done to her body mimicking the violence 
society perpetuates on women by forcing them to marry and to become 
homemakers, withholding in the process their chance at autonomous 
development.  
Many of the women Friedan interviewed reflected April’s distress, 
confessing to feeling alone and deeply isolated in their distress and believing 
themselves to be defective in some way. Unhappy housewives were “so 
ashamed to admit [their] dissatisfaction” that, according to Friedan, they 
“never knew how many other women shared it” (8). Doctors and psychiatrists 
reported seeing many patients complaining of a vague but pervasive 
experience of discontent, depression, and anxiety. Indeed, so many women 
reported these problems that one doctor labelled it the “housewife’s 
syndrome”, while another called it “the housewife’s blight” (Friedan 10). 
Despite the similarity of their symptoms however, women largely concealed 
these thoughts, shamed by the suffocating feeling that they were in some 
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way to blame, or simply ungrateful, in spite of their comfortable and 
financially secure lives.  
Women in particular who refused to accept their apparent biological 
destiny to be housewives and mothers were considered dubious and 
unnatural, and April Wheeler can be read as a classic example of these most 
socially suspect of cases. For Friedan, women who sought an alternative 
path to motherhood and housewifery during the post-war years were 
interpreted as having rejected their fundamental “nature as women, which 
fulfils itself only through sexual passivity, acceptance of male domination, 
and nurturing motherhood” (60). April’s desire to terminate her pregnancies 
is repugnant to Frank and fundamentally incomprehensible; her reluctance 
towards motherhood is understood as the “most unnatural of conjugal 
problems, a wife unwilling to bear [a] child” (Yates 220).  
This disinclination on April’s part towards her role as housewife and 
mother is rationalized by Frank as symptomatic of a psychiatric disturbance, 
brought on by her non-traditional upbringing. April was raised by a group of 
aunts. Her only relationship with her father was a fleeting and unsatisfactory 
one, while her mother gave her up as a new-born, only visiting occasionally 
during her formative years. Frank attempts to excuse April’s unnatural 
reluctance to bear children, viewing it as intrinsically linked to these 
unorthodox early years: “[w]asn’t it likely, after all, that a girl who’d known 
nothing but parental rejection from the time of her birth might develop an 
abiding reluctance to bear children?” (225). Concern over the lasting impact 
on children’s mental health from unhealthy or unusual family dynamics was 
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rife during the post-Second World War years even prior to warnings from 
Bateson, Laing, Esterson, and Cooper, and Frank’s comments draw direct 
attention to this anxiety. For Weinstein, this rationalization was typical of the 
post-war period, when psychotherapists “attempted to use therapeutic 
means to address social ills such as delinquency and prejudice [by] 
attributing these ills to pathological families”, and that media outlets 
(particularly television) regularly disseminated diatribes on the dangers of 
overbearing mothers and absent fathers (5). For instance, Weinstein writes 
that in 1959 a TV show was aired titled “The Fine Line” that starkly advised 
viewers that the “seeds of insanity could be lurking in your own home” (1). 
The family became the front line in the defense against madness, and 
Frank’s rationale that April’s childhood spent away from her parents and 
surrounded by women was responsible for her reluctance to engage fully 
with her gender-defined destiny would have been understandable to readers 
of Yates’s text, published just two years after “The Fine Line” aired.  
In the Wheeler home, April’s rejection of her role as a nurturing 
mother is, for Frank, a direct result of this unconventional family background. 
Going directly against what he believes to be the natural feminine attitude, 
Frank understands this rejection as a clear indication of mental instability. 
Although he is careful not to utter these words directly, the narrative voice 
tells us that “he managed to say it several times in several different ways” 
(Yates 224). Frank’s desire to believe that his wife is ill (rather than to 
respect, or even consider, that she does not want to bear his children) leads 
to his suggestion that she seek help from the medical profession in an 
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attempt to resolve their conflict. He tries to persuade her, arguing that 
“assuming you are in some kind of emotional difficulty, assuming there is a 
problem of this sort, don’t you see there is something we can do about 
it? …We ought to have you see a psychiatrist” (emphasis original, 226). That 
Frank’s only response is to medicalize April’s protest is telling. He ignores 
any other legitimate reason for April’s unwillingness to have more children, 
and instead tells her she is mentally defective.  
April understands the motivation behind this will to marginalize and 
discredit any protest against the expected behaviors of her gender. Indeed, 
she tells Shep Campbell after their tryst that her unhappiness with her life 
stems from “my own Emotional Problem” (257). The capitalized “E” and “P” 
demonstrate the ideology at play here. April’s unhappiness is categorized as 
a personal issue; there is no recourse allowed to blame society for her 
sadness. Instead, she must internalize it, and bear the shame herself. It is 
she who is damaged and ungrateful, rather than a participant in a social 
system that has forced her into a repressive and meaningless life and 
marriage. Cloud points out that 
[T]he therapeutic, as a situational, strategic discourse… 
dislocates social and political conflicts onto individuals 
or families, privatizes the experience of oppression and 
possible modes of resistance to it, and translates 
political questions into psychological issues to be 
resolved through personal, psychological change (xix).  
Simply put, it is far safer for the dominant socio-political ideology of the time 
to label unhappiness or dissatisfaction with the status quo as an emotional, 
and therefore highly individualized problem, rather than exploring the 
legitimacy of these experiences as rooted in an unsatisfactory or repressive 
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society. To that end, Rose argues that “the therapeutic worldview is a smoke 
and mirrors game, inviting people to believe their problems lie in themselves, 
not in the world” (11). This approach forces individuals to “adjust their 
attitudes rather than fight against injustice”, effectively neutralizing any 
possibility for socio-political protest (Rose 11). By removing or pacifying 
those who defy social convention, all challenge is effectively negated, and 
the system can continue undisturbed. The climax of Revolutionary Road 
reinforces this propensity to situate blame with the aberrant individual. When 
April Wheeler dies following a late-term home abortion attempt, Frank (who, 
despite his own lack of desire for another child, had been determined to 
prevent the termination) exclaims “she did it to herself”, absolving himself 
and society for its part in her decision and violent demise (320).  
When American psychiatrist C. C. Burlingame ran for president of the 
American Psychiatric Association in 1948 he categorically declared that 
psychiatry was a “scientific medical [discipline] and not one… trying to tell 
everyone else what to do and how to live” (qtd. Herman, 8). By the 1960s, 
however, this could no longer be taken for granted. Instead, the legitimacy of 
psychiatric labelling and therapeutic interventions were challenged not only 
by those somewhat cumbersomely grouped together as “anti-psychiatrists”, 
but also by American authors including Richard Yates, Ken Kesey, Sylvia 
Plath and Joanne Greenberg. Revolutionary Road, in common with these 
other sceptics of biomedical psychiatry, seeks to destabilize the supposedly 
constant binary categories of madness and sanity. Yates’s text forces 
readers to “re-evaluate certain… behavioural states that are regarded as 
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morbid” through characters like April Wheeler and John Givings, and to 
understand psychosis or other unconventional behaviours as “more or less 
abortive or successful strategies to achieve autonomy and self-consistency” 
(Cooper 1971, 12). Accordingly, Cooper and Yates, I argue, similarly position 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment as punishment for committing socially 
transgressive acts or behaviours. Madness and sanity are inverted for both 
Cooper and Yates, with the madman or madwoman becoming the ‘sane’ 
individual, while the ‘sane’ suburbanite can be characterized as passive, self-
alienated, and mindlessly conformist.   
This is why Yates’s choice of setting is so important: the suburbs 
occupied (and perhaps continue to occupy) a uniquely circumscribed social 
setting that simultaneously represents American materialist success but also 
American conformity and frustration in the wider cultural consciousness. This 
setting exposes a pointed tension in American society between the freedom 
of the individual and the primacy of autonomy, with the need to project and 
maintain a façade of progress and exceptionalism. By challenging this 
façade, whether through violence against the built environment of the 
suburban dwelling or through rejection of the domestic feminine role (and 
therefore of the ideological primacy of the family), individuals risk being 
extricated from their surroundings and treated as mentally ill.  
This suggests that therapeutic intervention functions as social 
cleansing designed to remove aberrant individuals and to act as deterrent or 
warning to the rest of the community. In Revolutionary Road, both John 
Givings and April Wheeler represent the need to marginalize or discredit 
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those who refuse to align themselves with the zeitgeist of the time: April 
recoils from motherhood and chooses physical violence against the fetus 
inside her, and her own (accidental?) death instead of submitting to the 
ideology of traditional gendered behaviors demanded of her; while John 
Givings is punished for exposing the self-delusions and underlying anxieties 
hidden close to the surface of suburban life. Givings forces his family and 
neighbors to confront the ruptures in the dominant ideology of the time, and 
revels in his knowledge of freedom as a false construct for both himself, his 
fellow inmates, and those out-with the walls of the institution. In consequence 
Yates’s novel, when read alongside the theories of those skeptical of 
psychiatry’s scientific neutrality, demands that readers probe the meaning of 
mental illness and ask ourselves where medicine ends, and socio-political 
control begins.  
Chapters One and Two, taken together, offer a 360 degree view of the 
psychiatric experience, from the outsiders viewing the madman with horror 
and curiosity, to a patient’s perspective of mental health care within the 
psychiatric facility. In the following chapter on Ken Kesey’s One Flew over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest read through a Szaszian framework, I expand upon the 
anxieties prevalent in Revolutionary Road surrounding the legitimacy of 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. Moving beyond Yates’s suburban 
setting, Kesey’s novel takes the reader inside the mental hospital and offers 
a first-person perspective of the closed ward system: exposing along the way 
the restriction of patients’ civil liberties, their systematic infantilization, and 

























While Yates’s Revolutionary Road gave readers an insight into psychiatric 
influence in the community, Ken Kesey’s famous 1962 novel, One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest takes the reader inside the institution itself. Kesey’s text 
takes Yates’s skepticism over the legitimacy of psychiatric medicine even 
further, explicitly demonstrating the violent, dehumanizing, and punitive 
motivations for the use of treatments like shock therapy and lobotomy, where 
Yates’s reservations were largely implicit. Kesey’s text rejects the possibility 
of genuine patient recovery and psychiatric rehabilitation since, in One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, psychiatric diagnosis and treatment are shown to 
be tactics utilized to weed out the socially unwanted rather than to treat the 
genuinely sick. Diagnoses of psychopathy and schizophrenia in particular are 
shown to be the labels applied to troublemakers, the undesirable, or those 
who struggle to assimilate themselves into an industrial society that, as in 
Yates’s text, undermines or denies the possibility of individual autonomy.  
To this end, like the majority of other novels considered herein (except 
for Joanne Greenberg’s I Never Promised You a Rose Garden), One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest utilizes interactions with psychiatry and the 
psychiatric institution allegorically, using psychiatric confinement as political 
synecdoche to explore the major thematic concerns of the early 1960s. 
These underlying contentions can be understood, according to Andrew 
Foley, as the growing discordancy between “individual liberty” and the 
concurrent “oppression” of autonomous personhood in post-war America 
(40). One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, alongside Kesey’s second novel, 
Sometimes a Great Notion, use their various settings effectively to explore 
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this mid-century prioritization of the collective over the autonomous 
individual, understood as an inherent and immediate threat to the 
Emersonian tradition of American individualism. In this chapter, then, I will 
read Kesey’s first novel through this tension between individual freedom and 
collective (or state) power. I will demonstrate, by reading Kesey’s narrative 
alongside the theoretical positions of controversial psychiatrist Thomas 
Szasz, that biomedical psychiatry represents a political tool for the enforced 
adjustment or suppression of those who cannot, or will not, assimilate into a 
conformist, post-war American society. I will also highlight Kesey’s part in a 
cultural heritage of protest writing, via the Beat writers of the 1940s and 
1950s, and demonstrate how these influences manifested themselves in 
Kesey’s later writings in the 1960s.  
These tensions between the individual and the state had come to the 
fore in the years following the end of the Second World War as discussed in 
relation to Revolutionary Road in Chapter One. As Thomas Newhouse 
explains, sociologists and other non-literary writers including “William Reich, 
especially in Listen, Little Man (1948); David Reisman, in The Lonely Crowd 
(1950); C. Wright Mills, in White Collar (1951) and The Power Elite (1956)” 
had pinpointed a “new consciousness by expressing contempt for the 
passive, well-adjusted consumer” (3). This was something Ken Kesey was 
keenly aware of, and his life and literary works can be seen to prioritize the 
rights of the American patriot as fiercely individualistic, following the 
ideologies established by Emerson and other pioneers. As his biographer, 
Rick Dodgson has commented, “Kesey… spent most of his existence living 
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out [the] myth [of rugged individualism] both in his work… and in his personal 
life” (76). Dodgson’s view is confirmed by the importance of this mythology 
throughout Kesey’s novels. 
Sometimes A Great Notion: Emerson, Individualism, and the Stampers 
Tensions between the individual and the collective were so central to 
Kesey’s work that, upon his death in November 2001, the L.A. Times 
explicitly described Sometimes a Great Notion in his obituary as a “gritty 
Pacific Northwest adaptation of Ralph Waldo Emerson's seminal essay ‘Self-
Reliance.’” (Brinkley 1). “Self-Reliance”, written in 1841, has become one of 
Emerson’s most famous works, and argues vehemently for the primacy of 
individualism over the community, and in support of those he labels as 
“nonconformist”. Emerson writes,  
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the 
manhood of every one of its members. Society is a 
joint-stock company, in which the members agree, for 
the better securing of bread to each shareholder, to 
surrender the liberty… of the eater. The virtue in most 
request is conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion (261). 
Although these words were written over a century earlier, Emerson’s 
concerns (including the gendered implications of the term “manhood”) were 
highly pertinent to mid-twentieth-century readers, and for Douglas Brinkley, 
Sometimes a Great Notion sought to explore these anxieties. To this end, 
Kesey’s tale of the Oregon logging family, the Stampers, depicted “rugged 
individualism [as] the prize attribute in a society dominated by nuclear 
weapons, Orwellian Groupthink and Public Opinion Polls” (Brinkley 1). In this 
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conceptual company, individualism, however stubborn, becomes a political 
stance against post-war conformity.    
The Stampers maintain their obstinately self-reliant position 
throughout the novel, emphasized by their family motto, “NEVER GIVE AN 
INCH”, which both literally and figuratively replaces the statement “blessed 
are the meek” on the Stamper nursery wall (1977, 31). Even the family’s 
isolated position within the wild Oregon landscape evokes this ideology, with 
the family home set apart from the local community, built on the river’s edge 
where it somehow alone defies the power of natural erosion. Instead of 
carefully planning where to build their home, considering the “yearly six 
inches the Wakonda Auga [the river] takes as its yearly toll” (1977, 3), the 
Stamper home stands in a splendid isolation on the banks, where it 
“acknowledged no zone of respect for nobody and surrendered seldom a 
scant inch, let alone a hundred or so yards” (1977, 4). This position mirrors 
the conflict between the Stamper brothers and the local community, centred 
around the Stampers’ decision to break a logging strike for personal profit.  
Sometimes a Great Notion has been understood by critics such as 
Barry H Leeds as more mature in terms of character development and prose 
style than One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, with a movement towards 
complex non-linearity and shifting narrative perspective that lend a 
“sophistication” to the text that is both “impressive and gratifying to the 
reader” (60). Whilst there is merit to Leeds’ comments, this chapter will focus 
on Kesey’s first novel One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, in order to 
demonstrate how the narrative’s choice of setting within the psychiatric 
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institution functions synecdochally to illustrate the tension between an 
Emersonian conception of American self-reliance and the increasing 
authority of the bureaucratic state in the post-Second World War years that 
runs throughout both texts.  
Kesey, the Beats, and the Counter-Culture 
Psychiatry, for Kesey, operates as a singular (albeit powerful) branch 
of an overall system of mass-subjugation that seeks to quash individual 
autonomy to preserve the illusion of a harmonious status quo. As in 
Revolutionary Road, psychiatric interventions function as tools of a social 
police force, while the institution itself represents the locus of punishment 
through violence and procedures falsely labelled “treatments”. These 
included shock therapies and lobotomies carried out to achieve adjustment 
to social norms and/or the brutal suppression of those seen as 
troublemakers. These politically charged themes directly connect Kesey’s 
novel with the cultural counter-narrative against the increasing power of 
psychiatry that I argue comes to the fore in the literature of the early 1960s. 
By revealing the ‘true’ underlying impetus behind psychiatric intervention 
Kesey’s text entirely rejects the veneer of medical legitimacy conferred upon 
psychiatry, and instead demonstrates its position as state-sponsored conduct 
corrector and subjugator of personal autonomy.  
These concerns have also been broadly linked to another group of 
writers whom Kesey claimed as influences upon his own work. Known as the 
Beat Generation, this group, particularly active in the immediate post-Second 
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World War decades, centred around literary works by Jack Kerouac, Allen 
Ginsberg, and William S. Burroughs, amongst others. Kesey has been 
included in this group by some writers: Ann Charters included Kesey in her 
anthology of Beat writers (although even here Kesey’s allegiance with the 
Beats is one of influence and continued stylistic evolution rather than strict 
imitation) (13).  
The Beat movement is notoriously hard to define, however. To that 
end, David Sterritt has argued that, although the group could more 
accurately be described as a “loosely knit collective rather than an organized 
movement”, these writers nevertheless “shared a deeply felt disappointment 
with the shallowness and acquisitiveness of American culture” at the mid-
century, that manifested itself as an “angry assault on the conformity… of 
postwar society” (1). These are values that manifest themselves throughout 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest and Kesey has explicitly cited each of the 
three writers mentioned above as influences on his work. Kesey was so 
impressed by Kerouac’s 1957 novel On the Road when it came out that he 
read it several times, memorializing the moment in his short story about the 
death of Neal Cassady titled “The day superman died”. In the story Kesey 
wrote that his protagonist, Devlin Deboree (a fictionalized self-portrait), had 
“read it three times before… heading off to California. Hoping … to join that 
joyous voyage, like thousands… inspired by the same book…and, of course, 
its incomparable hero” (71). Kesey even wrote what Charters termed an 
unpublished “North Beach novel” (“Zoo”) referring to the famous Beat 
hangout in San Francisco where Allen Ginsberg gave the first public reading 
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of his ground-breaking poem “Howl”, and where Kesey sought out Neal 
Cassady, the inspiration for Kerouac’s Dean Moriarty (307).  
  Kesey reiterated this profound admiration for Kerouac’s work thirty 
years later, when he told Peter Faggen that he was saddened by his own 
failure to tell Kerouac “how much his work meant to me” during their 
disappointing first meeting at a party arranged by Neal Cassady (152). Tom 
Wolfe later characterized this encounter as awkward, with each man 
standing in an uncomfortable silence, symbolically separated by Cassady. 
Wolfe wrote, “Kesey and Kerouac didn’t say much to each other”, and the 
feeling was that “Kerouac was the old star” while Kesey “was the wild new 
comet from the West heading Christ knew where” (94). Although this 
statement was written four years after the event, and much of Wolfe’s 
recounting can be regarded as unreliable, this remark echoes comments 
made by critics who have interpreted Kesey as a transitionary figure in 
literary history, connecting the Beat generation with the hippies of the 1960s. 
As Ann Charters commented, “As a writer Kesey served an important 
historical role, with Neal Cassady, of linking the Beats with the later 
psychedelic generation” (314). Neal Cassady, standing in between Kesey 
and Kerouac at the 1964 New York party recounted by Wolfe, can be 
understood as the physical lynchpin connecting the Beat’s “protest writing” 
(as labelled by writer Seymour Krim) and the counter-culture of the 1960s 
that Kesey would come to typify (10). The ideological lynchpin was that of the 
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primacy of the individual and the authentic in an increasingly commodified 
and sanitized society policed by psychiatry.13  
Cassady played a fundamental role in Kesey’s development, as well 
as connecting Kesey with the Beats by association. Later the driver of 
Kesey’s psychedelic school bus “Furthur”, Cassady was intimately linked 
with works by central figures of the Beat movement. He was the inspiration 
for the lusty, carefree figure of Dean Moriarty in On The Road; the model for 
John Clellon Holmes’ Hart Kennedy in Go (labelled as the first Beat novel, 
published in 1952); and the “secret hero” of Allen Ginsberg’s notorious poem 
“Howl” (Ginsberg 128). One could even suggest that Cassady as a cultural 
legend was influential in the development of Kesey’s hyper-masculine anti-
hero, Randle P. McMurphy, who tells his fellow patients in One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest that he’s locked up for “fight[ing] too much” and “fuck[ing] 
too much” (18). The similarities between McMurphy and Cassady are clear: 
Ginsberg described Cassady, his friend and sometimes lover, as the 
“cocksman and Adonis of Denver” in “Howl” (128), and, as Gerald Nicosia 
has pointed out, Cassady ran into trouble in Denver after getting “several 
girls pregnant”, as well as juggling lovers of both genders (95). Although 
Cassady, unlike McMurphy, had a life-long aversion to violence, he was well-
known to law enforcement across the United States as a “hard-core thief” 
                                                          
13 This connection between psychiatry and spiritual impoverishment in a 
commodified, conformist America was touched upon by Krim when he wrote 
that “Beat writing… didn’t come out of nowhere, even though it hit us that 
way; it came, grew, then overthrew the gags of taste and repression out of 
an awful soul-need that couldn’t be petted and then put back in its cage by 
psychiatry” (11). Psychiatry, in Krim’s reading, represents a tranquilizing 
force that protects the socio-political zeitgeist.  
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who, before his twenty-first birthday had stolen “some five hundred cars” 
(Nicosia 95). Cassady showed a blatant disregard for penal codes and social 
obligations, but despite these flaws, Kesey told Faggen that Cassady was a 
“great teacher” and a “hero” to him and later to his associates, the Merry 
Pranksters, on their cross-country trip in 1964 (150). Cassady ultimately 
reinforced Kesey’s belief that “living an adventurous or reckless life was a 
way to make one’s existence more meaningful”, something clearly applicable 
to the figure of McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest (Dodgson 
46).  
 Whilst Cassady was not an established writer in his lifetime (and even 
after his death is better known for his letters and personal associations than 
his novel, The First Third, published posthumously in 1971), according to 
Nicosia, Cassady is nonetheless responsible for changing “the course of 
American literature” through his influence on writers like Kerouac, Ginsberg, 
and even Kesey (98). One example of Cassady’s influence can be found in 
his “Great Sex Letter” to Kerouac, penned in 1947, that described Cassady’s 
attempts to seduce two women on a bus journey to Colorado. The letter 
ended with a postscript that read “Please read this illegible letter as a 
continuous chain of undisciplined thought” and, in Bill Morgan’s words, this 
glib recommendation “was a revelation” to Kerouac, allowing him to see “that 
it was possible to write in the same manner as people spoke… from then on, 
he tried to make his written work sound as unaffected and natural as his 
spoken words” (26-27). The immediacy and sense of authenticity that Kesey 
so admired in Kerouac’s writing stemmed from this moment. 
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  Kesey commented in a 1963 interview with Gordon Lish that he 
understood Kerouac not as a novelist but as a “reporter”, and that a 
“thousand years from now when [people] want to know what was going on in 
our day, they’ll have to read Kerouac” (23). This statement demonstrates 
Kesey’s appreciation of individual authenticity as crucial to the impact and 
effectiveness of Kerouac’s writing, and reinforces Beat writer John Clellon 
Holmes’s assertion that “everything self-conscious and artificial that 
separates literature from life… has to go” (24). This sentiment prioritizes 
communication between individuals, the reader and the writer, rather than 
paying heed to literary conventions or style. Thus, Kerouac was inspired to 
write spontaneously, in long sessions fuelled by caffeine and drugs, as did 
Ginsberg (although Ginsberg was not averse to editing or revisions, as 
Kerouac was). In this way, Beat writers sought to convey individual 
experiences as directly as possible with their readers, endeavouring to 
establish a new, flourishing form of literary expressionism and creativity.  
These were beliefs that Kesey shared and sought to propagate: in an 
interview with Pacifica Radio in 1965, for example, Kesey reflected upon the 
practice of teaching children how to write properly (with regards to grammar 
for example), and the implications that this instruction has upon the future 
expressive potential of the evolving individual consciousness. Kesey states 
that once the school children in his example had completed a story-writing 
task, their teacher: 
Had gone through [the stories] and corrected [their] 
mistakes and brought them into line grammatically, 
making sense, tense and stuff. Well, what did the child 
learn from this experience? Not how to express oneself, 
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but the child learned at this point that there is an 
accepted, correct way to express, to communicate, and 
that anything that veers outside of this is marked with a 
red ballpoint pen. And so we’re locked inside of this 
thing (Pacifica Radio 32). 
Compliance with structures that bind expression to firmly-established 
frameworks ultimately, for Kesey, remove any creative integrity or 
revolutionary potential from the writing process. The function of literature, in 
Kesey’s opinion, was its revelatory communicative potential, something he 
admired in Beat writers like William Burroughs, Jack Kerouac and Allen 
Ginsberg. According to Faggen, Kesey claimed that “the job of the writer is 
that of an exterminator. You’re trying to battle the evil bugs that have crawled 
into our works and get in the way of exploring the hollow” (159-160). By only 
propagating a narrow conception of what literature could and should be, the 
potential of the form is diminished. The novelist has “sold out” and the form 
no longer holds communicative worth between writer and reader, rather it 
endlessly regurgitates aesthetic reworkings of older texts (Pacifica Radio 32). 
This was why, after the publication of Sometimes a Great Notion in 1964, 
Kesey abandoned writing for a period to focus on more immediate forms of 
aesthetic expression, like his film of the Merry Pranksters’ trip across 
America.  
Other than the Beat writers Kesey admits to admiring, he also singles 
out those like Herman Melville who, in Kesey’s words, “had a vision in his 
mind of what [Moby Dick (the novel)] was going to look like, and he trusted 
himself to follow it through all the way” (Faggen 157). Kesey was also 
influenced by William Faulkner, whose prose Kesey views as neither self-
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aware nor inhibited because it “doesn’t have time for a mirror. It’s tumbling 
and tumbling, and this takes trusting and courage” (Faggen 156). This 
admiration for individual artistic or intellectual integrity is shared by Emerson, 
whose “Self-Reliance” essay opens by praising the bravery of a person who 
trusts their own vision, instead of supinely prioritising the words of those 
gone before. Emerson writes that “[a] man should learn to detect and watch 
that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the 
lustre of the firmament of bards and sages” (259). In this essay Emerson is 
at pains to convey that the greatest potential lies within the individual, and 
that the individual should be raised up to achieve that potential unhindered 
by social rules or obligations to the wider collective. Societal responsibility, 
for Emerson, relentlessly dulls the potency of its individual members. This is 
a message Kesey is also at pains to communicate throughout One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo’s Nest in the tension between Randle P. McMurphy as an 
enlightening (but destructive) force, and the Combine (Chief Broom’s 
characterization for corporate, conformist America), represented by the 
psychiatric ward controlled by Nurse Ratched.  
 Individual experience was fundamental to Kesey’s choice of setting for 
his debut novel. As John Clellon Holmes wrote in the introduction to his 
novel, Go, Beat writers often wrote “directly from our own lives” to better 
communicate their experiences with readers (qtd. Charters and Charters 
177). Kesey approached his work with a similar ideology, albeit 
understanding himself as a “parabolist” rather than a “reporter” in the 
Kerouac sense (Lish 17). By this, Kesey explains, he doesn’t  
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ask my reader to believe characters or situations exist 
anyplace other than in our minds” but that they are 
possible, in order to convey a particular moral point 
(Lish 17-18).  
Kesey based his work on real-life experiences and took the necessity of 
individual experience so seriously that he voluntarily agreed to undergo 
electroconvulsive therapy while working at Menlo Park VA Hospital’s 
psychiatric ward because he believed that “writer[s] must work from what 
[they] know” (Lish 16).  
Kesey and Thomas Szasz 
These extreme lengths earned Kesey the admiration of Thomas 
Szasz, who wrote to Kesey that, in his opinion, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest was a “tremendous achievement” and that he 
couldn’t help trying to guess how you had figured out so 
much about the mental health game, and my first guess 
was that you had put in some time as an attendant. But 
I certainly would never have guessed that you had tried 
EST: my hat is off to you (4 March 1963). 
This was not the only correspondence between Szasz and Kesey. Other 
letters exist that demonstrate their respect for one another, such as Kesey’s 
comment that it would be an “honor” for Szasz to include excerpts from One 
Flew in an upcoming book by Szasz (28 February 1963), as well as Kesey’s 
comment “Long Live Thomas Szasz!” in a letter decrying electroconvulsive 
therapy to Madness Network News Reader in 1974 (180).14 We can surmise 
from these communications that Kesey was familiar with Szasz’s libertarian 
                                                          
14 Unfortunately, Kesey was not featured by Szasz in the final version of 
Szasz’s book titled The Age of Madness (1975). I have been unable to find 
any correspondence between Szasz and Kesey’s publisher to ascertain the 
reason for this omission. Sylvia Plath’s short story “Johnny Panic and the 
Bible of Dreams” does feature, however.   
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position on involuntary institutionalization and psychiatric intervention laid out 
in The Myth of Mental Illness (1961) around the time of the novel’s release.  
Personal autonomy and self-responsibility were profoundly important 
to Kesey and formed the lynchpin of his political ideology, emphasizing this 
connection with the libertarian Szasz. This position is evident not just in his 
books, but also in the way he chose to live. During Kesey’s trip across the 
United States with the Merry Pranksters in 1964, for instance, every 
individual member was expected to look after themselves, without relying on 
others for support. Those unable to withstand the relentless pace of the 
journey were expected to recognize their deficiencies and leave, instead of 
holding up group progress. 
Kesey defined this as either being on or off the bus, and this 
philosophy was rigidly implemented even in the case of illness. Several 
Pranksters either left or were taken ill during the trip, with a number being 
committed to psychiatric institutions en route. Cathy Casamo, also known as 
“Stark Naked”, was one of the pranksters who received psychiatric treatment 
during the trip across America (in her case after being arrested) and who 
was left behind by the group. According to Wolfe’s account, she ended up in 
the “County psychiatric ward, and that was that, for the Pranksters were long 
gone” (82). Interestingly, given the anti-psychiatric message inherent in 
Kesey’s book, Casamo’s partner, Larry Hankin, claimed that when he asked 
the Texas police department why Casamo had been taken to the local 
asylum in Houston, he was told it was because “She bit the arresting officer”, 
to which he replied incredulously, “What’s that got to do with anything? 
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That’s resisting arrest: the county asylum for resisting arrest?” (“Cathy’s 
Disappearance”). 
Wolfe described Kesey’s stance in his account of the Merry 
Pranksters’ trip across American thus:  
‘There are going to be times… when we can’t wait for 
somebody. Now, you’re either on the bus or off the bus. 
If you’re on the bus and you get left behind then you’ll 
find it again. If you’re off the bus in the first place – then 
it won’t make a damn’ (78). 
Emphasis for Kesey was on individual members of the group as responsible 
for themselves, and the group therefore as a collective of self-reliant 
autonomous members with a common goal.  The ideal community, for 
Kesey, would be a group where each individual shared what Szasz called 
the “double-edged sword” of autonomy that safeguards freedom on one hand 
and “requir[es] responsibility on the other” (1983 16).  
This vision of the communal ideal corresponds with Emersonian 
ideology and therefore connects Kesey’s society of autonomous individuals 
within a specifically American intellectual lineage. Emerson argued that “the 
great man is he who in the midst of the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness 
the independence of solitude” (263). There is, however, an obvious problem 
with this position: how can an individual function in, and retain, complete self-
reliance within a community that demands connections between individuals 
to function? This dualism seems improbable and even impossible. For 
George Kateb, the ideal Emersonian community is based upon a “theory of 




[W]orld will be better off and all the better without the 
deliberate attempt to make it better [this refers to 
Emerson’s derision of charity]. It will be better because 
it will be more moral, but also more human. It will be 
more human because the world will be made up of 
individuals rather than masses, of individuals, not 
dependents and recipients, not instruments and 
followers (139).  
Emerson’s derision of what Kateb refers to as the “masses” derives from his 
belief that social relations inhibit individual potential, and that men who abide 
by social conventions necessarily temper their creative and moral 
possibilities to remain within the safe confines of the group.  
 This, for Szasz, Kesey, and other Beat writers like Seymour Krim and 
Allen Ginsberg, is where psychiatry comes in as a socio-political tool. In his 
1973 work, the Manufacture of Mental Illness, Szasz argues that the term 
“mental illness” can be reduced to the “psychiatric denigration of 
nonconformists” and indeed, these various writers, including Kesey, support 
this argument through their work (23). In his essay, “The Insanity Bit” (1960), 
which Szasz reproduced in his collection, The Age of Madness, Seymour 
Krim describes his harrowing experience as a psychiatric patient at the mid-
century and labels the mental institution a “human assembly line” that cares 
little (or not at all) about the humanity of its patients (64). Krim wrote that, 
during his stay he experienced “needless” electroshock therapy that “clubbed 
[his] good brain into… unconsciousness” (64) and he saw that  
[I]nsanity and psychosis can no longer be respected as 
meaningful definitions but are used by limited 
individuals in positions of social power to describe ways 
of being and thinking that are alien, threatening, and 
obscure to them (emphasis original, 67).    
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Just as Szasz rejects the medical legitimacy of the terms “madness”, “mental 
illness”, and other associated nomenclature and classifications as 
“metaphors”, Krim here reveals the underlying socio-political power of 
psychiatry to dictate and enforce adjustment to behavioural norms upon 
those who fail to assimilate harmoniously into society.  
Allen Ginsberg: Howl and Psychiatric Cruelty 
 Allen Ginsberg, friend to and literary influence upon Kesey, was also 
profoundly aware of psychiatry’s position within the context of individual and 
social control, understanding the discipline as part of a violent machinery 
designed to oppress troublesome citizens. Kesey told Todd Brendan Fahey 
in 1992 that Ginsberg, in his opinion, was a “warrior first and a poet second”, 
something he sought to emulate in his novels, including One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest (130). Unsurprisingly therefore, throughout Ginsberg’s poetic 
career themes of threatened or frustrated personal liberty are common, as 
are instances of oppression. Paul Christensen has commented that, “from 
his earliest writings, [Ginsberg] has been the champion of individual freedom, 
and his lifelong adversary has been social control” (215). Ginsberg’s poem 
“Howl”, first performed publicly in 1955, offers a particularly violent 
exploration of these issues with psychiatry at their core.  
Dedicated to Carl Solomon, a patient in the New York Psychiatric 
facility where Ginsberg was placed for “rehabilitation” after police discovered 
his flat to be “a cache for stolen property”, “Howl” has been understood as 
fundamentally important to the Beat movement and mid-century protest 
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writing more generally (Christensen 221). Critic Jason Shinder, for instance, 
has described Howl as “the critical ‘outsider poem’ of the modern era” (xxii), 
identifying the aloof stance of the poetic voice, observing morosely the 
destruction of “the best minds of my generation” in an American spiritual 
wasteland characterized by desperation and disillusionment (L1, 126). 
Ginsberg writes in part one of Howl that these “best minds” were, in distress, 
given “the concrete void of insulin/ metrasol electricity hydrotherapy 
psychotherapy /occupational therapy pingpong and amnesia” (L 179-181, 
130) as supposed treatments, while held captive in asylums described as 
“foetid halls/bickering with the echoes of the soul” (L 187 – 188, 130) with 
“bodies turned to stone as heavy/ as the moon” (L 190-191, 130). These are 
violent and dehumanizing situations, where psychiatric treatments and 
hospitals (Ginsberg mentions several by name, including Pilgrim’s State and 
Rockland, both in New York state, and Greystone, in New Jersey) function 
nefariously as punitive places that strip patients of humanity and self-hood.  
Psychiatry as “liberticide” 
 Ginsberg’s characterization of mental hospitals and psychiatric 
treatments can be related to comments made by Szasz throughout his 
career, rejecting the therapeutic value of these supposed medical 
interventions in cases of psychopathology. Since, as Szasz maintained, 
mental illnesses do not exist, what, he asks rhetorically,  
does the psychiatrist fight against? Against freedom! ... 
The psychiatric doctor fights against the freedom that 
makes the mental patient dangerous to himself and 




This, like many of Szasz’s pronouncements, is clearly a controversial 
standpoint, but it demonstrates the unequivocal primacy of civil liberties to 
Szaszian ideology, as well as his conception of involuntary psychiatry as a 
social tool of subjugation. 
Szasz’s views are often shocking, given their extreme nature, but they 
are perhaps most jarring when one considers the position of suicidal 
individuals hospitalized for what is generally, in Western societies, 
considered to be their own good (i.e. the preservation of human life). In the 
introduction to his book, Suicide Prohibition: The Shame of Medicine (2011), 
Szasz argues that  
Laws that enable some persons [the medical and legal 
communities] to lock up some other persons whose 
behavior they find upsetting [i.e. displaying suicidal 
impulses] have nothing to do with health, medicine, or 
treatment: they are a system of extra-legal social 
controls without the due-process safe guards of the 
criminal justice system (xiii).   
According to Szasz’s libertarian principles, individuals who choose to commit 
violence against themselves, even to the extent of self-murder, should be 
allowed to exercise their free will to do so without the state’s intervention 
through psychiatric treatment or commitment to a mental hospital.  
In fact, the only caveat Szasz adds is that “suicidal activity, like any 
intimate bodily personal activity, ought to be permissible only in private”. This 
is because, in his opinion, 
Public displays of self-harm or of the intention to kill 
oneself – exemplified by a person’s threatening to jump 
from a high building – are an interference on the 
everyday activities of others and a violation of their 
rights (emphasis mine, 3) 
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These displays should therefore, according to Szasz, be punishable by 
criminal law. This statement makes sense in abstraction as the rational 
endpoint to the libertarian worldview, a political stance defined by David 
Boaz as the “philosophy of freedom”, whose members “believe… [that] 
people ought to be free to live as they choose” (1). From a humanitarian 
standpoint that understands human life as inherently sacred, however, 
Szasz’s perspective lacks compassion and humility, appearing instead as 
cold and indifferent to the potentially relievable suffering of others.  
Szasz has rightly been criticised for the extremity of his libertarian 
worldview in the context of psychiatric interventions, and especially for the 
paucity of his suggestions for functioning alternatives. As set out in The 
Manufacture of Madness, Szasz divides psychiatry into two diametrically 
opposed paradigms: the first, he terms “Institutional Psychiatry” and the 
second, “Contractual Psychiatry”. Institutional Psychiatry, for Szasz, 
represents collectivist impulses to adjust or otherwise quash troublesome 
and non-compliant individuals: he writes that this kind of treatment, often 
imposed involuntarily upon the patient, is characteristically carried out by 
“psychiatrists employed by state mental hospitals, college health services, 
military organizations, courts, [and] prisons”, and functions to “protect and 
uplift the group (the family, the State), by persecuting and degrading the 
individual” (1970, xxvii – xxix). Under this kind of psychiatric system, the 
agent of the state, i.e. the psychiatrist or other form of health care worker, is, 
for Szasz, a “bureaucratic employee” who is “paid for his services by a 
private or public organization (not by the individual who is his ostensible 
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client)” (xxvii). This economic exchange is imperative for Szasz: if the 
psychiatrist is not being paid for his or her services directly by the patient, 
then they are unlikely to be working purely for the patient’s benefit within a 
properly defined contractual relationship. 
As Szasz points out in The Myth of Mental Illness, if the doctor 
involved is funded by the State or even by an insurance company, it is 
unclear whose interests the psychiatrist represents. In case of payment by a 
medical insurance company, Szasz writes, the answer is  
not clearly defined. As a result, it is possible for the 
physician to shift from one position to another. He may 
act entirely on behalf of the patient one minute, and line 
up against him the next (1975, 72).  
In the case of state funding, Szasz views the situation as even more 
damaging in the case of “so-called mental illnesses” (1975, 72). Szasz draws 
subtle comparisons between the American healthcare system and the State 
funded medical treatment facilities available to citizens of the Soviet Union, 
by pointing out that when doctors and other professionals work as part of the 
State apparatus, they contribute towards psychiatry as a tool for social 
control. Szasz writes that “The Soviet physician is identified with, and serves 
the interest of, the communist state”, and since Soviet psychiatrists were not 
paid for by their patients but by the state they “do not owe their primary 
loyalties to [their patients]”, with a clear inference that this represents a 
dangerously analogous situation to American state-funded institutional 
psychiatry (1975, 77). 
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To protect the integrity of the therapeutic relationship Szasz 
suggested the replacement of all involuntary psychiatric treatments with one-
to-one private practice in the context of a free economic marketplace. To 
ensure the abolition of coercion in psychiatry, these private practices were to 
be underpinned by consent rather than coercion, and an understanding of 
the physician as a service provider paid directly by the client. This financial 
aspect of the relationship was key to Szasz: he wrote that  
If the physician is hired by someone other than the 
patient, or is paid by another party, the medical 
relationship will no longer fall in the category of Private 
Practice… This definition highlights, firstly, the two-
person nature of the relationship, and secondly, the 
autonomy and self-determination of the patient” 
(emphasis original, 1975, 73). 
The relationship between Szasz’s libertarian politics and this statement is 
key, and in abstraction, there is a comprehensible sense of idealism at the 
root of Szasz’s suggestion. However, as critics like Peter Sedgwick have 
highlighted, these positions are enormously unrealistic and highly skewed 
towards the health and well-being of the economically privileged who are 
often the least likely to need access to psychiatric medicine for acute care. 
Consequently, in Psychopolitics Sedgwick complained that “Only the mildest 
mental disorders [i.e. the worried well] could possibly be handled within 
[Szasz’s] framework,” (155). This situation would leave the hundreds of 
thousands suffering from psychiatric distress without assistance, be it 
medical or otherwise, due to lack of financial privilege.   
With regards to the ethics of psychiatric confinement, Kesey holds a 
similar political position to Szasz in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest: 
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equating authoritarian psychiatric interventions with communistic, anti-
American ideology. It is significant, for example, that Randle P McMurphy, 
Kesey’s fiercely individualistic anti-hero who encourages the men to fight 
back against the unrelenting power of Big Nurse, was, the reader is told, 
previously awarded the “Distinguished Service Cross in Korea, for leading an 
escape from a Communist prison camp” (42). These political overtones are 
so apparent throughout the narrative that Kesey admitted in a 1993 interview 
that Cuckoo’s Nest was “to some extent, anti-American”, and intimated that, 
for that reason, it had been popular in “all the Communist-bloc countries” 
(158). Expanding on this, Kesey explained that Cuckoo’s Nest was, at its 
heart, about “American terror. Big Nurse works for an American bad guy, the 
combine, the inhuman part of American industrialism” (158).  
The Combine and Post-War Conformity 
The Combine, directly connected here with the dehumanizing impact 
of rampant post-war capitalist growth, occupies a powerful position in 
Kesey’s novel. It functions as the nebulous but omnipresent threat of either 
gradual individual inculcation and adjustment or violent suppression into the 
corporate collective of American mid-century society. This fear is directly 
relatable to the suburban anxiety counterfeited in the Wheelers’ performative 
monologues, and to the indignance that motivated John Givings’s violent 
protest in Yates’s Revolutionary Road. Chief Bromden, Kesey’s supposedly 
deaf and dumb schizophrenic narrator, understands the Combine as a 
powerful homogenising force that crushes individuality and inner-vitality. On 
the way to the docks for the fishing expedition, Bromden looks out the 
134 
 
window and notes with horror the progress the Combine has made on the 
American landscape while he’s been in hospital:  
All up the coast I could see the signs of what the 
Combine had accomplished since I was last through 
this country, things like, for example, a train stopping at 
a station and laying a string of full-grown men in 
mirrored suits and machined hats, laying them like a 
hatch of identical insects, half-life things coming pht-
pht-pht out of the last car, then hooting its electric 
whistle and moving on down the spoiled land to deposit 
another hatch (italics original, 203).  
Bromden’s description here is important for several reasons. Stylistically, it 
provides a strong example of the surrealist element to Kesey’s narrative, 
something that could be attributed to the influence of LSD on the writing 
process of One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. According to Ann Charters, 
Kesey’s “hallucinated but colloquial pose style was something new in fiction”, 
which connected Kesey with the Beats by demonstrating a fundamental 
commitment to literary directness and originality (308).  Bromden’s powerful 
use of imagery also demonstrates his position as diametrically opposed to 
the Combine as a force of technological advancement, through Kesey’s word 
choice: “I could see the signs of what the Combine had accomplished since I 
was last through this country” (emphasis mine, 203). Although this could be 
read as simply indicating that Chief Bromden has been incarcerated in the 
psychiatric system for a long period of time, I argue instead that this 
opposition indicates the polarisation between Bromden, descended from the 
indigenous population and understood by critics like Kingsley Widmer as 
representative of the “primordial American" who lived from the land; and the 




Native Americans, Nature, and the Combine 
In what could be argued to be a rather unimaginative, cliched 
connection between the natural world and the Native American, Bromden’s 
linkage with the landscape is emphasised throughout the novel, particularly 
at pivotal or otherwise significant moments in the narrative. One example of 
this recurrent connection comes mid-way through Kesey’s text, when 
Bromden wakens one night in the asylum more aware of his surroundings 
and alert than he has been in some time, something he equates entirely with 
McMurphy’s arrival and the disturbance caused to the Combine’s previously 
unchallenged position by McMurphy’s insubordination. Upon looking out the 
windows onto the countryside beyond the hospital perimeter, he begins to 
focus on the moon and recalls how as a youngster 
I [had] noticed the exact same thing when I was off on a 
hunt with Papa and the uncles and I lay rolled in 
blankets Grandma had woven, lying off a piece from 
where the men hunkered around the fire… in a silent 
circle. I watched that big Oregon prairie moon above 
me (142). 
Reconnection with the natural world, Bromden’s cultural heritage, and a 
sense of autonomous, powerful masculinity, are all here connected in this 
poignant memory and are juxtaposed with Bromden’s confinement in the 
sterile environment of the hospital.  
During the same episode Bromden becomes aware of a young dog 
excitedly exploring the “digger squirrel holes” in the land outside the hospital, 
sniffing each and rolling around in the wet grass (142). Through Bromden’s 
rapt descriptions of the animal, Kesey draws a connection between dogs and 
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the Chief that is repeated throughout the novel. In this instance the same air 
“full of smells so wild [they make] a young dog drunk” (142) is the same 
breeze that Bromden describes as “clear and had a taste to it [that] made me 
feel kind of giddy and drunk, [and] gave me this sudden yen to get up out of 
bed and do something” (141). Kesey also describes how the dog “suddenly 
froze still with one paw lifted and his head tilted, listening”, while Bromden 
does the same: “I listened too, but I couldn’t hear anything… Then, from a 
long way off, I heard a high, laughing gabble, faint and coming closer. 
Canada honkers going south for the winter”. This sound triggers another 
memory from Bromden’s youth, connected with the land: “I remembered all 
the hunting and belly-crawling I’d ever done trying to kill a honker, and that I 
never got one” (142). This moment is highly significant as it again offers a 
point of connection between the young dog exploring the landscape freely 
and the Chief, locked away in the asylum but keenly watching and vicariously 
participating in the animal’s sensory experiences, reaffirming an existential 
awareness in the Chief.  
What is also symbolic about this episode is the type of bird Kesey 
chooses to have Bromden see and hear, and what they signify: Canada 
geese (or “honkers”). Geese are a frequent motif in Kesey’s novel, 
symbolising freedom and the transcendental power of nature to overcome or 
outlive the Combine. In an earlier episode, Bromden remembers his father’s 
mockery of the government employees who came to buy his tribe’s land by 
ignoring their contract and exclaiming that there are “Canada honkers up 
there… Geese up there, white man. You know it. Geese this year. And last 
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year. And the year before and the year before” (86). Bromden’s father’s 
remarks indicate that the migratory patterns of the Canada geese continue 
regardless of the white mans’ plans and will be there long after the stalling of 
Western progress: this, the Chief intimates, is what is important, rather than 
financial incentives to sell the land that does not truly belong to mankind. 
This episode again connects Native Americans with the natural world, 
reinforcing Kesey’s choice of narratorial voice as deliberate in the conflict 
between nature and the encroachment of technological advances and mass-
consumption into the landscape.  
Canadian geese and Canada itself therefore represent freedom by the 
novel’s end; it is where Bromden escapes to, following the dog’s path, after 
he suffocates the lobotomised McMurphy in a form of mercy killing (although 
whether Chief actually escapes or not remains unclear, given his assertion at 
the beginning of the novel that the story is the “truth, even if it didn’t happen” 
(13)). The birds’ free flying progress across the moon, the dog’s wild gallop 
across the field, and the Chief’s place trapped within the hospital walls, 
corralled by nurses, reinforce this diametric opposition between the hospital 
and confinement, and the outside world (particularly the natural world) and 
the potential for liberation.  
The dog’s apparent freedom, threatened by a car that Bromden 
watches speeding towards the same stretch of road, stands in stark 
opposition to Bromden’s earlier imagined image of a dog lost in “the fog, 
running scared and lost because he can’t see” in the novel’s opening pages 
(13). This dog, again connected with Bromden, functions metaphorically to 
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communicate the Chief’s confusion and terror when receiving electric shock 
therapy. Whenever the Chief is given shock treatment he experiences a 
sense of disorientation and confusion caused by what he imagines to be a 
“fog machine”, controlled by the Big Nurse, installed in the walls of the ward. 
This “fog” causes him to forget his identity and personal history, eradicating 
his sense of self: this becomes apparent in the image of the disorientated 
dog, “running scared and lost” (13). Just before Bromden describes this 
terrified animal, he recalls how, as a young man, he went hunting with his 
father, a Native American chief, and a hunting dog they had borrowed for the 
occasion. The contrast between his memories of his father, and the lost dog 
who “picks up no scent but his own fear”, demonstrate the harmful nature of 
institutionalization and electroshock therapy to patients’ sense of self (13).  
Randle Patrick McMurphy: Freedom Fighter and Religious Icon 
McMurphy, on the other hand, plays a fundamental role in the 
potential reversal of this process of individual nullification. Although Bromden 
states that “one of these days I’ll quit straining and let myself go completely, 
lose myself in the fog that way some of the Chronics have”, he stalls this 
moment of self-abandonment out of interest in McMurphy’s arrival.15 
Bromden states that, rather than surrendering himself to the fog at this early 
stage in the narrative, “for the time being I’m interested in this new man 
[McMurphy]” (42), and again, later in the text Bromden explains that “[t]hey 
haven’t really fogged the place full force all day today, not since McMurphy 
came in” (71). In rejecting the psychiatric ideology of the ward, and Big 
                                                          
15 Chronics are long-term patients without hope of recovery. 
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Nurse’s control, McMurphy offers himself to the men as the leader of a 
concerted guerrilla campaign to destabilize the Nurse’s hold over her 
patients. It is for this reason that, for Barry Leeds, the symbolism of Kesey’s 
lead goose flying across the moon is important and can be connected 
directly to McMurphy’s self-appointed position within the group of patients. 
The goose flies “right in the center of that circle, bigger than the others”, and 
is described as “a black cross opening and closing” in the moonlight (29). 
Leeds argues that McMurphy, like the lead goose, is physically larger than 
his flock, and pulls his “followers in the direction he has chosen”, meaning 
towards defiance of the Nurse and the Combine, and therefore towards 
individual freedom and self-determination (29).  
Leeds describes the head goose, representative of McMurphy, as 
having a “halo” around its head in the moonlight, and touches upon the 
“metaphor of the cross” contained within the image that extends and 
continues Kesey’s use of religious iconography in connection with his hyper-
masculine anti-hero. This interpolation of Christian imagery into Kesey’s 
narrative is often strikingly obvious, such as when Bromden describes 
McMurphy as “a giant come out of the sky to save us from the Combine” 
(224), and when McMurphy chastises the men for regarding him as “some 
kind of Savior” during his brief spell of capitulation to the Nurse’s authority, 
after he learns that she will be influential in deciding when (and if) he will be 
released (166). Other examples abound throughout One Flew, including the 
fishing trip, where McMurphy led “twelve of us toward the ocean”, in an 
obvious reference to Jesus and the twelve apostles (203). That the 
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expedition is a fishing trip is similarly charged with religious symbolism: as 
Gilbert Porter has commented, “since the biblical miracle of the loaves and 
fishes, the fish has been a central Christian symbol” (88).  
What is interesting, however, is that in the story of the loaves and 
fishes, (Matthew 14:13-21) Jesus breaks the bread and fish in order to feed 
the five thousand hungry travellers before him. In Kesey’s version, with 
McMurphy as a Christ-like figure, McMurphy prioritises self-reliance over 
charity to the men: he teaches them how to fish for themselves in an 
Emersonian version of the Biblical tale that prioritizes self-development and 
personal autonomy over charitable distribution. Emerson despised charity, in 
both the sense of a modern charitable organisation, and of giving to others 
(even in the case of family). Emerson questioned, “Why should we assume 
the faults of our friend, or wife, or father, or child, because they sit around our 
hearth, or are said to have the same blood?” (13). By adopting an 
Emersonian approach, Barbara Lupack argues, McMurphy forces the men to 
be self-sustaining, “to rely on their own resources and to feel responsible for 
each other, [thereby allowing] them to reclaim their identity as independent 
functioning persons” (79).  
In leading the men, Christ-like, against the Big Nurse, McMurphy 
becomes what Porter has termed a “messianic martyr”, a role that will 
necessarily lead to his own destruction (91). McMurphy is aware of the 
sacrificial outcome to his battle with Nurse Ratched and explicitly refers to 
the crucifixion during his merciless sessions of electroshock therapy. For 
instance, when McMurphy climbs onto the (significantly) cross-shaped 
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electroshock table, he asks the attendant what the substance is that’s being 
massaged into his temples: “‘what is it?’ he says. ‘Conductant’, the 
technician says. ‘Anointest my head with conductant. Do I get a crown of 
thorns?’” (237). If this symbolism, and Kesey’s choice of linguistic style, were 
not transparent enough, Bromden then compares the headpiece used to 
deliver the electric charge to a “crown of silver thorns” upon McMurphy’s 
head (237).  
These metaphorical linkages between Jesus and McMurphy function 
in two ways: firstly, they connect McMurphy with forces for good, and his 
adversaries, Nurse Ratched, psychiatry and the Combine as forces for evil. 
This creates a stark dichotomy of good versus evil based upon the primacy 
of individual autonomy as the ultimate human value, akin to the philosophy 
that underpins the work of Thomas Szasz. Nevertheless, this represents an 
artificially simple bifurcation that some critics including Leslie Fiedler and 
Terry G. Sherwood have linked to the influence of comic strips on Kesey’s 
writing style. Fiedler argues that “everywhere in Kesey… the influence of 
comics and, especially comic books, is clearly perceptible” (184). Sherwood 
agrees, explaining that “as in the comic strip, action in Kesey’s novel turns on 
the mythic confrontation between Good and Evil: an exemplary he-man 
versus a machine-tooled, castrating matriarch ever denied our sympathies” 
(97). This situation is engineered by Kesey’s use of characterization types 
rather than through the development of subtle and unique personas: the “he-
man” as masculine underdog championing an American brand of 
individualism (which Sherwood links directly with cowboys and the “American 
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Old West” (99)), taking on the maniacal matriarch that threatens to 
emasculate as she assimilates victims into modern “machine culture” 
(Sherwood 99).  
Big Nurse: Enemy, Victim, or Both? 
This moral polarization of McMurphy as good and the Nurse as evil is 
problematic however: the alignment of McMurphy wholly (holy?) with good is 
questionable, given his long criminal history (which includes charges of 
statutory rape) and the misogyny prevalent throughout the book which he 
continually perpetuates and exacerbates. Likewise, although Kesey 
constructs the Nurse without sympathy, there are moments in the novel 
where it is possible to see her, as well as the men she presides over, as 
victims of the larger shift towards social conformity and intolerance. For 
example, shortly after McMurphy’s arrival onto the ward, the Nurse 
overhears him singing. Her response, according to Bromden, is telling: “Her 
face is puzzled at first; like the rest of us, it’s been so long since she’s heard 
singing it takes her a second to recognize what it is” (87). Singing is an 
important motif throughout the novel, with McMurphy using it along with 
laughter as a weapon of self-identification and humanization. In addition, 
Kesey’s inclusion of the phrase “like the rest of us” emphasizes the 
connection between the Nurse and her patients: she is similarly part of an 




This picture of the nurse as similarly inculcated within the oppressive 
zeitgeist is reinforced when McMurphy and Bromden are sent to the 
Disturbed ward as punishment for assaulting an aide. The nurse in charge of 
the Disturbed ward sympathizes with the men for being under the Big 
Nurses’ control, and states that she is an example of “Army nurses, trying to 
run an Army hospital. They are a little sick themselves” (234). The army, as 
Erving Goffman explained in his 1961 text, Asylums, is an example of a “total 
institution”, defined as a place  
of residence and work where a large number of like-
situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an 
appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, 
formally administered round of life (11).  
As discussed in relation to Revolutionary Road, this institutionalised way of 
life, in the army, prison, or psychiatric hospital, is profoundly damaging to the 
individual’s sense of self. In this case, one can understand Nurse Ratched as 
a victim of the total institution who perpetuates the same constricting 
guidelines in the hospital that she was exposed to in the armed forces. In 
1993, decades after his novel was published, Kesey acknowledged that the 
Big Nurse was not “the villain”, but instead was “just a… tough ex-army 
nurse... trying to do the best she can according to the rules... She worked for 
the villain… but she ain’t the villain” (Faggen 157).  
  Despite these complicating factors, Kesey views the enforcement of 
blanket conformity as far more damaging to individuals and society than 
McMurphy’s criminal history, and therefore Big Nurse’s control of the 
psychiatric ward, regardless of motivation, represents the greatest social 
wrong. In an interview with Faggen, Kesey explained that 
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when I see bad-looking bikers with black leather studs 
on their wrists… I take it as a sign of health. No, I don’t 
want them hanging around, but trying to eliminate them 
all, arrest them all, legislate against them all – that’s evil 
(159). 
I argue that this can be linked directly with Szasz’s opinion of psychiatric 
hospitalization, which he views as analogous to deprivation of liberty in 
criminal cases, and as part of an overarching socio-political effort to subdue 
offensive individuals (both criminal and otherwise). Szasz wrote in 2007 that 
the  
use of force vis-à-vis adults is a privilege reserved for 
the modern state… In the eyes of the law, confinement, 
regardless of how it is justified is deprivation of liberty. 
This is what makes psychiatric ‘care’ similar to law 
enforcement and punishment for crime, and different 
from medical care and treatment for disease (4).  
Like Szasz, Kesey rejects the medical legitimacy of psychiatric treatment by 
rejecting the concept of mental illness in its entirety: when McMurphy arrives 
on the ward, for example, he reflects that the men are “not any crazier than 
the average asshole on the street”, and that, instead of being ill, they are just 
“hung up” (61).  
Big Nurse also inadvertently confirms this non-medical stance when 
she tells the men that they are being held since they “could not adjust to the 
rules of society in the Outside World”, something she directly associates with 
parental failings in disciplining the men as children for misbehaviour 
(emphasis mine, 171). She continues, stating significantly that the “foolish 
lenience on the part of your parents may have been the germ that grew into 
your present illness” (171). This statement is doubly important: firstly, it 
reveals the intimate connection between behaviour and psychiatric disorders, 
145 
 
undermining the medical argument that mental illnesses are somehow 
physiological in origin; and secondly because it connects the psychiatric 
mission with the readjustment of maladaptive individuals from troublemakers 
to functioning citizens, which relates to Kesey’s statement above concerning 
the suppression of those who appear threatening or different (such as 
bikers). 
Psychiatric Violence as Punishment: Lobotomy and Shock Therapy 
McMurphy, as the Christ figure of individualists, offers his fellow ward-
mates hope of overthrowing the Big Nurse’s tyranny, but he is also fated to 
die as Christ did at the hands of his enemies. This fate is foreshadowed 
whenever McMurphy is compared to Christ, as the reader cannot escape 
foreknowledge of the fate of the messiah. Lobotomy in Kesey’s novel 
functions as a contemporary form of crucifixion that seeks to destroy the 
troublesome individual, but also to turn their ravaged bodies into an example 
to other would-be protestors of the consequences of defiance against what 
Fiedler calls the “female world of civilization” (177). Bromden suffocates 
McMurphy after his procedure to prevent the Big Nurse from using his living 
remains in this way, but other patients who previously challenged the Nurse’s 
authority were not so fortunate. For example, Ellis is introduced as a 
“Chronic” who “came in an Acute and got fouled up bad when they 
overloaded him in that filthy-brain murdering room”, meaning the room where 
electroshock therapy is administered (or the “shock shop”). As a result, 
Bromden continues, Ellis is  
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nailed against the wall in the same condition they lifted 
him off the table for the last time, in the shame shape, 
arms out, palms cupped, with the same horror on his 
face. He’s nailed to the wall like that, like a stuffed 
trophy (20).  
This posture clearly recalls the image of Jesus on the cross, again linking 
patients who protest their institutionalization with martyrdom, as well as a 
display of psychiatric power. Terence Martin agrees, labelling Ellis “an empty 
Christ [with] arms outstretched in tortured crucifixion, fixed that way by an 
electric shock machine used as a weapon of the institution” (49).  
 Other patients who have suffered similar fates include Ruckly and Mr 
Taber: Ruckly is described by Bromden as “another Chronic” who was a 
“holy nuisance all over the place, kicking the black boys [Nurse Ratched’s 
aides] and biting the student nurses on the legs, so they took him away to be 
fixed” (emphasis mine,15). Being “fixed” in this instance again refers to being 
lobotomized, while the word “holy” subtly connects Ruckly with the fight for 
freedom led by Christ-like McMurphy. According to Bromden, in ‘successful’ 
lobotomy cases, patients are transformed from “mean and mad and 
snapping at the whole world” to “the sweetest, nicest, best-behaved thing 
you ever saw”. These men even had the potential to “go home in a month or 
two… [wearing] the face of a sleepwalker wandering round in a simple, 
happy dream” (15-16). In the case of Mr Taber, whom Nurse Ratched 
describes as having been an “intolerable ward manipulator, for a while”, 
lobotomy was administered after Taber fought back against the ward aides 
who, the novel suggests, sexually assaulted him in retribution for his asking 
what medication he was being given (emphasis original, 25).   
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This violence, as well as the operation itself, represents a direct 
assault upon Taber’s attempts to retain personal autonomy and refusal to be 
treated as a child. This desire to infantilize patients, and to suppress those 
who refuse to surrender their adult autonomy, is clearly visible in Taber’s 
fateful exchange with a nurse over his medication: 
“Wait just a shake, honey; what are these two little red 
capsules in here with my vitamin?” 
… “It’s just medication, Mr Taber, good for you. Down it 
goes, now.” 
“But what kind of medication. Christ, I can see that 
they’re pills –” 
“Just swallow it all, shall we, Mr Taber – just for me?” 
(32). 
When Taber refuses to swallow his medication without being informed of its 
purposes, and the nurses’ childish appeals fail to appease him, the Big 
Nurse takes over. She, without hint of irony, asserts that “If Mr Taber 
chooses to act like a child, he may be treated as such. We have tried to be 
kind and considerate with him” (32). As an autonomous adult, Taber is 
pursuing a fair line of enquiry, but the Big Nurse understands any form of 
resistance (even one that could rationally be understood as reasonable) as a 
childish failure of adjustment that leads directly to Taber’s lobotomy. 
Taber’s reported experience tallies with Beat writer Seymour Krim’s 
recollection of his time in a psychiatric hospital, when he wrote that  
I was considered beyond reasoning with and was 
treated like a child... In the eyes of this enclosed world I 
had relinquished my rights as an adult human being… 
Private sanatoriums and state institutions, I realized 
much later, were isolation chambers rather than 
hospitals in the usual sense; mechanical ‘cures’ such 
as the one I underwent in a setup of unchallenged 
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authority, like the Army or a humanitarian prison, slowly 
brought 75 per cent of the inmates down to a more 
temporarily modest view of reality. Within nine or ten 
weeks I too came down, humbled, ashamed, willing to 
stand up before the class and repeat the middle-class 
credo of limited expressiveness and the meaning of a 
dollar in order to get my discharge (63). 
The “mechanical ‘cures’” that Krim experienced included electroshock 
therapy not lobotomy, but nevertheless parallels can be drawn between the 
two scenarios (Kesey’s and Krim’s). The purpose of so-called mechanical 
cures including shock therapies and psychosurgery can be understood in the 
context of Kesey’s narrative, and Krim’s memories of his treatment, to be the 
permanent oppression of protest and the enforcement of a child-like state 
(emphasized by Krim’s statement “stand up before the class”, as might a 
child), from which a patient can be re-adjusted to better fit society’s 
behavioural requirements.  
While sceptics of Kesey and Krim’s position might argue that adoption 
of this stance requires the political manipulation of the medical facts of 
lobotomy (and electroshock therapy), a closer inspection of its origins reveals 
that Walter Freeman, the physician, who, according to Mical Raz is the 
individual “most closely associated with the rise of American psychosurgery”, 
acknowledged these qualities (childlike compliance, citizenship, and 
quietude) as the desired outcomes of the controversial procedure (2). Whilst 
not the inventor of the lobotomy (that honour fell to Egas Moniz, who won the 
Nobel Prize for his development in 1949), Freeman modified Moniz’s original 
surgical process, the prefrontal lobotomy, described by Jenell Johnson as an 
“invasive form of neurosurgery that severed fibres connecting the thalamus 
149 
 
and the frontal lobes” (2). Freeman’s adaption, designed to make the 
procedure quick and easy enough for psychiatrists to perform instead of a 
neurosurgeon, was called a transorbital lobotomy because “an instrument 
resembling an ice pick was hammered into the orbital plate [eye socket] and 
swung back and forth to damage the same area of the brain” (Johnson 2). 
Both procedures targeted these areas of the brain because it was 
believed that “perverted activity of the frontal lobes” lay at the root of 
psychiatric disorders, although no concrete scientific data had been 
ascertained to confirm this thesis (Freeman and Watts, xiii). Despite this, 
Freeman was confident that the procedure was beneficial, and that patients 
“may become capable of better adaption when these lobes are partially 
inactivated” (emphasis mine, xiii). Freeman expanded on this in his memoirs, 
when he noted that lobotomy often  
marked a ‘certain turning point’ at which the ‘personality 
of the patient is changed in some way in the hope of 
rendering him more amenable to the social pressures 
under which he is supposed to exist’ (emphasis mine, 
qtd. Raz 105). 
More explicitly, in one of Freeman’s case studies (number 83), the patient, 
identified as a married woman “obsessed” with her minister, was understood 
to be much improved after the procedure having learned to “curb her tongue” 
(Freeman and Watts, 124). Unsurprisingly, these statements, with emphasis 
placed upon the improvement of social interaction and the harmonization of 
individual conduct, allow critics including Kesey, Krim, and Szasz, who called 
lobotomy “cerebral spaying” and argued that “[p]rima facie, lobotomy is the 
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destruction of a human being qua person” to easily assert that lobotomy 
operates primarily as a tool of social cohesion (2007, 159).  
This is most obviously presented in Kesey’s novel in the case of Mr 
Taber who, upon release post-operation, is described admiringly (if ironically) 
as “a little black-and-blue around the eyes” but nevertheless “a new man. 
Gad, modern American science” (emphasis original, 40). Even in cases 
where patients do not recover their faculties after a lobotomy, Freeman and 
Watts were still apt to claim success through their procedure: they wrote that, 
even if patients were unable to regain “effective citizenship” there usually 
remains a “gratifying reduction in the wear and tear on hospital equipment 
and personnel” (ix). Lobotomy functions as the ultimate weapon in the 
arsenal of mid-century psychiatry, a step-up from the imposed amnesia of 
shock therapy. Martin has called the procedure the “trump card of the 
institution” as a means of “dealing with… rebellion”, a description that is 
highly appropriate for McMurphy given his love of gambling (49). The 
message contained therein is clear: while it is possible for McMurphy, Taber, 
Ruckly, or other patients like them to win a hand, psychiatry, as the foot-
soldier of state coercion and control, always wins the game.   
Laughter as Resistance: Humour and Autonomy 
While McMurphy may be doomed from the very beginning of his 
campaign against Nurse Ratched, he utilizes a surprising tactic to try and 
restore individual power to the men: laughter. Laughter appears as a motif 
throughout the narrative as symbolic of a positive (often masculine) 
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autonomy that exists in direct opposition to the homogenising and vitality-
sapping force of the combine and the psychiatric ward. The power and 
symbolism of laughter as connected with autonomy and authenticity 
becomes clear from the early pages of Kesey’s narrative, when McMurphy 
arrives on the ward for the first time. Bromden describes him standing  
[W]aiting, and when nobody makes a move to say 
anything he to him he commences to laugh. Nobody 
can tell exactly why he laughs; there’s nothing funny 
going on…. It’s free and loud and it comes out of his 
wide grinning mouth and spreads in rings bigger and 
bigger till it’s lapping against the walls all over the 
ward… This sounds real. I realize all of a sudden it’s 
the first laugh I’ve heard in years (16).  
McMurphy’s loud and unapologetic mirth signals the beginning of a period of 
protest against the status quo (i.e. the rule of Big Nurse and her aides, as 
agents of the Combine) that will lead directly to McMurphy’s death, the 
destruction of Nurse Ratched’s apparently infallible power over her patients, 
and Bromden’s escape. Nicolaus Mills refers to this as “Kesey’s politics of 
laughter”, and writes that “for McMurphy, laughter is above all functional. It 
does not simply provide a release of tensions but a way of gaining one’s 
balance so that he can deal with pain” (86).  
Mills’s assessment is largely correct but needs to be refined to be 
wholly accurate: laughter, for McMurphy, should not be understood as a pain 
reliever as such, but more accurately as a weapon of resistance used to 
deflect and evade the clutches of the Combine. Indeed, when McMurphy 
attempts to utilize laughter strictly in the way Mills suggests, it is revealed to 
be a poor defence. After his brutal and repeated exposure to electroshock 
treatments, for instance, laughter and caustic remarks cannot hide the pain 
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revealed by the blanching of his face, and the tautening of his jaw muscles 
“every time that loudspeaker called for him” to receive shock (243).    
Instead of being a pain reliever, McMurphy’s laughter represents a 
weapon against being subsumed into the ideological system guided by “the 
Combine”, since, by refusing to take the underpinning categories of sanity 
and insanity seriously, the resultant actions taken by Nurse Ratched and 
psychiatry in general become absurd and even comical. As Mills explains, 
getting the men to laugh… is not a question of amusing 
them but making them see there is a comedy in their 
situation that originates with the assumption that their 
behavior is insane while that of society is sane (87). 
This dichotomy between sanity and insanity is most obviously collapsed in 
Kesey’s novel when McMurphy encourages the men to protest Nurse 
Ratched’s anti-democratic refusal to allow the men to watch the World Series 
baseball tournament on television (a ward vote is taken but overruled by the 
Nurse). In retaliation for Ratched’s decision, McMurphy gathers the men 
around him and begins shouting at the turned-off screen, performing the part 
of a sports fan watching the game. In response, Big Nurse begins to lose her 
polished, calm composure and begins to shout at McMurphy that he is under 
“the jurisdiction of me… the staff” while “holding up a fist, [with] all those red-
orange fingernails burning into her palm. ‘Under jurisdiction and control – ‘”, 
followed by increasingly frenzied orders, also ignored, to the others to return 
to their work (emphasis original, 127-128). This outburst strips away the 
therapeutic gloss generally placed upon psychiatric intervention and explicitly 
reveals McMurphy’s confinement as penal in nature. 
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The frenzied tone of Nurse Ratched’s shrilly repeated orders to the 
men demonstrates the absurdity of their respective positions, as well as the 
paucity of the power structures that underpin them if one party defies or 
otherwise refuses to accept their veracity. Bromden realises this when he 
reports that “If somebody’d of come in and took a look” at that moment, they 
would have seen “men watching a blank TV, a fifty-year-old woman hollering 
and squealing at the back of their heads about discipline and order and 
recriminations” and “they’d of thought the whole bunch was crazy as loons” 
(128). The irony here is that the men are consciously engaging in a 
performance of madness, while the nurse is not.  
Humour, in Kesey’s narrative, functions as both healing and 
humanizing. This places it, and McMurphy as its promoter, in direct 
opposition to the Combine, viewed by Bromden as automatizing. In 
Bromden’s earlier metaphorical description of the ant-like commuters in the 
“spoiled” landscape he views as having been invaded by this technological 
and industrial force, he effectively communicates the threat of 
dehumanization and slavish thraldom to mass-culture feared by post-Second 
World War Americans. This collective loss of individualism (and therefore, 
Kesey implies, a loss of what makes one human) for the purported benefit of 
social progress is the impetus behind what Bromden calls “the Combine”. As 
the name suggests, individuals are homogenised (or “combined”) through 
adjustment to social rules and norms, thereby making psychiatry increasingly 




Endangered Masculinity: Collectivism as Feminine 
This shift towards social cohesion for perceived collective progress is 
what sociologist William H. Whyte has referred to as a transition during the 
twentieth-century in American society from the “Protestant Ethic” to a “Social 
Ethic”. The “Protestant Ethic” can be characterized by individual competition 
for resources and self-sufficiency, what one might label as a profoundly 
American social structure. Whyte, quoting banker Henry Clews in 1908, 
depicts the Protestant Ethic as a “survival of the fittest” ideology, where the 
(masculine) individual can benefit from “industrial freedom”; where he may 
“work hard or not; he may make his own bargains and set his price upon his 
labor or his products” (qtd. 15). This kind of social arrangement, according to 
Clews, led to America becoming an “inspiring example” on the world stage of 
egalitarianism, where “merit is the sole test” and “birth [i.e. class] is nothing” 
(qtd. Whyte 15).  
This is the ideology underpinning what has been termed the American 
Dream: that every man (gender implied) is ultimately in control of his own 
destiny, and economic fortune can be won through hard work and ability. 
Kesey subscribed to this concept wholeheartedly, claiming in 1963 that “a 
man should have the right to be as big as he feels it’s in him to be”, a 
metaphor that reflects the change in Chief Bromden by the novel’s end (Lish 
24). In addition, this is very much the ideology that Kesey’s narrative 
supports in Sometimes a Great Notion, where the Stamper brothers 
intentionally break the townspeople’s strike against a logging company for 
personal profit through long and arduous work in the forests.  
155 
 
This emphasis on autonomy as superior to collective interdependence 
is inherently connected to the formative years of American identity. Joel 
Porte has argued that the mood of post-revolutionary America can be 
characterized by “the spirit of independence” and a “disdain of control” 
following the rejection of British rule in the late eighteenth century (6). 
Michael Kimmel connects this directly with gender in his study of American 
masculinity by arguing that immediately after American independence was 
achieved, a shift occurred in the “definition of manhood” from the “old 
standard rooted in the life of the community” to a “new standard based on 
individual achievement” (14). Kimmel explains this shift by claiming that 
whilst under British rule the colonized were unable to practice self-control 
and governance, and ultimately “felt enslaved by the English father, 
infantilized, and thus emasculated” (14). When the British forces left, 
however, American settlers of European descent were free as never before, 
and as the early nineteenth century experienced an economic boom, self-
made men became the epitome of white American masculinity. Kimmel 
claims that  
The emerging capitalist market in the early nineteenth 
century both freed individual men and destabilized 
them. No longer were men bound to the land, to their 
estates, to Mother England, or to the tyrannical father, 
King George. No longer did their manhood rest on their 
craft traditions, guild memberships, or participation in 
the virtuous republic of the New England small town. 
America was entering a new age, and men were free to 
create their own destinies (17). 
By the mid-twentieth century these apparent glory days of self-made 
masculinity were coming to an end, however, and Whyte’s “Social Ethic” was 
beginning to take precedence in American culture. Just as market forces had 
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allowed men to strike out on their own and earn a living independently after 
casting off British rule, by the 1950s there was concern that men were 
becoming soft and enslaved to rapidly-expanding corporations that eroded 
their individual masculine potency by requiring the self-made man to become 
the company man.  
This cultural shift meant that individuals were less able to dictate their 
own economic futures through the ability to do things that Henry Clews had 
thought were crucial to self-mastery, such as being unhindered by 
overbearing government interference, and being able to set one’s own “price 
[for] labor or… products” (Whyte, 15). As the corporatization of America 
increased following the Second World War, and the proportion of American 
families living in mass-produced suburban homes increased, this prized 
masculine individualism began to give way to a more collective experience 
dictated by social norms as discussed in Chapter One. Whyte’s “Social Ethic” 
is the epitome of these concerns and can be defined as follows:  
Man exists as a unit of society. Of himself, he is 
isolated, meaningless; only as he collaborates with 
others does he become worthwhile, for by sublimating 
himself in the group, he helps produce a whole that is 
greater than the sum of its parts (7).  
This kind of structure is maintained through continuous adherence to social 
codes of acceptability and a requirement for individual passivity that, 
combined, demonstrate each individual members’ belonging within the wider 
group context. Within this social context, each individual must operate as a 
functioning cog within a well-oiled machine, without the possibility of protest 
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or other autonomous action, to ensure the accumulation of material wealth 
and social progress to the extended community. 
 Unsurprisingly this social structure has been understood as 
repressive, and as Andrew Foley points out, this directly contradicts the 
ideology of personal freedom that the Americans had fought for during the 
Second World War. Foley argues that the post-war years were characterized 
by a repression of “individual liberty. As the Cold War intensified, and the 
dogma of Communist threat took hold, so America began to resemble a 
totalitarian state” through, for instance, the “so-called ‘Communist witch-
hunts’ propagated by Senator Joe McCarthy’s committee on ‘unAmerican 
activities’”; but also through a general sense of intolerance that “ostracised 
and excoriated all those whose pursuit of happiness had led them to express 
themselves in ways different from the overwhelmingly dominant moral 
discourse of the time” (33).   
What Foley refers to as the “dominant moral discourse” was for Szasz 
fundamental in psychiatric diagnosis of those considered socially 
undesirable. As Vatz and Weinberg explain, under Szaszian doctrine 
psychiatry  
functions rhetorically to accredit socially valued 
behavior and discredit socially disvalued behaviors, 
ostensibly through medical analysis and cure, but in 
reality through the medical rhetoric of ‘diagnosis’ and 
‘treatment’ of ‘mental illness’ or ‘mental disorders’ 
(313). 
While in an ideal world, under the Social Ethic there should be “no conflict 
between man and society”, those who refused or were unable to assimilate 
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were understood as dangerous to overall harmony (7). In these situations, 
Whyte notes ominously, these “obstacles to consensus” would be 
“eliminated” by “applying the methods of science to human relations” to 
create “an equilibrium in which society’s needs and the needs of the 
individual are one and the same” (Whyte 7). I argue that in a Szaszian 
reading of this scenario, the euphemistically termed scientific intervention to 
human relations refers to psychiatry and to psychiatric ‘treatment’ of the 
maladjusted under an oppressive form of American social ethic.   
Readjustment and the Institution 
This Szaszian interpretation of Whyte’s solution to malfunctioning 
cogs in the wheel of the social ethic is equally understood as the impetus for 
medical intervention in Kesey’s novel. One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
understands psychiatry as a force for social cohesion through the involuntary 
adjustment of troublesome individuals much in the same way as Szasz 
depicts the implementation of Soviet psychiatry upon recalcitrant Russian 
citizens. In the Soviet Union, Szasz claims, “the authorities… make frequent 
use of psychiatry and mental hospitals for discrediting and disposing of 
politically embarrassing or otherwise unwanted individuals” (1971, 217). The 
parallels between the Soviet/Communist and American psychiatry are 
highlighted throughout Kesey’s novel, such as when McMurphy tells Big 
Nurse that “those Chinese Commies could have learned a few things from 
you, lady” (236), and exclaims to his fellow patients that “For a minute there I 
thought I was back in a Red Chinese prison camp” when the men refuse to 
stand up to Nurse Ratched (62).  
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In this vein, Chief Bromden understands the psychiatric ward as a 
place of readjustment, a “factory for the Combine” that functions by  
Fixing up the mistakes made in the neighborhoods and 
in the schools and in the churches... When a completed 
project goes back out into society, all fixed up, good as 
new, better than new sometimes, it brings joy to the Big 
Nurse’s heart; something that came in all twisted 
different is now a functioning, adjusted component, a 
credit to the whole outfit and a marvel to behold (38).  
The narrator’s choice of language here clearly demonstrates the 
dehumanizing impact of institutionalization, while the political implications are 
also clear for those who challenge the zeitgeist. Patients are viewed as 
“projects” and as “components” rather than as individuals, and hospital stays 
are understood as opportunities for readjustment (or warehousing, in the 
case of the Chronic patients) instead of personal development. Troublesome 
individuals are admitted to the asylum, whether voluntarily or not, to be 
fundamentally altered in their behaviour.  
In reference to Goffman’s definition of the total asylum, William F. May 
reminds us that “[t]he word ‘total’ refers not simply to the comprehensive way 
in which the institution organizes all activities… but also the strategies by 
which the institution invades the interior life of its inmates” (518). These 
strategies and long-term impact, Goffman found, led to a profound 
undermining of the individual’s sense of self, while the very structure of the 
total institution as a self-contained and isolated unit is also inherently 
damaging. He argues that, at the time of his or her admission, each “recruit 
comes into the establishment with a conception of himself made possible by 
certain stable social arrangements in his home world” (24). These include, 
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for example, one’s occupation, and position within the family unit, alongside 
other crucial social interactions that help to define and reinforce the 
individual’s position on a daily basis. Upon detention within a total institution 
however, according to Goffman, the individual is 
immediately stripped of the support provided by these 
arrangements… he begins a series of abasements, 
degradations, humiliations, and profanations of the self. 
His self is systematically… mortified (1991, 24).  
In place of a complex web of social roles in the outside world, the new 
detainee is reduced to patient, prisoner, or recruit (whichever label applies to 
the total institution involved). Separated from the relationships and 
community structures that define and solidify this layering of social roles, the 
individual’s previous sense of self becomes dangerously fragmented and 
therefore malleable within the new institutional context.   
The processes by which this attack upon the individual’s integrity 
occur include this isolation from the outside world as mentioned, along with 
the forced removal of patients’ clothing, the distributing of uniforms, and the 
handing-over of personal effects to staff for safe keeping during the 
individual’s stay. Goffman quotes a report that details the experiences of a 
cadet attending a military academy for the first time, illustrating how each of 
these techniques were implemented to achieve a compliant and 
homogenous group. The men were isolated from the outside world; they 
were “not allowed to leave the base or engage in social intercourse with non-
cadets” to “produce a unified group… rather than a heterogeneous collection 
of persons of high and low status” (25).  Uniforms were also distributed, 
discussions of life before the academy were disallowed, and the men taught 
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that the “role of the cadet must supersede other roles the individual has been 
accustomed to play” (25).  
Clothing as Social Signifier 
May also emphasises the significance of patients being required to 
don a uniform in place of their own clothing: he argues that  
the act of taking off one’s old clothes and donning new 
garments impresses symbolically upon the inmate the 
price he must pay for entering into the total institution: 
the surrender of his old personal identity and autonomy 
and the acquisition of a new identity oriented to the 
authority of the professional staff and… the smooth 
running of the institution (518). 
Within the context of a psychiatric-hospital-as-total-institution, the patients’ 
uniform demarcates that individual’s place both within the asylum hierarchy 
and beyond by becoming easily differentiated from civilian staff within the 
institution, but also from “sane” members of society outside. As mentioned in 
my discussion of Revolutionary Road, John Givings keeps his hospital 
clothes on during home visits as a way of forcing his parents and the wider 
community to witness the violence done to his individual identity through 
institutionalization (i.e. the forced eradication of the flawed or difficult 
individual). Clothes and appearance are fundamental to the creation and 
preservation of identity within the social context, therefore by refusing to 
change out of his uniform, John is making a political statement about 
freedom and the demonised position of the psychiatric patient within 
American society.  
The power of the psychiatric patients’ uniform as an intimidating 
signifier of difference to the public is also alluded to in Kesey’s novel, when 
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some of the ward men leave for a fishing trip led by McMurphy and Dr 
Spivey. Bromden reports that, as they “stood in a silent bunch” waiting for the 
doctor to get his car, they watched 
the townspeople… driving past on their way to work 
slowdown to gawk at all the loonies in green uniforms. 
McMurphy saw how uneasy we were and tried to work 
us into a better mood by joking (emphasis mine, 199).  
Kesey explicitly draws attention to the power of the uniform as a 
communicative signifier to the so-called “normal” commuters on their way to 
work, and Bromden’s use of the term “loonies” illustrates the practice of 
codifying persons who do not conform to normal social values or behaviours. 
Again, during this incident McMurphy attempts to delegitimise the 
polarisation of the mad/sane dichotomy through laughter since, by 
demonstrating the absurdity of such arbitrary categories, the individual can 
reject the apparent objective veracity upon which they depend and create a 
space for personal defiance. 
This could also be understood as Kesey’s own conclusion reached 
while working as a night aide at the Menlo Park Veteran Association Hospital 
in the early 1960s, where he gained the inspiration to pen Cuckoo’s Nest 
under the influence of LSD and other psychedelic substances. In 1989, 
Kesey told Terry Gross that disregarding the colour of his uniform (white 
instead of the patient’s green) “there wasn’t that much difference between 
me and those people they were locking up [in the hospital]” (114), something 
he has McMurphy reinforce when he states the men are “no crazier than the 
average asshole on the street” (61).  
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These statements echoed the beliefs of other contemporary protest 
writers like Seymour Krim, who, in 1960, wrote that during his time confined 
to a psychiatric institution he realised that he “could no longer afford to think 
of contemporary insanity as an exact objective phenomenon” and instead, to 
him, insanity appeared “as an interpretation of human thought and behavior 
conditioned by inherited prejudices, fear [and] questionable middle-class 
assumptions of the purpose of life” (76). Krim’s mention of “middle-class 
assumptions of the purpose of life”, along with Bromden’s reference to the 
townspeople as commuters on their way to work, can be taken together as 
indicating an economic aspect to ideas of normalcy. This expectation of 
financial and material accumulation as a life-goal for the sane individual 
connects directly with John Givings’s protestations over the illogical nature of 
capitalist society as discussed in the previous chapter, when he states 
You want to play very nice house, very sweet house, 
then you have got to get a job you don’t like. Great...  
Anyone comes along and says ‘Whaddya do it for?’ you 
can be pretty sure he’s on a four-hour pass from the 
State funny farm (Yates, 187). 
Givings’s statement emphasizes the difference of those classified as “insane” 
in terms of their altered perspectives, something neurosurgeon Harvey 
Cushing knew all too well. In praise of lobotomy, Cushing claimed that 
“society can accommodate itself to the most humble laborer, but it justifiably 
distrusts the mad thinker” (emphasis mine, qtd. Freeman and Watt, xvii). The 
questioning of norms or flagrant difference is not to be tolerated, and the 
enforced wearing of uniforms within psychiatric institutions strengthens this 
sense of separation between the ‘sane’ and the ‘insane’ by offering visual 
confirmation of difference that reassures the public of their normalcy. 
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The insane individual in a psychiatric uniform becomes, in Szasz’s 
words, “a symbol of evil which… through its very being, confirms the 
remaining members of the community as good”, a statement that 
demonstrates Szasz’s conflation of psychiatric diagnosis and moral 
judgements (1970, 268). Clothing is used to demarcate the socially 
unacceptable individual then, but sartorial choices can also signify personal 
defiance. Soon after McMurphy’s arrival on Nurse Ratched’s ward, his 
clothing choices demonstrate his intention to preserve his autonomous 
identity within the institution. One morning Big Nurse arrives at the ward to 
find McMurphy performing his ablutions with only a towel around his waist, 
since the ward staff have failed to provide him with a uniform. When she 
confronts him and demands to know why he is wearing only a towel, he 
whips the scant covering away, hoping to rile the nurse further. Instead of his 
naked body, however, he reveals a pair of black shorts with “big white 
whales leaping round” on them (96). Big Nurse is horrified that he has called 
her bluff, and that he is wearing his own “gaudy underpants”, as she terms 
them, instead of regulation wear (97). Bromden describes how the 
experience was “more’n [Nurse Ratched] can take. It’s a full minute before 
she can pull herself together… her voice is shaking out of control she’s so 
mad” (96).  McMurphy’s unauthorized apparel, and his small victory in 
making the Nurse lose her composure are hereby linked, demonstrating the 





Moby Dick and One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest 
These black shorts are mentioned at several key moments throughout 
Kesey’s novel, and are highly symbolic: indeed, McMurphy tells Bromden 
that they were a gift from a “‘co-ed at Oregon State, Chief, a Literary major’. 
He snaps the elastic with his thumb. ‘She gave them to me because she said 
I was a symbol’” (76). The whale motif on the shorts has been argued to 
represent Moby Dick, from Herman Melville’s classic text, a novel that Kesey 
has been outspoken in his admiration for. In the case of McMurphy’s shorts, 
Porter writes that Big Nurse is appalled by the motif because she represents 
a “dehumanizing death force”, while McMurphy is a “rehumanizing life force”; 
the shorts emphasize McMurphy’s position as a “virile life giver” from a 
literature student “who had read enough of Moby Dick to know he was a 
sperm whale” (78-79). While the shorts indicate masculine virility and sexual 
potency (something connected with McMurphy since he arrived on the ward 
with pornographic playing cards), there are a variety of other possible 
interpretations of McMurphy’s symbolism. As in Moby Dick, according to 
Richard Chase, “the whale is endlessly suggestive of meanings” (60). These 
include the untameable power of nature, and the eventual defeat of human 
civilization by nature’s timeless resilience (this explanation recalls Chief 
Bromden’s mockery of the white man by references to the Canada honkers 
overhead).  
Others, like critic John Clark Pratt, have confidently argued that the 
whale motif draws an explicit connection between head-strong and self-
reliant McMurphy and Melville’s doomed Captain Ahab. Pratt states “of 
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course McMurphy is Ahab” (416), the obsessive seaman who, Peter Fish 
writes, “chases [the] enormous white whale at the eventual cost of his ship 
and his life”, just as McMurphy engages in fatalistic battle against the Big 
Nurse and the Combine (47). This connection, along with Kesey’s messianic 
metaphors, effectively prophesize McMurphy’s eventual destruction to those 
familiar with Melville’s famous text. There are similarities between the two 
characters’ personal ideologies, such as Ahab representing a “heightened 
example of independent man[hood]” who, Chase argues, by his actions tests 
“some of the extreme implications of the dominant Emersonian creed of self-
reliance” in his single-minded determination to destroy the whale, whatever 
the cost (54). The analogies to McMurphy are highly evident here: 
McMurphy, like Ahab, adopts a hyper-masculine, “never give an inch” type 
posture that anticipates the stubborn independence and isolationism 
displayed by the Stampers in Sometimes a Great Notion. 
 For Chase, Ahab should be considered “guilty or victimized by a 
distorted ‘self-reliance’”, and crucially, he adds, “An alternative to Ahab’s 
suicidal course is proposed by the author” (56). These statements are 
striking in their similarity to McMurphy’s situation: just as Kesey’s text makes 
clear, McMurphy has an alternative to martyred self-destruction which he 
pursues for a short period then rejects when the ward-men ridicule him for 
his compliance. Bromden reports that, after finding out the Nurse has power 
over his release since he is committed involuntarily, McMurphy begins to 
submit to her authority: “he surprised everybody by on the ward by getting up 
early and polishing the latrine till it sparkled, and then went to work on the 
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hall floors when the black boys asked him to” (149).  It could be argued that 
maintaining this docile frontage whilst under the Big Nurse’s authority would 
be the most advantageous to the individual in the long term by securing a 
quicker discharge, even at the temporary cost of one’s dignity. This is the 
alternative that Kesey poses for McMurphy, but the men mock him for this 
sudden compliance, teasing him by saying “I thought you’s the super-stud 
with all that whambam?” (166). This directly paraphrases McMurphy’s earlier 
claim that “all [the] what-bam-thank-you-ma’am”, along with fighting, 
dominated his life before his arrest (62). This reminder effectively forces 
McMurphy to either abandon his masculine bravado, or to reaffirm it at any 
cost.   
The power-play between McMurphy and the Nurse is therefore highly 
gendered. McMurphy represents hyper-masculine individualism, in direct 
contravention to what is understood as the feminizing force of social 
cohesion represented by Big Nurse, whom Bromden refers to as the 
“juggernaut of modern matriarchy” (68). McMurphy’s adoption of the plight of 
his ward-mates should be understood as an extreme act of charity and as a 
martyrdom that seeks to provide a sorely needed (Kesey suggests) injection 
of manly potency that the others lack. By adopting this role, however, 
McMurphy moves towards his own destruction since, as already discussed, 
McMurphy-as-Christ/Ahab is always fated to destruction.  
According to John W. Hunt, McMurphy “receives his fatal wound when 
he abandons his psychopathic character and takes on a responsibility to right 
the wrongs done to others, with no motive of profit himself” (15). This reading 
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reveals McMurphy’s demise as intimately connected with the assumption of 
responsibility for others, something Kesey rejected in his personal life. In a 
1970 interview, when discussing the counter-culture Kesey told the radical 
student newspaper, the Ann Arbor Argus, that his philosophy on protest 
could be understood as “don’t take the gauntlet… don’t let ‘em push your 
button. Keep away from anger” (46-47). McMurphy fails to heed this passive, 
libertarian advice, and as Bromden realizes before the climactic final 
encounter between the Nurse and McMurphy, “We couldn’t stop him 
because we were the ones making him do it. It wasn’t the nurse that was 
forcing him, it was our need” meaning the men of the ward (267). At this 
significant moment in the narrative the black shorts with the whale motif are 
again referred to, when McMurphy hitches them “up like they were horsehide 
chaps” as well as pushing back “his cap with one finger like it was a ten-
gallon Stetson” (267). The connection to Melville’s novel inherent in the 
shorts, and McMurphy’s cowboy-esque mannerisms, indicates this 
connection between American tradition, masculinity, and individualism that 
McMurphy embodies. Through his choice of action McMurphy, like Ahab, 
represents a “great, doomed hero”, each enslaved by his respective and 
irredeemable mission and commitment to a fatalistic goal (Chase 50).  
Humiliation and Emasculation on the Ward 
The patients in Kesey’s novel are subjected to a barrage of 
humiliations from their arrival on the ward that function to diminish their 
autonomy and perceived masculinity, with the aim of making them more 
amenable to staff control. Whilst this, one would assume, might equally be 
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the case in a mid-century ward with female patients, in Kesey’s novel, the 
admission procedures are directly framed as assaults upon the humanity and 
masculine autonomy of incoming male patients. Bromden, Kesey’s narrator, 
describes a typical admission as follows: 
Most days I’m the first one to see the Admission, watch 
him creep in the door and slide along the wall and 
stand scared till the black boys come sign for him and 
take him into the shower room, where they strip him 
and leave him shivering with the door open while they 
all three run grinning up and down the halls looking for 
the Vaseline… Then I see two, maybe all three of them 
in there, in that shower room with the Admission, 
running that thermometer around in the grease till it’s 
coated the size of your finger (10). 
The first important clue in the passage above is the naming of the new 
patient as the Admission: the capitalization implies that this, instead of the 
individual’s name, is the primary indicator of their identity (except for 
McMurphy who, on arrival is pointedly labelled the “new man” instead (19)). 
By being stripped, humiliated, even sexually abused, during their admittance 
to the psychiatric facility in the first place, Kesey’s male patients are 
debased, dominated, anonymised, denuded of social status, and treated as 
the sexual playthings of the cruel and inhuman black aides (a detail that also 
highlights troubling racial politics in Kesey’s text).  
Both Goffman and Szasz agree that through this process of diagnosis 
and entry into the asylum setting, the individual is exclusively labelled a 
mental patient, to the exclusion of all other possible social roles; a situation 
that is profoundly damaging to the individual’s sense of self. Szasz explains 
that “being considered or labelled mentally disordered – abnormal, crazy, 
mad, psychotic, sick… - is the most profoundly discrediting classification that 
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can be imposed on a person” (1971, 237).  In this gendered context, one 
might postulate that the masculine role, intimately connected with self-
reliance and the primacy of autonomy, is directly threatened at this point of 
entry into the asylum.  
Goffman compares diagnosis of mental illness and subsequent 
admission to a psychiatric facility to the stages described in Harold 
Garfinkel’s 1956 article entitled “Conditions of Successful Degradation 
Ceremonies”. For Garfinkel, social degradation ceremonies occur in most 
cultures and perform the function of moving aberrant individuals from one 
“total identity into an identity lower in the group’s scheme of social types” 
(420). Admission into a total institution, whether it be a prison or a psychiatric 
facility, represents one way in which an individual may be forced to undergo 
this degradation process under the supervision and instruction of the 
psychiatrist as a “denouncer” and protector of social norms. Kesey’s 
narrative suggests that not only are the men admitted to psychiatric hospital 
understood as patients, but as children of the state, with Big Nurse assuming 
a mother-type role and referring to the male patients as “boys”. Most 
memorably, Harding refers to her factiously as a “sweet, smiling angel” and 
as “Mother Ratched”, in a speech dripping with irony (58). The shift from man 
to child-patient that Ratched presides over can be understood as a 
movement from one “total identity”, as Garfinkel postulates, to another lower 
in the social hierarchy. In the asylum, men are unsexed by the stripping away 
of their personal autonomy. Afterwards, they either leave the hospital “fixed” 
as Bromden terms it, or languish there as “Chronics”, who are described as 
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having had the “the man in them… dumped out” through the implementation 
of vengeful and punitive shock therapies and lobotomies (214).  
The Therapeutic Community as Tool of Oppression 
This process of readjustment (or feminization, one could argue) is not 
merely pursued through what Krim referred to as “mechanical cures” (i.e. 
shock therapies and lobotomy), but also through dialogue aimed to expose 
and examine the patients’ neuroses. In Kesey’s ward this is implemented via 
the ideology of the therapeutic community. One definition of the therapeutic 
community is provided by Maxwell Jones, a British psychiatrist key to the 
implementation of this innovative approach in both the US and the UK. 
Jones’s therapeutic method rested upon the assumption that the 
“psychoanalytic model, with its preoccupation with conflicts… within the 
individual and its stress upon a two-person treatment relationship [i.e. the 
patient and therapist] should be bolstered by “a much greater understanding 
of group dynamics, social theory, and of social organization generally” (14). 
This allows for movement away from an individualist conception of mental 
illness, and towards a more socially aware, holistic version of psychiatric 
treatment. 
While this may appear to be reasonably progressive in comparison to 
the more invasive physiological interventions, the therapeutic community is 
similarly rejected in Kesey’s text. In the novel, Bromden reports that the 
“theory of the Therapeutic Community” is that  
a guy has to learn to get along in a group before he’s 
able to function in a normal society; how the group can 
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help the guy by showing him where he’s out of place; 
how society is what decides who’s sane and who isn’t, 
so you got to measure up. All that stuff. Every time we 
get a new patient on the ward the doctor goes into the 
theory with both feet; it’s pretty near the only time he 
takes things over and runs the meeting. He tells how 
the goal of the Therapeutic Community is a ward, run 
completely by the patients and their votes, working 
toward making worth-while citizens to turn back Outside 
(48). 
The implications of this system are clear: a systematic, yet insidious method 
of readjustment that seeks to invalidate individual thought and behaviour and 
operates within a moral framework to ‘correct’ society’s mistakes to align 
mental patients better with their social context. Nurse Ratched’s ward 
functions as a parodic bastardisation of Jones’s theories as outlined above, 
as made evident by her rejection of the vote on watching the World Series.  
Nurse Ratched presides over these episodes as a form of power-play 
based upon humiliation and re-education: she even controls the ward 
psychiatrist, Dr Spivey, who attends reluctantly and “squirms in his seat” 
(53). Understanding herself to be correcting the mistakes made by 
recalcitrant parents on the outside, the Nurse operates as an omnipotent and 
omnipresent mother figure, to whom the men are encouraged to “snitch” on 
their ward-mates if they say anything that could be discussed during these 
meetings. As in the suburban community of Revolutionary Road, this creates 
a panopticon-like atmosphere, in which everything is figuratively conducted 
under the Nurse’s watchful gaze. As Foucault points out in Discipline and 
Punish, "imprisonment was never confused with mere deprivation of liberty", 
it also carries the function of "transformation" of prisoners", as can also be 
seen in Kesey’s psychiatric ward here (233 – 234). Big Nurses’ control over 
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the men via the passing on of these secrets forces them to comply with her 
orders under threat of personal humiliation.  
The men, Bromden reports, are so terrified of the information held in 
the Nurse’s log book (where these titbits are written) that, when she 
threatens to consult it, they begin confessing shameful secrets to prevent her 
reading out the revelations within: “They were all shouting to outdo one 
another… telling things that wouldn’t ever let them look one another in the 
eye again. The nurse nodding at every confession… saying Yes, yes, yes” 
(49). Although these meetings may be conducted under the rhetoric of 
therapeutic healing, it becomes immediately apparent that the real force 
behind the gatherings is control through shame, humiliation, fear and 
emasculation.  
Harding, the effeminate, possibly homosexual patient who is portrayed 
as the most intelligent of the ward men when McMurphy arrives, is the focus 
of a particularly vicious group meeting early in the novel. The subject, carried 
over from an earlier meeting, is his difficulties with his wife. Nurse Ratched 
reads from her log that Harding had “stated that his wife was extremely well 
endowed in the bosom and that this made him uneasy because she drew 
stares from men in the street”, as well as having been overheard on the ward 
saying, “that she ‘damn well gives the bastards reason to stare’” and that “he 
may give her reason to seek further sexual attention” (emphasis original, 43). 
These statements suggest that Harding is inadequate as a husband, and that 
his wife, as a result, is seeking sexual satisfaction elsewhere. During the 
meeting, the men are invited to ask Harding questions, purportedly to help 
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him resolve these difficulties with his wife. Instead, their participation, they 
realise in shame afterwards, constituted a “grilling” in which they treated 
“their friend like he was a criminal and they were all… judge and jury”, 
“chopping him into pieces as if they enjoyed it” with their relentless and brutal 
questioning on Nurse Ratched’s behalf (54).  
Incredibly, however, when McMurphy questions Harding about this, 
asking “Is this the usual pro-cedure for these Group Ther’py shindigs? Bunch 
of chickens at a peckin’ party?” Harding becomes indignant, adopting an 
artificially elevated form of speech intended to humiliate McMurphy: “A 
‘pecking party’? I fear your quaint down-home speech is wasted on me, my 
friend. I have not the slightest indication what you’re talking about” (55). 
Undeterred, McMurphy reiterates his point in violent terms, describing how  
The flock gets sight of a spot of blood on some chicken 
and they all go to peckin’ at it, see, till they rip the 
chicken to shreds, blood and bones and feathers. But 
usually a couple of the flock gets spotted in the fracas, 
then it’s their turn. And a few more get spots and gets 
pecked to death… a peckin’ party can wipe out a whole 
flock in a matter of a few hours… And you want to know 
somethin’ else buddy? You want to know who pecks 
that first peck... It’s that old nurse (emphasis original, 
55).  
In the “pecking party” described by McMurphy, the only way to get the 
chickens to stop cannibalising each other is to “clip blinders on them, so they 
can’t see” (55). Conversely, McMurphy’s analogy suggests, instead of 
blindness, the ability to see through the psychiatric rhetoric employed by the 
Nurse, thereby revealing the violence inherent within, is the way to stop this 
metaphorical blood sport between the men and create an authentic 
community in place of the “therapeutic”.   
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Harding again responds incredulously, desperately trying to maintain 
the therapeutic purview that inculcates the ward:  
Why, this is incredible. You completely disregard, 
completely overlook and disregard the fact that what 
the fellows were doing today was for my own benefit?  
That any question or discussion raised by Miss 
Ratched or the rest of the staff is done solely for 
therapeutic reasons? You must not have heard a word 
of Doctor Spivey’s theory of the Therapeutic 
Community, or not have had the education to 
comprehend it if you did (56).  
At this stage in the novel, Harding remains, at least superficially, convinced 
by the psychiatric terminology and rationale espoused by ward authority, 
including Doctor Spivey and Nurse Ratched. By denigrating McMurphy’s 
intelligence, he rejects and even ridicules the alternative perspective that 
McMurphy puts forward: that the Big Nurse is nothing but a “ball-cutter”, 
someone trying “to make you weak so… you toe the line, to follow their rules, 
to live like they want you to” (57). In refusing to see the denigration and 
emasculation at the heart of Big Nurse’s treatment of the men as recalcitrant 
children, Harding displays a disturbing assimilation of psychiatric rhetoric 
(especially pertaining to the therapeutic community) into his outlook that 
could be understood as a form of brain-washing. This is the outcome of what 
Szasz has referred to as “base” psychotherapy which “uses language to 
increase [the therapist’s] power, to produce converts to his own cause, and 
to create loyal followers of his own person”, as opposed to helping 




 Harding’s adoption of psychiatric rhetoric is hardly unique however. 
Both Kesey and Goffman have noticed this in other individuals held in total 
institutions, be they prisons or hospitals. For example, Kesey told Tom Wolfe 
that  
There are guys in jail who have been in jail so much, 
that’s their whole thing…. They’ve picked up the whole 
jail language… only it isn’t their language, it’s the 
guards’, the cops’… the cops like that. It makes them 
feel better if you play their game (29).  
Likewise, the men in Nurse Ratched’s ward understand that to avoid 
punishments like shock therapy, being sent to the Disturbed ward, or 
lobotomy, they must assimilate themselves (however superficially) into this 
linguistic pattern and adhere to the concurrent expected conduct until their 
eventual breakdown or release. Goffman has written that one manner of 
“adaption to the setting of a total institution is that of ‘conversion’: the inmate 
appears to take over the official or staff view… and tries to act out the role of 
the perfect inmate” (63). This can be seen in Harding’s defence of the brutal 
“therapeutic” meeting, and in his description of McMurphy as a “Psychopath 
with definite sadistic tendencies, probably motivated by an unreasoning 
egomania” (56). This labelling functions dichotomously to create distance 
between the men, with Harding setting himself up as superior to the 
newcomer, but also serves to delegitimize McMurphy’s concerns around the 
true nature of the therapeutic setting despite the cruelty Harding has just 
experienced. Goffman noted similar patterns of behaviour in concentration 
camps during the Second World War, when occasionally “a long-time 
prisoner sometimes came to adopt the vocabulary… posture, expressions of 
aggression… of the Gestapo” (63).  
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Gender Politics: Powerful Women and Emasculated Men 
To extend this metaphor, one could state that in Kesey’s psychiatric 
concentration camp, all the prisoners are men, while the guards are under 
the control of one, overbearing woman and the ideology of social 
collectivism. Raymond Olderman clearly recognises the gender politics at 
play in Kesey’s narrative when he argues that the patients’ lives are 
controlled “by women; it is a ‘matriarchy’ and behind almost every ruined 
man is a grasping, castrating female” (45). Certainly, if one considers only 
women characters such as Big Nurse, Vera Harding, and Billy Bibbit’s 
overbearing mother then this conclusion seems impossible to avoid. Each of 
these women seek to emasculate, control, and in various ways infantilize the 
men in the ward. For example, Billy Bibbit’s mother dismisses her mature 
son’s expressed desires to attend college and start a family. Bromden, 
Kesey’s narrator, reports that she “laughed at [his] foolishness” and 
countered with “Sweetheart, you still have scads of time for things like that. 
Your whole life is ahead of you” (281). When Billy haltingly rejoinders that he 
is “th-th-thirty-one years old”, his mother responds “Sweetheart, do I look like 
the mother of a middle-aged man?” before she “wrinkled her nose and 
opened her lips at him and made a kind of wet kissing sound in the air with 
her tongue” (281). This disturbing exchange emphasises the mother’s desire 
to preserve her son in the innocence of youth, in order to maintain control 
over his actions and desires – in particular his sexual desires. The wet 
kissing sound suggests an unsavoury relationship where the mother requires 
her son to remain child-like, in order to preserve her youthful self-image and 
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sense of self-worth since, once her child has grown up, she loses her own 
identity.  
Once Billy has lost his virginity (courtesy of a prostitute friend who 
McMurphy invites onto the ward) and been discovered by the Big Nurse, it is 
through an appeal to his mother’s delicate sensibilities that Billy is fatally 
shamed and returned to his prolonged boyhood. In the moments before his 
mother is mentioned, Billy is calm and confident, unhindered by the stutter 
that usually dominates his speech. The narrator describes how he wishes the 
Big Nurse a “‘Good morning, Miss Ratched,’” whilst “not making any move to 
get up and button his pajamas”, showing himself to be newly assertive after 
his sexual awakening (300). Billy then take’s “the girl’s hand in his and 
grinned” before introducing her as Candy to the Big Nurse, again without any 
impulse to move or to hide himself – or his mate - in shame (300). Once Miss 
Ratched brings Billy’s mother into the discussion, Billy’s demeanour 
immediately shifts back to the role of the anxious juvenile:  
“‘What worries me, Billy’ she said – I could hear 
the change in her voice – ‘is how your poor mother is 
going to take this.’  
She got the response she was after. Billy 
flinched and put his hand to his cheek like he’d been 
burned with acid… ‘Nuh! Nuh!’ His mouth was working. 
He shook his head, begging her. ‘You d-don’t n-n-
need!’” (301). 
Billy’s rapid deterioration from a composed and assertive individual to a 
stuttering, pleading child is a direct result of this linkage between his sexual 
awakening and his mother’s assumed disappointment in this symbolic act. 
By having sex, Billy asserts his adulthood and thus his independence from 
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his mother. This desire for personal autonomy is a powerful act of subversion 
within the tightly structured and regimented environment of the ward.  
Marriage and Emasculation 
 The correlations between loss of control over one’s identity, 
humiliation, and gender conflict are fundamental to the marriages described 
in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, since marriage itself could be argued to 
function as part of the Combine. For instance, it is clear to the reader that 
McMurphy is different; he has managed to escape the controls of the 
Combine because he “growed up so wild all over the country, batting around 
from one place to another, never around town longer’n a few months” (89). 
This could be argued to signify that transience and a lack of engagement 
with the community, specifically in the laying down of familial roots, is the 
only way to ensure continued autonomy for individuals. In this case, 
marriage, a social institution that signifies permanence, could be understood 
as a fundamental element of the Combine’s power. Certainly, the marriages 
touched upon by Kesey demonstrate an undermining of masculine autonomy 
and the spread of what Feidler has called a “female civilization”, especially in 
the case of Harding and his wife Vera, and Chief Bromden’s parents. 
Harding is deeply unsatisfied with his marriage as explored in the group 
therapy meetings, where he describes his glamourous wife as a “bitch”. On 
the other hand, Vera is equally unhappy, ridiculing her husband for his 
purported inadequacies in front of the other men, as well as flirting with 
McMurphy in order to humiliate her feminine husband (158).  
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This understanding of marriage as harmful and unrewarding is 
emphasized again the case of Chief Bromden’s parents. Bromden refers to 
himself in the opening pages as a “half-breed Indian”, born from a white 
mother and a full-blooded Native American father (5). It becomes clear, as 
the narrative progresses, that this interracial marriage was far from 
harmonious and that instead of challenging racial power-structures, their 
union served to cement them. Bromden’s father, a tribal Chief originally 
named Tee Ah Millatoona (translated as “The-Pine-That-Stands-Tallest-on-
the-Tree”) took his wife’s name after their marriage to make it easier to 
integrate into white society: with a white surname, it was easier to become a 
fully-fledged American citizen with a social security number. This loss of the 
Chief’s original named identity, in addition to his forced assimilation into his 
wife’s white community, gradually strips him of his masculine power, 
autonomy, and authority. Bromden, Kesey’s narrator, claims that his father 
was “real big when I was a kid” but that his “mother got twice his size” as his 
father’s strength within the family and prestige in the wider social sphere 
completely disappeared (208). Bromden’s mother’s gross size, and the 
power over her husband thereby made visible directly connect her with 
Nurse Ratched as a symbol of monstrous white motherhood, since Ratched 
is described as a “chalk statue” (172) who “blows up bigger and bigger, big 
as a tractor”, with her face “a blend of white and cream and baby blue eyes” 
(11). Their shared colour and monstrosity strengthens Nurse Ratched’s 
position as a “second mother” to Bromden (Fiedler 180).  
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By replacing Tee Ah Millatoona’s proud Indian name with that of his 
white wife, matrimonial gender norms are subverted, and the husband loses 
his personal and cultural identity upon marriage, a process expedited when 
his tribal lands (and therefore his physical heritage) are sold off for 
redevelopment. It is interesting that Kesey’s narrative views this as 
catastrophic for the novel’s men, but the opposite situation, where wives take 
their husbands’ names, is considered normal and therefore unthreatening. 
This highlights another troubling aspect of Kesey’s gender politics, where 
women are considered monstrous and even dangerous if they become, in 
Kesey’s view, too powerful.  
McMurphy-as-Father and Restorative Masculinity 
As Kesey’s narrative progresses Bromden begins to reclaim his 
autonomy, memories of his cultural heritage, and his masculine power 
characterized by size and strength all because of McMurphy’s presence. 
Indications of change become apparent as soon as McMurphy enters the 
ward, since, immediately upon hearing his voice Bromden thinks,  
He talks a little the way Papa used to, voice loud and 
full of hell, but he doesn’t look like Papa; Papa was a 
full-blood Columbia Indian – a chief – and hard and 
shiny as a gunstock (16).  
This description is loaded in primitive masculine energy that reminds 
Bromden of his heritage and foregrounds the dramatic impact McMurphy has 
upon the Chief.  
When the patients shake hands for the first time, this connection 
between McMurphy and masculine vitality continues:  
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the fingers with thick and strong closing over mine, and 
my hand... [felt] peculiar and went swelling up out there 
on my stick of an arm, like he was transmitting his own 
blood into it. It rang with blood and power. It blowed up 
near as big as his (27).  
This motif of transplanting power and causing Bromden to swell as he 
becomes more self-assured continues throughout the novel, with McMurphy 
continuing to encourage Bromden’s development.  
As Martin has commented, “the early McMurphy has a primitive 
energy, the natural expression of his individualism” that flows from him to the 
others and inspires them to become more assertive (25). Throughout the 
novel McMurphy functions as an example to the men of how strong they 
might become, and as a surrogate father-figure to Bromden, who, Bruce 
Carnes writes, is “miraculously return[ed]… to the world of the living” through 
their developing bond (14). This relates directly to the lifting of the “fog” that 
clouds and separates the men from one another in Bromden’s mind, 
particularly after shock treatments, but also to the individual’s developing 
sense of self. In the opening pages of the novel, Bromden wonders if 
McMurphy is laughing at him because of “how funny it looked, an Indian’s 
face and black, oily Indian’s hair on somebody like me. I thought he was 
laughing at how weak I looked” (26). This demonstrates a disconnection 
between the physical and emotional self, something that will become 
fundamentally important to Esther Greenwood’s sense of self in Chapter 
Three. Chief reports an even more pronounced rupture between his inner 
and outer self later in the text when looking at his  
face in the mirror, dark and hard with big, high 
cheekbones, like the cheek underneath them had been 
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hacked out with a hatchet, eyes all black and hard and 
mean-looking, just like Papa’s eyes or the eyes of all 
those tough, mean-looking Indians you see on TV, and 
I’d think, That ain’t me, that ain’t my face (140). 
This moment occurs just before the night time episode when Chief Bromden 
witnesses the dog playing outside the asylum in the moonlight, which 
functions to connect Bromden with the natural world (a native American 
stereotype that Kesey perpetuates relentlessly) and with an existential 
awareness that connects him with the present moment in a way denied to 
him before McMurphy’s arrival by his willingness to surrender himself to the 
fog.  
 By the novel’s end, however, Bromden not only recognizes himself as 
a Columbian Indian freed from influence of his mothers, the Big Nurse and 
his biological mother who brought down the original Chief, but he even plays 
upon the various stereotypes associated with his finally accepted identity to 
his advantage. After his escape, on the way back to his tribe’s lands on the 
Columbia river then to Canada, Bromden hitchhikes with a “Mexican guy, 
going north in a truck full of sheep” to whom he tells such 
a good story about being a professional Indian wrestler 
the syndicate had tried to lock up in a nuthouse that he 
stopped real quick and gave me a leather jacket to 
cover my greens and loaned me ten bucks to eat on 
while I hitchhiked (272). 
This moment recalls McMurphy’s bravado in the petrol station earlier in the 
novel, using prejudice against psychiatric patients to secure certain benefits 
procured through fear, as well as portraying himself as a outlaw in the style 
of his mentor, and as a strong, masculine Native American, thereby finally 
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aligning himself with his identity that had been stripped by life-long exposure 
to the Combine.  
In Conclusion 
In a letter to the editor of the New York Times in 1963 Kesey fought 
back against those who had criticized the play version of One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest. Theatre critic Howard Taubman had claimed that the 
portrayal of the psychiatric hospital was tasteless and irrelevant, much to 
Kesey’s disgust. He retorted that “The notion that this setting is only a 
fictional and fantastic one does an injustice to thousands of patients in 
hundreds of wards almost identical to that ward on stage” since,  
While Cuckoo’s Nest is...  about more than a mental 
hospital, it is also an attack on tyranny of the sort that is 
perhaps more predominant in mental hospitals than any 
place else in our land (emphasis mine, qtd. Christensen 
63). 
 With this last line Kesey crystalizes his concerns over psychiatry, and 
particularly, of psychiatric hospitalization, showing both to be an affront to the 
American tradition of personal autonomy and self-reliance, as established by 
Ralph Waldo Emerson in 1841. This position brought Kesey into alliance with 
Thomas S. Szasz, who similarly denounced psychiatric intervention as a 
form of pseudo-medicine that functions as a tool of state repression, and with 
whom Kesey corresponded admiringly.  
Beat writers like Seymour Krim and Allen Ginsberg, whose poem 
“Howl” has been described as “a stunning definition and denunciation of the 
conformist American machine state”, also criticised psychiatry as state 
violence perpetrated against social or political misfits (Christensen 30). 
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These writers were highly influential to Kesey, particularly in their propensity 
to write about situations from their own experiences, something that inspired 
Kesey’s decision to set his novel in a psychiatric ward resembling the one he 
worked in as a night aide in the early 1960s. Indeed, his need for accuracy 
was so great that he even tried electroshock therapy himself, just to see if it 
was as bad as patients claimed it to be. In his response to the negative 
reviewer, Kesey wrote that during his final shifts at the hospital 
I had to try shock treatment to get some idea why the 
patients thought it so bad… to those who think it is 
fictionally exaggerated, I only say try it first and see. 
Because it can never be as bad in fiction as it is in real 
life (qtd. Christensen 63). 
Like most of the other novels considered herein, psychiatric intervention, 
characterized by shock treatments, lobotomy, restraint, and 
institutionalization is understood in Kesey’s novel as punitive, driven by a 
repressive social structure that cannot tolerate non-compliance. The medical 
legitimacy of psychiatry is rejected, with mental illness revealed as 
stigmatizing labels applied to those who have deviated from their social 
responsibilities. One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest is a foundational text of 
the counter-cultural push against psychiatric omnipotence evident in the 
literature of the early 1960s. In my next chapter, on Sylvia Plath’s The Bell 
Jar, I seek to extend this critique further by focusing on the ways in which 
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment can be employed to readjust those who 
reject social convention, particularly with regards to gender and conservative 







The Bell Jar, Ontological Insecurity, and the Curse of Womanhood 
Just as Ken Kesey’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest understood society 
as a threat to the individual, Sylvia Plath similarly depicts post-war culture 
and the omnipotent power of psychiatry as antithetical to the development of 
autonomous personhood in The Bell Jar. I argue that both texts locate 
psychiatry within this collectivized society as a form of unofficial police force, 
ensuring conformity through the threat of diagnosis, the resultant labelling of 
dissenters as mad, and the violent readjustment of those who refuse to 
comply. There are disparities between Kesey's and Plath's texts however, 
particularly with regards to respective gender roles and their significance in 
preserving the social status quo. This, in turn, is intrinsic to the depiction and 
deployment of psychiatric intervention in both novels. In Kesey's text, the 
emphasis on social collectivization or collaboration is understood as a 
feminizing force that threatens masculine self-determination, therefore 
psychiatry is understood as a "matriarchy", where this feminization is 
violently enforced.  
On the other hand, in Plath's text, psychiatry functions to impose 
society’s patriarchal values upon dissenting and troublesome females to 
preserve masculine authority and social power. As Szasz commented in 
1973, Plath, throughout her life, "waged an unsuccessful war against the 
constraints of the feminine role [and] was labelled mentally ill, hospitalized, 
and treated with electroshock" as a result (300). This chapter will argue that 
Plath's protagonist, Esther Greenwood, faces a similar fate. Much attention in 
this chapter will therefore be paid to the politics of gender in The Bell Jar, 
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since, in my reading, gender roles underpin the social structure that 
psychiatry and psychiatrists support through diagnosis and treatment. Unlike 
Kesey’s text however, Plath’s novel allows for the development of ambiguity 
in the individual’s relationship with psychiatry. Esther, Plath’s protagonist, 
undergoes a questionable recovery by the novel’s end, by which time she 
describes herself as “patched” and “retreaded”, linguistic choices that 
deliberately undermine the legitimacy of her progress (233). Despite Plath’s 
ambiguity, this chapter will argue that Esther remains a victim of psychiatric 
violence based upon her dissatisfaction with the conservative gender roles 
open to women at the mid-twentieth century.  
Sylvia Plath, R. D. Laing and The Divided Self  
By reading Plath’s novel through the framework of R. D. Laing’s The 
Divided Self, first published in 1960, this chapter will interpret mental illness 
(particularly schizophrenia) not as organic in etiology but as a label applied to 
those who reject or struggle to harmoniously assimilate their individual 
selfhood with socially defined expectations of behaviour, particularly in 
relation to gender. Far from being illogical and incomprehensible, madness is 
understood in Plath’s and Laing’s texts to be a cogent response to pressure 
placed upon the self by family and society. Furthermore, this chapter will 
demonstrate how R. D. Laing’s ideas of ontological insecurity and the false-
self system can be expanded from an apolitical focus upon the individual to 
apply more widely to the psychological impact of socially gendered 
expectations upon middle-class women in the post-war decades. By 
considering Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique and Simone de 
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Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in parallel with The Bell Jar and The Divided 
Self, this socially-imposed schism upon the female becomes clear. 
Psychiatry is therefore understood in Plath’s text to play the role of 
patriarchal enforcer of gendered positions, rather than a legitimate branch of 
an objective medical science.  
Despite selling only 1600 copies in the first four years after its 
publication in 1960, The Divided Self by R. D. Laing has become one of the 
most famous texts of its time. The Divided Self sought not only to explain the 
“process of going mad” in a way that would make madness “comprehensible” 
to readers, but also aimed to restructure debates around mental illness by 
moving away from orthodox psychiatric terminology that led to the 
depersonalization of the patient (9). In accordance with this more humanistic 
framework, influences visible in The Divided Self come from a variety of 
sources, including literature, theatre, psychology, mythology, and most 
prominently, philosophy. Laing was particularly interested in existentialism 
and phenomenology, two philosophical ideas that he combined with his 
psychiatric background in The Divided Self. By applying and revising 
philosophical ideas derived from continental thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre, 
Søren Kierkegaard, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Laing 
established an innovative rhetorical framework that renounced the primacy of 
organic aetiology in schizophrenia. Instead, Laing viewed psychosis as part 
of a spectrum of normal and predictable human behaviour, and as a chosen 




Laing argued that rather than viewing human beings as “organisms”, 
as he believes to be the case in traditional medicine, the existential 
psychiatrist would consider the individual as a “self-acting agent”, whose 
behaviour should be understood “in terms of that person’s experience and of 
his intentions” (1976, 22). In contrast, “behaviour seen organismically [as in 
orthodox therapeutic doctrine] can only be seen as the contraction or 
relaxation of certain muscles, etc.” (1976, 22) Whilst it seems unlikely that 
many doctors would admit to viewing their patients through this essentialist 
lens, Laing argued that in order to understand schizophrenics, and 
psychiatric patients more generally, one must recognize the patient not as a 
passive victim of a neurochemical flaw, but as an individual with agency and 
responsibility, as well as interpersonal experiences of socialization.  
Laing’s emphasis upon the experience of the individual is echoed in 
Plath’s novel, through the connections it draws between her socio-political 
context and Esther’s supposed sickness. Teresa de Lauretis has pointed out 
this social emphasis in Plath’s text, arguing that The Bell Jar’s narrative 
structure follows the  
pattern of psychoanalytic novels and case histories but 
whereas in the latter the main interest lies in the 
psychological processes described rather than in 
cultural and existential ones, Esther’s story is totally 
entwined with a specific and fully detailed culture (174). 
As in Laing’s text, Plath empties out the veneer of medical objectivity behind 
psychiatric diagnosis and emphasizes the importance of one’s interpersonal 
experiences in instances of mental distress. To that end, Esther’s purported 
sickness is not understood in The Bell Jar as rooted within an individual 
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psychopathology, but in the sick society in which she exists, most specifically 
in the arbitrary nature of its gender roles. Similarly, in The Divided Self Laing 
compares the translation of ancient texts to interpretation of “psychotic 
‘hieroglyphic’ speech and actions” (which have been termed 
“schizophrenese”) and argues that “Beyond… formal analysis, it may be 
possible to shed light on the text through a knowledge of the nexus of socio-
historical conditions from which it arose” (emphasis mine, 32). This position 
refutes the scientific objectification of (wo)man-as-patient, and instead posits 
a more humanistic, interpersonal relation between the individual and their 
social context.  
For Laing, most of the schizophrenic patients he encountered can be 
understood as psychologically divided and as experiencing what he termed 
“ontological insecurity”. Ontological insecurity is a state in which the 
individual lacks a solid core understanding of themselves and their position 
within their world, and from which one can – but does not always - progress 
on from to experience psychosis. Laing describes the ontologically insecure 
individual as: 
More unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead 
than alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of 
the world, so that his identity and autonomy are always 
in question… He may not possess an over-riding sense 
of personal consistency or cohesiveness. He may feel 
more unsubstantial than substantial, and unable to 
assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, 
valuable. And he may feel his self as partially divorced 
from his body (1976, 42). 
Laing is vague about why some individuals experience this internal vacuum, 
or what exactly causes it in The Divided Self, although we get some 
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indication through case studies that it is often connected with overbearing 
mother figures (a suspicion that David Copper would later repeat in 
Psychiatry and Anti-Psychiatry in 1967). 
 Laing was aware of, and inspired by, the work of Gregory Bateson 
and his colleagues in Palo Alto, California, and their study “Towards a 
Theory of Schizophrenia”. Published in 1956, Bateson’s paper theorised that 
children were more likely to develop schizophrenia if they were repeatedly 
exposed to communicative “double bind[s]” through pathological parental 
relations. According to this study, schizophrenia develops because of 
repeated communicational confusion resulting from “contradictory messages” 
from one or both parents, conveyed both verbally and non-verbally. Laing 
met Bateson on his first trip to America in 1962, according to Adrian Laing, 
and the trip made a “lasting impression” upon him, inspiring his later work 
with Aaron Esterson (although both Laing and Esterson had been working on 
interpersonal dysfunctionality and the development of schizophrenia since 
1958) (80). Laing’s meeting with Bateson strengthened his assumption that 
schizophrenic self-divisions could occur through the long-term erosion of the 
self specifically by the dysfunctional family, a position he explored further in 
Self and Others and Sanity, Madness, and the Family. This chapter however 
understands the family as microcosm for a restrictive society, thereby 
widening Laing’s remit by taking into consideration the impact of a broader 
socialization upon the individual.  
Those affected by this sense of internal division often, according to 
Laing, attempt to combat this existential insecurity over the solidity or validity 
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of their ‘true’ selves by surviving behind a metaphorical mask. This also 
includes the vampiric imitation of other people’s identities, which Laing 
termed “ontological dependency” (1976, 53). This masking tactic, labelled in 
The Divided Self as the “false-self system” is integral to Laing’s theory of 
schizophrenia: it seeks to provide a superficial front behind which the 
vulnerable inner self can retreat, thereby maintaining an apparently safe 
distance from the outside world and its perceived existential threats. Laing’s 
concept of false and true selves is directly relatable those laid out by D. W. 
Winnicott. Winnicott, a psychoanalyst and colleague of Laing’s at the 
Tavistock Institute in London, similarly wrote that the false self performs a 
defensive function to “hide and protect the True Self, whatever that may be” 
(142).  
In the division of selves, the interior “authentic” identity therefore 
remains trapped within the mind of the sufferer, while the outer “inauthentic” 
self-system alone relates to the physical world as a kind of defence 
mechanism. This schism, however, reads as overly facile. The concept of an 
“authentic” or “true” self is complicated, particularly in relation to the 
utilization of masks and alternate protective identities. These masks, I argue, 
are adopted through the process of socialization (most pertinently for this 
chapter in the case of social inculcation into specific gendered identities). As 
Daniel Burston has pointed out however, “if taken to its logical extreme, this 
line of reasoning suggests that the presocialized person is the only true self”, 
and “that the rediscovery of authentic selfhood requires that we unlearn 
whatever beliefs, identities, and cognitive constructs have been acquired” 
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(223). While this logical conclusion may be useful for understanding Laing’s 
gravitation towards rebirthing therapies in later years, Burston’s comments 
demonstrate the difficulty in fully accepting the idea of an “authentic” or true 
self located behind the adopted false-self system.  
Nevertheless, for Laing this split between true and false selves 
establishes a disembodied/embodied dichotomy that the individual must 
precariously negotiate to avoid a descent into a Laingian psychosis, liable to 
occur when the affected individual begins to identify exclusively, or at least 
predominantly, with this disembodied interiority (65). This self-division can 
lead to feelings of asphyxia for the “true” self, as the individual trapped inside 
their own psyche is unable to interact with or extract stimulus from the “real” 
world. Instead, Laing reports that these persons generally experience their 
interactions with the material world as characterized by “unrealness, 
meaninglessness, purposelessness… [and] overall deadness [as a] direct 
consequence of the basic dynamic structure of the individual’s being” (96). 
One of the clearest examples of the highly pressurized and suffocating 
nature of this divided inner/outer experience is developed in The Bell Jar.  
Although Adrian Laing writes that his father met Ted Hughes in 1964, 
the year after Plath’s suicide, there is no concrete evidence that Plath and 
Laing were aware of each other personally or of the other’s work (99). 
Despite this, there are many notable connections between Plath’s narrative 
and Laing’s theories of schizophrenic experience, and critics have been 
quick to establish a link between the two. Luke Ferretter, for example, 
discusses Plath’s work in relation to Laing’s Sanity, Madness and the Family, 
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focusing on the case of the Gold family and the “procrustean identity” that the 
daughter, Ruth, displays to her parents (emphasis original, 2011, 161). In 
addition, William Wootten has argued that, despite the lack of evidence of a 
connection between the two, “it is extremely likely that Plath would have 
been aware of the arguments [The Divided Self] advanced” (107). Plath was, 
like Laing, interested in psychoanalysis, and her Letters Home to her mother 
show she was aware of Sartre’s brand of existential philosophy, since Plath 
writes in a letter dated 16 August 1960 that she has been translating Sartre’s 
1951 play titled Le Diable et Le Bon Dieu (or The Devil and the Good Lord) 
(391).  
Given these common intellectual interests, and that both Laing and 
Plath were working in London at the same time, it is conceivable therefore 
that they were aware of each other’s work (although Wootten’s assertion that 
it was “extremely likely” seems exaggerated, since Laing’s work did not 
become especially famous until 1964, by which time Plath was deceased). 
Nevertheless, The Bell Jar and The Divided Self have much in common, so 
much so that for Marjorie Perloff the “central action” of the novel can be 
understood in explicitly Laingian terms (509). She argues that the narrative 
impetus behind The Bell Jar is its protagonist Esther’s “attempt to heal the 
fracture between [her] inner self and false-self system so that a real and 
viable identity can come into existence” (Perloff 509). Howard Moss agrees, 
arguing that “As a work of fiction, The Bell Jar seems to compliment the 
clinical theories of the Scottish analyst R. D. Laing”, not just as a result of 
Plath’s exploration of the false-self system as Perloff points out, but also in 
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the way that the novel destabilizes the concepts of “mad” and “sane” (127). 
For Moss, since the narrative is presented from Esther’s point of view “rather 
than the viewpoint of someone observing her, there is a continuity to her 
madness; it is not one state suddenly supplanting another, but the most 
gradual of processes” (127).  
Furthermore, Harold Bloom has added that through Plath’s choice of 
narrative style, Esther’s “mental illness becomes real, even understandable 
to the reader” (20). Both Moss’s and Bloom’s readings directly mirrors the 
position Laing advocates in The Divided Self: the existential therapist must 
challenge themselves to adopt, or at least comprehend, the perspective of 
the client or patient, and, in doing so, disregard the discrete segregation of 
the terms “mad” and “sane” as false constructs. Moss’s comment that 
madness appears in Plath’s novel as a “process” also links his words directly 
to a Laingian position that views schizophrenia part of a spectrum of possible 
human behaviours, rather than a biological category that only affects those 
experiencing a neurochemical pathology. 
The Pitfalls of Autobiography: Beyond the Author 
It is widely known that The Bell Jar is a semi-autobiographical novel 
that confronts the events leading up to Plath’s first suicide attempt in August 
1953, when she was 20 years old, and her consequent experience of 
psychiatric treatment with both psychotherapy and ECT. While David 
Holbrook has understood the text as a “horrifyingly autobiographical account” 
of Plath’s late adolescent battle with mental illness, to begin to unpack the 
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wider social and political implications of the text the similarities between 
Plath and Esther’s experiences must be set to one side (53). This, one could 
argue, may have been Plath’s intention for the text given her adoption of the 
pen name Victoria Lucas for its original publication (the only within her 
lifetime). One should also consider, as Paul Alexander has pointed out, the 
risk of embarrassment to those who recognised themselves in Plath's text. 
For this reason, Aurelia Plath repeatedly fought against her daughter being 
identified publicly as the text’s author given her belief that "certain 
characters... were grotesque caricatures of living individuals… who would be 
hurt by the [publication]" (Alexander, 374).  
Whatever the motivation behind Plath's original choice of pseudonym, 
Jacqueline Rose has argued that preoccupation with an author’s life (and in 
Plath’s case, her death) “clamps [their] writing into [a] hollow wooden frame” 
and, in this case, “cramps [Plath’s] style” as well as “deny[ing] the 
transformative potential of her art” (50-52). This is inarguably the case; 
however, the complexity of Plath’s own opinions on the gendered roles of 
mid-twentieth century women are worth considering as they elucidate the 
reasons for the novel’s own gendered ambiguities. For example, shortly after 
meeting Ted Hughes at Cambridge University Plath wrote in her journal that:  
I am inclined to babies and bed and brilliant friends…. 
This is what I was meant to make for a man, and to 
give him this colossal reservoir of faith and love for him 
to swim in daily, and to give him children; lots of them in 
great pain and pride (79).  
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Plath’s statement initially appears to romanticise and propagate the 
traditional female role; she wants to produce children and offer herself as a 
sexual mate in service to a man (presumably a husband).  
Likewise, in The Bell Jar, Esther initially romanticises maternity, 
conflating painful childbirth with womanly serenity: she writes that she 
“always imagined myself… on the delivery table… dead white, of course, 
with no make-up and from the awful ordeal, but smiling and radiant, with my 
hair down to my waist” (63). After watching another woman give birth early in 
the novel however, Esther becomes disillusioned with this feminine destiny 
and looks upon modern childbirth with horror, describing the mother as a “big 
white lump” on a trolley (61) and imagining labour to be a “long, blind, 
doorless and windowless corridor of pain” that traps mothers, “shut[ting]” 
them in (62).  
Esther is similarly horrified by submissive wives, and in particular with 
Mrs Willard’s suggestion that wives become the “arrow” from which their 
husbands shoot out from: instead, she writes that "The last thing I wanted 
was infinite security and to be the place an arrow shoots off from. I wanted 
change and excitement and to shoot off in all directions myself" (79). 
However, this idea of the wife as a restorative base for the husband to "shoot 
off" from can be read as analogous to the reservoir that Plath mentions in her 
journal entry: in her imagined future defined by matrimony and motherhood, 
she will provide an immersive love for her husband to "swim in". At first 
glance therefore, Plath’s journal entry above seems to agree with Mrs 
Willard’s conservatively gendered idea of wifedom, since Plath-as-wife will 
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put herself through physical pain to birth children and create a safe space for 
the benefit of her husband. 
Plath’s mention of “brilliant friends”, however, suggests an extension 
of the wife/mother role that indicates Plath’s rejection of wives abandoning 
their individual creative or intellectual potentiality in sole service to their mate. 
Indeed, in another conversation recorded in Plath’s journal she wrote that her 
boyfriend, Dick Norton, had accused her of wanting to dominate her future 
husband, or of being afraid of being dominated herself. She responded,  
Sure, I’m a little scared of being dominated. (Who isn’t? 
Just the submissive, docile, milky type of individual. 
And that is Not he, Not me) … It is only balance that I 
ask for. Not the continual subordination of one person’s 
desires and interests to the continual advancement of 
another’s! That would be too grossly unfair (emphasis 
mine, 106).   
Women, as wives and mothers, should be allowed to pursue meaningful 
interests and endeavours outside the home according to Plath. Statements 
like these are the reason why Tim Kendall has written that “Plath’s conformist 
ambitions existed alongside a profound dissatisfaction with such roles” (50). 
Marriage, motherhood, and individual identity are all equally integral to 
Plath’s sense of self.  
Plath’s anxieties over the inflexibility of women’s roles are important to 
address as they correspond directly to those displayed in The Bell Jar, but 
also to tensions highlighted by other women of the post-war years including 
French feminist Simone de Beauvoir. Beauvoir characterised this period as 
one of "transition" for women, where an awareness of the claustrophobic 
demands of the feminine role was building in female consciousness (445). In 
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1949, Beauvoir wrote in The Second Sex that this tension in the female 
position between individual desires and social expectations lead to a 
rupturing within the feminine self that I will align with a Laingian conception of 
the schizoid individual. Beauvoir writes, 
In woman… there is from the beginning a conflict 
between her autonomous existence and her objective 
self…. she is taught that to please she must try to 
please, she must make herself object; she should 
therefore renounce her autonomy. She is treated like a 
live doll and is refused liberty (308).  
As Beauvoir suggests, women are necessarily divided beings, who are 
required to conform to restrictive gender practices and to subjugate their 
subjective desires to these socially expected roles.  
Virginia Goldner makes this point even more explicitly, stating that 
[s]ince gender is a… cultural designation of the self that 
‘cleanses’ itself of opposing tendencies, it is, by 
definition, a universal, false-self system generated in 
compliance with [gender norms]” (emphasis mine 73). 
By referring to the “false-self system” here, Goldner, as I intend to do, 
connects the requirement of gender performance with R. D. Laing's concept 
of ontological insecurity, and suggests that feminine experience is always 
dichotomous and even, in Laing's terms, schizophrenic. To address the 
biographical nature of Plath's text alone would miss this point, and therefore 
unavoidably narrows the political significance of her novel. Biographical 
critiques restrict engagement to the identification of analogies with the 
author's singular life, rather than facilitating an exploration of feminine identity 
and psychiatry's role as a tool of patriarchal readjustment. 
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 To avoid such myopic engagement, this chapter will argue that by 
reading The Bell Jar through the framework of Laing’s The Divided Self, the 
reader can understand Esther as experiencing a textbook “ontological 
insecurity” that leads to the conscious construction of a “false-self system” 
through what Laing has termed “ontological dependency” that eventually 
deteriorates into psychosis. I will also demonstrate how, despite Plath’s 
personal views on gender roles being conflicted and often markedly 
conservative, Esther’s often frustrated struggle for an identity she can live 
with is inherently connected to the mutually exclusive feminine archetypes 
available to women in the mid-1950s, as represented by characters like 
Betsy, Doreen, Jay Cee, and Dodo Conway, amongst others. Perloff agrees, 
arguing that the major focus of Plath’s novel is “not on mental illness per se” 
but resides instead within “the relationship of Esther’s private psychosis to 
her larger social situation" since "her dilemma seems to have a great deal to 
do with being a woman in a society whose guidelines for women she can 
neither accept nor reject” (511). Accordingly, I will connect Esther’s 
exploration of potential gender approved identities to Laing’s concept of the 
“false-self system” and posit that a divided self is in fact at the heart of mid-
twentieth century female experience.  
Womanhood and the Split Self 
To be clear, this is not to suggest that the experience of schizoid or 
divided selves is only encountered by those who are in conflict with the 
stereotypical gender roles socially expected of “normal” citizens (of either 
sex) at that particular cultural moment or is limited exclusively to women 
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(several of Laing’s case studies, including David, Peter, and James are 
male). It should be acknowledged that men as well as women are subjected 
to stereotyped gender roles that may cause psychological distress: in 
Revolutionary Road, Frank Wheeler often consciously projects a hyper-
masculine air and struggles with crushing weight of being a sole family 
breadwinner; while Kesey's Randle McMurphy becomes a caricature of 
masculinity trapped within the gendered expectations of his fellow patients, 
surprising them with unexpected moments of sensitivity.   
Significantly however, like Beauvoir before her, Plath’s narrative 
suggests that these gender roles are more harmful to women since, Plath 
suggests, females are subject to tighter (often double) social standards that 
compound the split between femininity and individual autonomy in a way less 
visible in men. For example, with regards to sexual freedom in men and 
women, Beauvoir writes that  
Patriarchal civilization dedicated women to chastity; it 
recognized more or less openly the right of the male to 
sexual freedom, while woman was restricted to 
marriage. The sexual act, if not sanctified by the code, 
by a sacrament, is for her a fault, a fall, a defeat, a 
weakness; she should defend her virtue... whereas any 
blame visited upon her conqueror is mixed with 
admiration (395). 
Anger over social double standards with regards to sexuality and sexual 
expression partially drives Plath's narrative, particularly when Esther learns 
that Buddy Willard, her boyfriend, has lost his virginity before her in a casual 
fling with a waitress. After Buddy tells her of his affair, Esther is stunned, 
stating that “something in me just froze up” (66). After asking her classmates 
how they would feel in the same situation, they respond that “most boys were 
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like that and you couldn’t honestly accuse them of anything until you were at 
least pinned or engaged to be married” (66).  
This double standard, which profoundly disturbs and even enrages 
Esther, is revisited when her mother sends her an article titled “In Defence of 
Chastity”, which advises that men would  
try to persuade a girl to have sex and say they would 
marry her later, but as soon as she gave in, they would 
lose all respect for her and start saying that if she did 
that with them she would do that with other men and 
they would end up making her life miserable (77). 
 Shocked by this dichotomous position, Esther decides to break the taboo 
around female sexuality and to lose her own virginity outside of wedlock as a 
form of female empowerment. She states that “I couldn’t stand the idea of a 
woman having to have a single pure life and a man being able to have a 
double life, one pure and one not” (77). Esther’s desire to have sex to secure 
her independence is, however, fraught. Bourjaily comments that “through 
emotionally neutral defloration, Esther has become her own woman in a 
world of inadequate, repressive men. She says ‘I hate the feeling of being 
under a man’s thumb’” (138). While Esther’s logic, as Bourjaily sees it, 
makes sense, one could counter this position by arguing that in placing such 
emphasis on heterosexual activity as a passage to female liberation, the man 
is necessarily placed in a position of power. This was Beauvoir's position, 
since she wrote that “the normal sexual act in effect puts women into a state 
of dependency upon the male… It is the male… who has the aggressive role, 
the female submitting to his embrace” (395). Furthermore, Esther’s eventual 
haemorrhage, caused by sexual penetration, emphasizes the violence 
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inherent in this coupling both literally and metaphorically. Esther’s claims to 
female liberation through sex therefore remain highly problematic.  
 Esther's rejection of the limits placed on female sexuality is one of 
many examples of her adolescent desire to probe and to sometimes 
challenge the socially constructed notion of how womanhood should be 
performed. As Goldner has pointed out, in The Bell Jar “gender experience is 
not necessarily a self-state, but a complex, evaluatively structured self-
representation, which is then measured against an idealized, abstract, 
dichotomous gender category” (emphasis original, 74). Plath’s narrative style 
helps to reveal this normally hidden aspect of Western culture, through what 
Stan Smith has argued is an atmosphere of “alienation” engendered and 
communicated through the psychological detachment of her protagonist. By 
this, Smith means that “Esther’s ‘madness’ offers her an increasingly 
‘objective’ exterior view of the culture she has inherited” (34). Esther’s 
schizoid perspective paints a picture of an individual both inherently 
connected to, and psychologically disconnected from, her social context in 
ways that ultimately confront the reader with the familiar rendered strange 
(most predominantly in the case of gender relations and in her dealings with 
psychiatry unmoored, at first, from the therapeutic framework).  
Narrative Distance, Cultural Relativism, and Gender Roles 
This sense of disconnection directly corresponds with Laing’s 
depiction of the schizoid individual as segregated into a dichotomous 
disembodied/embodied state. Plath is utilizing Esther's disembodied or 
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schizoid position to create space for dialogue around what is automatically 
accepted as both natural and therefore culturally normal. Robert Scholes 
agrees, arguing that Plath uses “what the Russian critic Viktor Shklovsky 
called ‘defamiliarization’”, with the intention of challenging “comforting… 
clichés that we are all too ready to accept” (132). Indeed, for Shklovsky, the 
revelatory power of this technique lies at the very heart of the aesthetic 
endeavour: "the purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are 
perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects 
'unfamiliar'" (emphasis mine, 12). By utilizing this distancing narrative style, 
Plath's text allows Esther and readers alike to reflect upon the constructed 
and artificial nature of socially received knowledge depicted as natural. In 
detaching oneself from a socially learned framework of meaning, the text 
demands that we approach central issues like gender roles and psychiatric 
intervention more sceptically, and prioritizes knowledge gained through 
individual experience over received social wisdom. This narrative strategy 
serves to highlight the relativity of culturally constructed social norms.  
An especially pointed example of this schizoid defamiliarization occurs 
when Esther confronts the reality of modern childbirth, as she watches Mrs 
Tomolillo give birth in the medical school. She describes the hospital bed as 
an “awful torture table, with… metal stirrups sticking up in mid-air at one end 
and all sorts of instruments and wires and tubes” (61). Her description of Mrs 
Tomolillo’s body is sinister and uncanny; entirely separated from 
romanticised notions of childbirth and maternity in general:  
The woman’s stomach stuck up so high I couldn’t see 
her face or the upper part of her body at all. She 
206 
 
seemed to have nothing but an enormous spider-fat 
stomach and two little ugly spindly legs… and all the 
time the baby was being born she never stopped 
making this unhuman whooing noise (61). 
This emphasizes Mrs Tomolillo’s dismemberment through medical 
intervention: she has been reduced (in Esther’s eyes) to an eerie, and 
inhuman, mass of limbs and sounds (Esther even refers to her as a “lump” 
(61)). Plath’s narrative style makes this description alien and refutes romantic 
notions of childbirth so central to the female gender role. In a way, this effect 
strips back what might be understood as the culturally constructed (and 
romanticised) “essence” of childbirth represented in the novel by Esther’s 
vision of herself in childbed, “smiling and radiant, with my hair down to my 
waist” as discussed and replaces it with the brutal fact of birth in an 
industrialised hospital setting (63).  
Esther’s depiction of Mrs Tomolillo as reduced to a huge pregnant 
belly with legs also directly connects to Laing’s view that medical rhetoric 
frames patients as pathological organisms during diagnosis and treatment, 
rather than as holistic (existential) entities. Laing writes that by seeing the 
patient “as an organism, man cannot be anything else but a complex of 
things, of its, and the processes that ultimately comprise an organism are it-
processes” (1976, 22). This is precisely how Esther views the childbirth 
episode: Mrs Tomolillo is dehumanized to the extent that her consciousness 
of the experience is vitiated by the administration of a drug designed to 
engender a “twilight sleep” that would cloud her memory to the physical pain 
of childbirth (61). Esther understands Mrs Tomolillo, as an existential being, 
to be entirely irrelevant to the whole procedure. Her sole function is as a 
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passive vessel in service to the male body, since Esther reflects that the drug 
is “sort of drug a man would invent” that would “make [her] forget how bad 
the pain had been” (61). 
 The issue here again is of disconnection from the body and bodily 
experiences; women, in Esther’s eyes, are tricked by medical advances into 
having baby after baby, since they never recall the traumatic and painful 
experience of giving birth. This episode suggest that women are being 
controlled, robbed of their autonomy and corporeal experience by a 
patriarchal social structure akin to Kesey’s Combine, and by the medical 
profession that underpins and supports this cultural zeitgeist. Indeed, Gayle 
Whittier has argued that the  
labouring woman strapped to a table (more like an 
instrument of torture than a helpful invention) is one of 
a series of images [in the novel] in which society 
ostensibly ‘helps’ people by reducing them to passivity 
(137). 
This series of images, I argue, should include Esther’s experience of 
electroshock therapy and psychiatric hospitalization.  
Although childbirth is understood in The Bell Jar (and more generally 
in mid twentieth-century society) as the zenith of female experience, women, 
and particularly women’s bodily experiences, are fundamentally removed 
from the birth-process, usurped by medical science. This process, according 
to Irving Zola is a relatively recent one: in 1978 he wrote “it was barely 
seventy years ago that virtually all births… occurred outside the hospital as 
well as outside medical supervision” (90). By bringing pregnancy and birth 
into the scientific realm of medicine, women’s control over this process has 
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been eroded, as can be seen in the propagation of the lithotomy position 
(adopted by Mrs Tomolillo), as the optimum posture for delivery. Activist 
Doris Haire has commented that  
There is gathering scientific evidence that the 
unphysiological lithotomy position (back flat, with knees 
drawn up and spread wide apart by stirrups), which is 
preferred by most American physicians because it is 
more convenient… tends to alter the normal fetal 
environment and obstruct the normal process of 
childbearing, making spontaneous birth more difficult or 
impossible (emphasis mine, 192). 
This position, adopted by Mrs Tomolillo, has numerous disadvantages for 
delivering mothers and babies: it restricts space in the birth canal, can lead 
to lengthier labours, and forces women to push against gravity to deliver. 
Regardless of these negative factors however, this position is, according to 
Haire, preferred by medical professionals because is more expedient for the 
presiding obstetrician. This argument is similarly advanced by Brigitte 
Jordan, who decades later compared women’s experiences giving birth in an 
upright position, with accounts of birth in the supine lithotomy position. She 
wrote that “without exception” responses from women using the upright 
position were “more positive” since they experienced “more ease in pushing, 
less pain during pushing, fewer backaches… fewer forceps deliveries, and 
fewer perineal tears” (85). Most significantly however, she wrote that “there 
were no adverse effects” delivering in the upright position, but that “birth 
attendants reported that this position was inconvenient for them” (85). In this 
position the mother becomes a passive instrument of human propagation; 
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her body rendered powerless, while credit for successful birth is focused 
upon the (mostly male) medical profession16. 
 Plath's use of defamiliarization in the childbirth scene allows readers 
to experience a familiar world made strange through the separative metaphor 
of the bell jar; a position that leads one to question the received social 
zeitgeist and aligns Esther's disjointed self with Laingian ideas of the false-
self system and ontological insecurity. As Esther's mental state becomes 
more precarious, the disembodied narrative perspective intensifies, but even 
at the novel’s opening Esther describes herself as “very still and very empty, 
the way the eye of a tornado must feel, moving dully along in the middle of 
the surrounding hullabaloo” (2). Esther is defined during these moments by 
passivity and absence; she is struck dumb by her mental separation from the 
outside world. Not long afterwards she compounds this insubstantiality by 
describing herself as “the negative of a person I’d never seen before in my 
life” during an impromptu drinking trip with her friend Doreen (9). Again, this 
disembodiment is a clear indication of Laingian ontological insecurity as 
described in The Divided Self, where the individual is characterized as   
Split in two main ways: in the first place, there is a rent 
in his relation with his world and, in the second, there is 
a disruption of his relation with himself. Such a person 
is not able to experience himself ‘together with’ others 
or ‘at home’ in the world, but, on the contrary, he 
                                                          
16 Diane Scully and Pauline Bart wrote in 1978 that in America, "Gynecology 
and obstetrics are overwhelmingly a male specialty (6.8 percent female 
practitioners)" (214). Given that this figure relates to the medical profession 
twenty-five years after 1953, the year Plath's novel was set, it would be 
reasonable to surmise that the percentage of women in gynecology and 




experiences himself in despairing aloneness and 
isolation; more over he does not experience himself as 
a complete person but rather as ‘split’ in various ways, 
perhaps as a mind more or less tenuously linked to a 
body (1976, 17). 
This description closely matches Esther’s reported experience: she exists in 
a physical sense within the world, but mentally she becomes more and more 
distant, until she experiences a psychotic break. For Laing, psychosis is 
likely to occur “if the individual begins to identity himself too exclusively with 
that part of him which feels unembodied”, a state that increasingly 
corresponds to Esther’s precarious selfhood (1976, 65).  
When Esther joins her friend Doreen and her new love interest Lenny 
in his apartment this split self clearly manifests itself, as does Esther’s 
schizoid preoccupation with watching or observing. Esther states that “I liked 
looking on at other people in crucial situations” (12), and when Doreen and 
Lenny begin dancing she “tried to look devout and impassive like some 
businessman I once saw watching an Algerian belly-dancer”, while feeling 
herself “shrinking to a small black dot… like a hole in the ground” (15). 
Esther feels herself reduced to a disembodied spectator which, for Louis 
Sass, is entirely predictable, and relates directly to Plath’s use of narrative 
defamiliarization. He writes that “most schizoid persons seem to be well 
aware of their own detachment. ‘There is a pane of glass between me and 
mankind’ is a typical remark” (116). This perfectly describes the situation in 
Lenny’s apartment – Esther views the jitter-bugging couple with an artificial 
studied interest based upon someone else’s previously observed behaviour 
(the businessman watching the belly-dancer). She is unable to “authentically” 
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respond to what is happening in front of her, but instead must adopt a 
performative role based upon the recalled actions of others. Her external 
appearance is a constant amalgamation of others’ behaviours combined to 
preserve her vulnerable inner self.  
The pane of glass that Sass mentions above is highly appropriate 
here, given the continued reference to the bell jar as an allegory for Esther’s 
mental state. Moss writes that “a thin layer of glass separates [Esther] from 
everyone, and the novel’s title, itself made of glass, is evolved from the 
notion of disconnection” (126). Time and time again Esther emphasises this 
disconnection from others and reality by referring to the bell jar metaphor: 
when her mother informs her that her sponsor, Philomena Guinea, has 
stepped in to fund her care at a private psychiatric facility (Mclean), Esther 
thinks  
If Mrs Guinea had given me a ticket to Europe, or a 
round-the-world cruise, it wouldn’t have made one 
scrap of difference to me, because wherever I sat… I 
would be sitting under the same glass bell jar, stewing 
in my own sour air (178).   
What Esther refers to as “the same glass bell jar” is analogous to Laing’s 
idea of the empty core at the heart of ontological insecurity that exists in 
“perpetual isolation” (87) and therefore “develops an overall sense of inner 
impoverishment… expressed in complaints of the emptiness, deadness, 
coldness, dryness, impotence, desolation [and] worthlessness of inner life” 
(1976, 90). From her inner position trapped within this disconnected prism of 
hopelessness, Esther is unable to directly experience the world around her 
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physically and is instead relegated, as mentioned, to the position of watcher 
and evaluator. 
This comparison with the bell jar works in two ways however. Esther is 
trapped inside, condemned to look outwards without any direct connection 
with the external world; but she is also doomed to become an object of 
others’ unyielding observations, like the pickled baby she sees floating in its 
glass case in the medical school. Bourjaily agrees, arguing that the bell jar is 
an “archaic laboratory fixture for displaying specimens” (emphasis mine, 
137). This dual functionality also connects Esther’s position as observable 
(female) object displayed under glass to film scholar Laura Mulvey’s theories 
of the “male gaze”. Mulvey argues that 
in a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in 
looking has been split between active/male and 
passive/female… in their traditional exhibitionist role 
women are simultaneously looked at and displayed 
(808-809). 
Although Mulvey’s ideas relate directly to women portrayed on film, this idea 
of the female-becoming-object through external voyeurism is equally relevant 
to The Bell Jar and Esther’s sense of self. If, for Mulvey, woman exists solely 
as erotic object under the male gaze, Esther’s first-person perspective turns 
this on its head by giving voice to a denied female interiority. Unfortunately 
for Esther, however, this female autonomy remains nonetheless trapped 
within the glass specimen jar that metaphorically represents traditional 
gender roles. 
Esther, as a specimen trapped in a display case, is continuously 
concerned with how she appears to others, and she often adopts personae 
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or acts out parts to avoid her ‘real’ nature becoming detectable. She is 
fundamentally concerned with keeping her inner self hidden and safe from 
harm by throwing anyone watching her off the scent. This is an example of a 
pathological self-consciousness which, for Laing, is highly characteristic of 
schizophrenia. Laing describes the experience: 
[T]he heightened sense of being always seen, or at any 
rate of being always potentially seeable, may be 
principally referable to the body, but the preoccupation 
with being seeable may be condensed with the idea of 
the mental self being penetrable, and vulnerable, as 
when the individual feels that one can look right through 
him into his ‘mind’ or ‘soul’ (1976, 106). 
The ontologically insecure individual, like Esther, is therefore continually 
guarding an endlessly vulnerable and insubstantial inner sanctum from those 
on the outside looking in. Laing, expanding on the above, significantly calls 
these experiences “plate-glass feelings”, meaning the anxiety that one is 
ultimately transparent, can be seen through, and has nowhere to hide in 
order to protect a fragile inner self that cannot survive engagement with the 
outer world (1976, 106).  
New York and False-Selves: Betsy, Doreen, and the Fig-Tree 
This can be interpreted as a fear of what Laing terms “engulfment”, 
meaning the risk of “simply… being seen” in the sense of being understood 
or metaphorically “grasped”, since for the schizoid individual, isolation 
(whether that be physical, emotional, or both) is integral to controlling outside 
threats to the precarious nature of the interior (1976, 44). Andrew Collier has 
described this situation as a fear “that relations with others will lead to loss of 
self”, demonstrating the fragility of the schizoid individual's core knowledge of 
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themselves as an autonomous being (3). Carol Warren has likewise 
identified this tendency towards protective distance in rehabilitated mental 
patients, known as “Quarantining”, which she defines as “one method of 
distancing [that] restricts… interaction to those who will support attempt to 
[preserve or] regain a sense of normalcy” (163). The divided nature of 
Esther’s delicate mental state requires that she mirror this form of distance 
creation to survive.  
Esther seems particularly afraid of, and vulnerable to, this kind of 
unveiling by her boss at the magazine, Jay Cee, an imposing and assertive 
woman whom Esther finds it almost impossible to shield her inner turmoil 
from. Early in the novel Jay Cee calls Esther into the office to enquire about 
her future plans, asking “Doesn’t your work interest you, Esther?” Esther, in 
some desperation, responds “‘oh, it does, it does… It interests me very 
much’. I felt like yelling these words, as if that might make them more 
convincing” (29). Esther defends herself with a “hollow flatness” that fails to 
fully satisfy Jay Cee, and even more horrifyingly for Esther, when Jay Cee 
asks her what she intends to do after college she significantly is shocked to 
“hear [herself] respond… ‘I don’t really know’” (emphasis mine, 29). That 
Esther understands this moment as separate from herself – that she does 
not realise she is speaking when she utters these words, nor does she 
realise the truth of the sentiment until it has been articulated – demonstrates 
the enormous gap between her typical, well-rehearsed answer to this 
question, and her distorted actuality.  
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Laing understands this kind of situation as a symptomatic of 
ontological insecurity where the self operates a dual functionality, with each 
function as distinct from each other: "the [ontologically insecure] individual’s 
actions are not felt as expressions of his self… [they have] become 
dissociated and partly autonomous” (1976, 74). Although a split clearly exists 
for Esther in this situation, and there are definite similarities between Plath’s 
protagonist and Laing’s description of ontological insecurity, here, in this 
situation, Esther’s assertion that “I don’t really know” does in fact represent 
her “true” self, as she acknowledges (in an inversion of Laing’s example 
above).  
Esther has become so absorbed by her false-self system for so many 
years that her typical and axiomatic response would be to offer a florid 
description of her lofty plans to become an academic, or an editor, and study 
in Europe; that she doesn’t offer this response therefore, and that she hears 
herself revealing a truth held secret even from herself, demonstrates a 
dichotomous and disharmonious selfhood that can be aligned with Laing’s 
theories. Most importantly, Esther understands this encounter as her true self 
being “unmasked” by Jay Cee, which again connects Esther’s psychological 
state to Laingian ontological insecurity. This fear is precisely what Laing 
refers to above as “engulfment”, and demonstrates the horror felt by the 
sufferer of being comprehended beyond the false-self system.  
Esther also touches upon these fears with the creation of her Elly 
Higginbottom persona, a character that she adopts repeatedly in moments of 
psychological uncertainty. Elly is mentioned for the first time early in the 
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narrative, when Esther and Doreen find themselves unexpectedly in a bar 
with Lenny Shepard and his associates. Esther introduces herself as Elly, 
admitting to the reader that, after doing so, “I felt safer. I didn’t want anything 
I said or did that night to be associated with me and my real name” (11). In 
hiding her ‘true’ identity, Esther again creates a psychological safety-net that 
keeps the others perpetually at a distance.  
The second time Esther introduces herself as Elly is much later in the 
narrative, after she has returned home from New York and is increasingly 
divorced from reality. After a chance meeting with a sailor in town, she not 
only calls herself Elly but creates an entire back-story for the character, 
claiming she’s an abused orphan from Chicago, even affecting tears in order 
to seem convincing: “I let out a tear that seemed ready”, after telling the 
sailor that a passer-by (who Esther mistook for Buddy Willard’s mother) was 
her abuser (129). This one tear becomes a deluge of grief as Esther indulges 
in her newly created pseudo reality, saying that  
I thought what an awful woman that lady in the brown 
suit had been, and how she… was responsible for my 
taking the wrong turn here and the wrong path there, 
and for everything bad that had happened after that 
(129).  
Smith writes that “[Esther’s] actual identity becomes no more than the 
negative source of her positive image [Elly]” and that the Elly persona 
functions as a “kind of imagined… twin behind whom Esther can shelter… to 
observe with aesthetic disinterestedness” (38). In becoming Elly, then, 
Esther can perform a role without endangering the hollow at her core: she is 
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able to cry, to feel (perhaps superficially), within this persona because it does 
not threaten her directly, but instead deflects observers’ attentions.  
Another interesting aspect of Elly’s personality, which Smith calls the 
“positive image” of Esther’s own “negative” interiority, is her passive 
compliance with feminine norms. In Esther’s fantasies, she, as orphan Elly, 
will move to Chicago in the future, adopt a “quiet, sweet nature” and “marry a 
virile, but tender garage mechanic and have a big cowy family, like Dodo 
Conway” (127), despite Esther’s revulsion at Dodo’s endless progeny, since 
“[c]hildren make [her] sick” (113). Significantly, when Esther introduces Elly 
and her dreams of marriage and matrimony, Esther is still wearing the 
clothes loaned to her by Betsy, one of her fellow guest editors in New York 
City, who is described by tough, cynical Doreen as “Pollyanna Cowgirl” in 
allusion to her sickly-sweet demeanour and her endless optimism. Doreen's 
statement refers to a 1913 novel by Eleanor Porter, titled Pollyanna, about a 
young orphan girl with boundless positivity and optimism no matter how 
difficult the circumstances. Readers could surmise therefore, that by wearing 
Betsy’s clothing continuously for three weeks, Esther seeks to imitate or 
absorb into herself the specific female archetype that Betsy-as-Pollyanna is 
understood to embody, and to take comfort in this ready-made identity type. 
Significantly, Esther describes her dirty clothing as smelling “sour but 
friendly”, retaining even in their unwashed state something homely and 
comforting in their association with Betsy (122).  
Betsy and Doreen are depicted as opposites of one another. While 
both women are inherently two dimensional, archetypal female characters, 
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they are clearly intended to function dually as what Gilbert and Gubar have 
termed the “monster-woman” and her “angelic sister” (28). Betsy, the angel, 
is described as “imported… straight from Kansas with her bouncing blonde 
ponytail and Sweetheart-of-Sigma-Chi smile”, referring to a fraternity song 
penned in 1911 about an angelic long-lost love with golden hair and blue 
eyes (6). Doreen, on the other hand, strikes Esther immediately as radically 
different from the other young women around her: she is sarcastic, dry, and 
seems like the voice of authenticity, speaking to Esther “like a secret voice… 
straight out of my own bones” (7). Doreen is set-up in direct opposition to the 
other, largely indistinguishable, girls staying at the Amazon hotel: she 
separates herself from the group by having an “amused, mysterious sneer” 
that suggests she finds the others immature and ridiculous (4).  
As with Betsy, whose blouse is described as having “floppy” sleeves, 
like the “wings of a new angel”, clothing is also significant for Doreen (108). 
She differentiates herself sartorially from the other girls by wearing sexually 
provocative garments, like her “full-length nylon and lace [nighties] you could 
half see through, and dressing gowns the colour of sin, that stuck to her by 
some kind of electricity”, while the others protected their modesty in 
“starched cotton… and quilted housecoats” (5). The connection Esther 
makes between Doreen's choice of clothing and her identity again agrees 
with Goffman's statement that clothing and sartorial choices form an integral 
aspect of an individual’s “identity kit” that inhabits a “special relation to self" 
(28-29). As discussed in chapters one and two, clothing communicates a 
specific image about who we wish to present ourselves to be to observers. 
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Through her clothing, Doreen presents herself as the femme fatale, a 
dangerously sexual woman with predatory tendencies that match her primal 
scent, described as “an interesting, slightly sweaty smell”, and her apparently 
independent nature (5).  
For Linda Bundtzen, the polarity between Doreen and Betsy is 
fundamental to the early stages of Plath’s text: “the first two episodes of The 
Bell Jar are an allegory about the divided image of the woman that emerges 
from the [feminine] double standard” (emphasis mine, 122). She continues, 
“Esther’s companions are Doreen and Betsy, the stereotypical ‘bad’ girl and 
‘nice’ girl of this social ideology. Esther plays each part in turn, both 
unsuccessfully” (122). Bundtzen’s characterization of woman as inherently 
divided as a result of social ideology, and Esther’s adoption of both female 
roles are what particularly interests me here, along with Esther’s relationship 
with other, predominantly older women, like her boss Jay Cee whom she 
finds both fascinating and repulsive in equal measure.  
As discussed, in The Divided Self R. D. Laing argues that 
ontologically insecure individuals seek to protect their increasingly 
disembodied interiority from intrusion from the outside through the 
construction of a false-self system. This system involves “compliance” with 
the “expectations of the other” by “acting according to other people’s 
definition of what one is, in lieu of translating into action one’s own definition 
of whom or what one wishes to be” (Laing 1976 98). Like Holbrook however, 
one could argue that this is a common state of experience that “we [have] all 
ha[d], of being threatened with depersonalisation by an affluent, 
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dehumanised materialistic environment” (36). One could even take this 
further, by arguing this is especially characteristic of a particular phase of 
adolescence, when the young person is still trying to consciously come to 
terms with their burgeoning adult identity. Indeed, psychotherapist and 
Counsellor Seamus Prior confirmed in 2012 that “identity formation” 
represents a “core developmental task… of adolescence” (699).  
However, Esther’s anxieties and frequent adoption of other identity 
types appear to be much more pathological than the average teenage 
experience, as they can be directly linked through Laingian theory to her 
psychiatric breakdown and resultant suicide attempt. Bourjaily agrees, 
arguing that Esther, early on in The Bell Jar, “seems normal for a vulnerable, 
imaginative, mostly appealing young woman, at odds with society”. However, 
he continues, “what is not normal is the growing split we are shown into the 
two selves, Esther and the very-much lesser, unappealing self she has 
named Elly Higginbottom” (136). While Bourjaily’s position that Esther 
appears “normal” in the early stages of the novel is clearly contentious (as is 
his bizarre point that Esther is “mostly appealing”), his assertion that “the 
growing split” she exhibits is in some way abnormal is far less problematic 
because, in locating the rupture in Elly, it does not go far enough. Indeed, I 
would argue that Bourjaily’s analysis of Esther’s growing psychiatric 
pathology should include her much earlier selective and seemingly 
compulsive adoption of archetypal female identities such as Betsy’s and 
Doreen’s, particularly during the New York episode of the text.  
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In acting according to Laing’s directive above, that the false-self 
functions in harmony with others’ “definition of what one is, in lieu of… what 
one wishes to be”, Esther is clearly and repeatedly grasping with the very 
question Beauvoir posed: how to behave both as a woman, and as an 
individual who refuses to accept a singular, biologically defined destiny. This 
is most obvious in the famous fig-tree analogy, where Esther imagines her 
life 
Branching out before me like [a] green fig-tree… From 
the tip of every branch, like a fat purple fig, a wonderful 
future beckoned and winked. One fig was a husband 
and a happy home, another fig was a famous poet and 
another fig was a brilliant professor, and another fig 
was Ee Gee, the amazing editor…. I saw myself sitting 
in the crotch of this fig-tree, starving to death, just 
because I couldn’t make up my mind which of the figs I 
would choose. I wanted each and every one of them, 
but choosing one meant losing all the rest, and, as I sat 
there unable to decide, the figs began to wrinkle and go 
black, and, one by one, they plopped to the ground at 
my feet (73).  
Here, the false-self system reveals itself not as one created by the individual 
for self-protection, but represents a system forced upon women, consisting of 
the gender restricted behaviours that females (especially of the mid-twentieth 
century) were obligated to comply with. Indeed, Perloff describes this fig 
story metaphor as “the objectification of [Esther’s] central malaise, a malaise 
that is hardly confined to schizophrenics” but is instead highly relatable 
instead to female readers (514-515). Perloff muses that “every woman who 
reads this passage has felt [this way] at one time or another”, which she 
relates to the fact that, in her opinion, “female roles are no longer clearly 
defined” and that “women are confronted by such a bewildering variety of 
seeming possibilities that choice itself becomes all but impossible” (515). 
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This is precisely what Beauvoir pinpointed when she referred to the post-war 
period as one of “transition” for woman, and, according to Nancy Walker 
underpins the “schizophrenia” of women’s magazines at the time (relevant to 
Plath’s novel since Esther is in New York working as a guest editor on such a 
publication). Walker writes that “on the one hand, homemaking and 
motherhood are described as almost a ‘calling’” but on the other hand 
“articles [also] showed women resisting identification with the domestic and 
yearning for professional status” (208). 
The Unconventional Woman as Mad 
Perloff’s and Walker’s comments, in addition to Esther’s position in the 
“crotch” of the fig tree, links her predicament directly to gender and the 
biology that Beauvoir argues “imprisons [woman] in her sex” (33). Plath 
herself made a similar comment when she wrote in her journals that “[b]eing 
born a woman is my awful tragedy. From the moment I was conceived I was 
doomed… to have my whole circle of action, thought and feeling rigidly 
circumscribed by my inescapable femininity” (77). Esther refuses to choose 
between the mutually exclusive options available to her, but as a woman this 
position engenders the risk of being labelled insane. This consequence is 
made particularly clear when Buddy claims that Esther is “crazy” for not 
wanting to get married and commenting she has the “perfect set-up of a true 
neurotic” (89). Significantly, Esther replies that  
If neurotic is wanting two mutually exclusive things at 
one and the same time, then I’m neurotic as hell. I’ll be 
flying back and forth [between them] … for the rest of 
my days (89-90).  
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This correlates with Jane Ussher’s argument that women in Esther’s (i.e. 
non-compliant) situation are often “categorized [as mad] for not playing [their] 
designated social role”, a dangerous stigma that Ussher and others, 
including Goffman and Szasz, have pointed out can never be fully rescinded 
(135). To this end, Ussher points out that once diagnosed, “everything they 
say or do will be interpreted within this context, as their behaviour is 
selectively interpreted… to provide confirmation of the diagnosis” (136). 
Esther’s label, this implies, will haunt her for the rest of her life.  
Buddy Willard reinforces this when he remarks to Esther, upon her 
purported recovery, “I wonder who you’ll marry now”, implying that she is 
undesirable both as a recovering mental patient and as an unconventional 
woman (230). The stigma attached to labels of madness here, applied for 
non-compliance with expected behaviours, disconnects psychiatry (and not 
just popular understandings of psychiatry, since Buddy is training to be a 
doctor) from medical legitimacy and instead suggests a correlation between 
diagnosis, treatment, and individual conduct that bypasses the presence of 
possible neurological flaws. This is also akin to Laing’s understanding of 
psychiatric diagnosis (specifically schizophrenia) since, in 1964, he wrote 
that “I do not myself believe that there is any such ‘condition’ as 
‘schizophrenia’” but that the label was both “social fact” and a “political event” 
that aimed to repress non-conformists (1964, 64).  
 Ussher’s conception of a “designated social role” for women centres 
around a gendered stereotype defined by conservative commentators 
Ferdinand Lundberg and Marynia Farnham as limited to marriage and 
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maternity. Women of the time, they wrote, were “obviously […] expected to 
grow up, select a mate, create a home and have children…. [Overall] she is 
expected to make the best of it” (emphasis mine, 7). Implicit in the “select a 
mate [and] create a home” is the expectation of matrimony, and Esther’s 
rejection of this possibility initially sets her apart (although we know by the 
time Esther is supposedly writing her narrative she has become a mother, at 
the very least). Unsurprisingly, Esther reports from her unspecified temporal 
distance that she still sees Betsy, the archetypal angel, on magazine covers 
as a fashion model, described as “‘smiling out of those P.Q’s wife wears B.H. 
Wragge’ ads” (6), demonstrating that Betsy – explicitly labelled and defined 
here as a wife – has continued to comply with gender norms. One could 
argue that women are forced into a schizoid position like Esther’s through the 
adoption of false selves to comply, and endure, a life limited by gender 
restrictions. 
 It is after Esther has predominantly exhausted the possibilities that 
Betsy and Doreen’s ready-made feminine identities offer her that Esther truly 
begins to slip towards a Laingian form of psychosis. The crucial moment, I 
argue, when the process begins to accelerate towards complete 
disconnection is on the evening Doreen and Esther spend time with Lenny 
and his friends. Doreen has always made Esther “forget [her] worries [and 
feel] wise and cynical as hell” (7), but after Doreen goes girlishly “dumb as a 
post” in front of Lenny, the distance between the two women opens up, and 
Esther begins to crumble as she realises her friend is not as autonomous 
(sexually or otherwise) as she had seemed (8). Doreen’s persona, as much 
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as her own, is nothing more than an act. From her position as watcher, 
Esther describes how Doreen “just sat there” passively with her drink, “dusky 
as a bleached blonde negress” (11). For Bundtzen, this racial description 
carries undertones not of exotic romance, but of sexualized serfdom that 
reveal a woman’s place in the social hierarchy: “Plath’s comparison of 
Doreen to a Negress, with its connotations of slavery, tells the reader that 
[Doreen] is nothing but a sexual possession” (123). The disappointing 
revelation of Doreen as a submissive sexual object leads to Esther’s affected 
exterior crumbling; she even describes herself as the “negative” of a person. 
 The chasm between reality and Esther’s perception of herself 
continues to grow, and becomes momentarily absolute when she returns to 
the Amazon hotel. In the elevator, as she looks in the mirror, she sees not 
herself but a “big, smudgy-eyed Chinese woman staring idiotically into my 
face” (17). This moment of non-recognition hints at a deeper split occurring 
between Esther’s inner or authentic self, and her external, constructed false 
self. This is what Laing has described as “the denial of being, as a means of 
preserving being”, as the gap between the false-self/selves and the authentic 
inner self widens as a means of protection (1976, 150). This dramatic schism 
suggests that Esther is leaning towards the disembodied, which Laing insists 
is where psychosis begins.  
 The dramatic nature of Esther’s disenchantment with Doreen is 
confirmed explicitly later that same evening when Doreen bangs on her hotel 
door before vomiting and passing out on the floor outside Esther’s room. 
Esther claims that she “made a decision about Doreen that night. I decided I 
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would watch her and listen to what she said, but deep down I would have 
nothing at all to do with her” (21). Interestingly, Esther continues, saying “I 
would be loyal [instead] to Betsy and her innocent friends. It was Betsy I 
resembled at heart” (21). The reader knows however that Esther does not 
relate to Betsy other than superficially, and Esther’s need to jump from one 
allegiance to another demonstrates what Laing terms “ontological 
dependency”. In The Divided Self the case of James offers the clearest view 
of this kind of ontological dependency: James had, from a young age, and 
particularly after his mother’s death, began to “display an extensive 
identification” with her. He would, Laing reports, “dress[…] himself up in her 
clothes in front of the mirror and ke[ep] house for his father just as his mother 
had done, even to the extent of darning his socks" in order to comply with a 
"wish on his father's part that had never been directly expressed". Laing 
surmised that James, through these acts, “had become his mother” (1976, 
101). Ontological dependency therefore refers to a “vampire-like attachment 
in which the other person’s life-blood is necessary for one’s own survival… 
[which necessitates a] complete merging of identity”. In these cases, “the 
individual oscillates perpetually, between… two extremes” (1976, 53). These 
two extremes can be understood as isolation from, or assimilation with, the 
chosen individual and both states are in evidence between Esther and 
Doreen.  
After Esther decides to mentally distance herself from Doreen, and 
quickly grows bored with Betsy, she drifts deeper into a fractured sense of 
ontological insecurity, alongside a crippling passivity. Even during a violent 
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altercation with a would-be rapist, Marco, Esther’s sense of detachment from 
her own body remains heightened as she observes the attack, seemingly 
from a distance: “‘It’s happening,’ I thought. ‘It’s happening. If I just lie here 
and do nothing it will happen’” (104), and then “The dust cleared, and I had a 
full view of the battle” (105). Esther’s viewpoint remains oddly disembodied 
during this highly visceral experience, and even once she does fight back 
and Marco threatens to break her neck she remarks that “I didn’t care” (106). 
A Laingian appraisal of this episode might characterise Esther’s reported 
disembodiment as reminiscent of the ontologically insecure individual, who 
experiences themselves as a “mental observer, who looks on, detached, and 
impassive, at what his body is going or what is being done to his body” 
(79).17 It is also important to note that during this attack Esther throws away a 
diamond, and consistently refers to her purse as her “imitation jet bead 
evening bag”, highlighting her rejection of materialism as she loses touch 
with her physical reality (101). These reactions demonstrate the division 
between Esther’s authentic, unembodied self, and the collapsing front-facing 
mask presented to others.  
As mentioned throughout this thesis, clothing is fundamentally 
important as a communicative tool, and it is through clothing that Esther's 
rupture between the divided aspects of herself is made externally visible. 
                                                          
17 It should also be acknowledged, however, that this disconnection is a 
survival mechanism often reported in cases of rape or sexual assault. For 
example, Kathleen L. Barry reported one woman’s experience of herself as 
disembodied during a rape attack when she was 15 years old. This woman 
claimed that, as she was being raped, she “looked up at the ceiling and I 
went to the ceiling and I numbed myself… because I didn’t want to feel what 
I was feeling” (qtd. 38). This can also be read as analogous with Esther’s 
experience with Marco.  
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When she returns from the party, decorated with Marco’s blood, she climbs 
onto the roof of her hotel and throws her clothing, a “sad array of queerly-cut 
forty dollar dresses”, over the edge piece by piece (100). The items fall 
“flutteringly, like a loved one’s ashes, the grey scraps were ferried off, to 
settle here, there, exactly where I would never know, in the dark heart of 
New York” (107). Plath’s language is appropriately funereal: by discarding 
her expensive and highly stylized clothing, Esther is casting off the vestiges 
of this particular mode of female existence and the superficial persona that 
she has had to adopt at Ladies Day magazine. As Pat Macpherson has 
commented, “Fashioning femininity through image is the business of Esther’s 
magazine. The creation of appearance is the pre-test for femininity”, and 
therefore Esther’s dramatic action – throwing her clothes off the roof – can in 
fact be read as a political statement renouncing this form of superficial 
femaleness (8). Indeed, Perloff has referred to this episode as the “symbolic 
[…] kill[ing] of her false self” (510). 
 After this point, again, Esther’s psychological cohesion continues to 
disintegrate; the next morning, as she boards a train home back to the 
Bostonian suburbs, she again fails to recognise her own face, describing 
herself as appearing like a “sick Indian”; she is unable to make sense of the 
scenery out the train window, describing the world as a “hotchpotch”; she 
calls herself a “wan reflection”; and she even begins to talk to herself aloud, 
much to the alarm of other passengers (108). Each of these aspects of 
Esther’s behaviour are significant, and demonstrate the crumbling of her 
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embodied self, consecutively to the growing predominance of her 
unembodied, inner self.  
Wife/Mother or Madness: Suburban Femininity 
 Esther’s arrival back into the suburbs heralds the most destructive 
section of the novel with regards both to her already perilous sense of self, 
and indeed to her life. Laing’s understanding of the “schizoid state” that I 
argue Esther exhibits hinges on “attempt[s] to preserve a being that is 
precariously structured”, and Esther’s journey back to the matriarchal home 
represents this final straw in her journey towards psychosis (77). To this end, 
Macpherson frames Esther’s return home as a chance to explore the other 
side of the either/or feminine choice that Friedan and Beauvoir both criticise, 
to “see the other life on offer to her: [that of] suburban-wife-and-mother” from 
which Esther instantly baulks (41). Esther experiences the suburbs as the 
locale of death; both in a literal sense, since this is where she attempts to 
take her own life, and metaphorically as the place where female identity, 
creativity, and autonomy dies. The suburbs represent both a grave and a 
"prison to which women are sentenced – or sentence themselves" 
(Macpherson, 115). This belief in the suburban environment as one of stasis 
is equally reflected in Plath's letters and journals: she wrote of her "hate" for 
the suburbs in her journals (330), and in a 1952 letter to her college 
roommate, Marcia Stern, Plath describes herself as experiencing a 
"suburban rut" in the "warm, stagnant calm" of Wellesley, a small town near 
Boston where she lived after her father's death (8 July 1952).  
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For Plath in both fact and fiction, then, the suburbs are read as 
claustrophobic and asphyxiating, characterised by the scent of “motherly 
breath” that links motherhood, femininity, domesticity, and the built 
environment, as well as their distance from the world in which Esther has 
previously thrived – that of college and academic achievement (109). The 
pervasive surveillance of nosy neighbours like Mrs Ockenden, who Esther 
writes spends “an inordinate amount of time peering from behind… starched 
white curtains” gives the neighbourhood a repressive panopticon-like feel, 
where, as in chapter one, neighbours are eternally vigilant to signs of non-
conformity (111). 
The natural inhabitants of this landscape, housewives and mothers, 
are understood by Esther throughout the novel as monstrous, dangerous and 
even machine-like: the pins holding her mother’s curlers in place at night are 
read as “glittering like a row of little bayonets” (118). Eternally pregnant 
neighbour Dodo Conway is described as being “not five feet tall, with a 
grotesque, protruding stomach”, pushing an “old black baby carriage” with 
children trailing in amongst her skirts (110-111). This gothic effect is 
heightened by Esther’s dehumanizing narrative style; she describes Dodo 
turning her “face, by instinct, or some gift of supernatural hearing… on the 
little pivot of its neck” (emphasis mine, 113). Dodo appears placid (perhaps 
even vacant) within this maternal landscape, leading her ever-growing brood, 
while Esther is anything but, watching from the window of her mother’s car 
(itself understood as a “prison van”), as each of the “white, shining, identical 
clapboard houses” rearrange themselves in her mind to represent “one bar 
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after another in a large but escape-proof cage”, while Dodo’s serenity makes 
her appear machine-like and lacking in humanity (110). One of Plath’s later 
poems, “The Applicant”, offers a similar view of the wife as dehumanized 
object: “A living doll, everywhere you look/It can sew, it can cook,/It can talk, 
talk, talk” and ends with the line “Will you marry it, marry it, marry it” (L 33-35, 
40). The continual reference to the woman as “it” refuses her an autonomous 
identity, reaffirming the object-like, service-oriented function of the wife in 
Western society.   
In her 1963 piece “Angry Letters, Relieved Letters” Betty Friedan 
quoted from correspondence she’d received from a tormented housewife 
following the publication of The Feminine Mystique, which confronted the 
psychological impact of suburban life upon women in the mid-twentieth 
century. The letter writer wrote that “Here I am! I feel like an appliance. I want 
to live! I want more education and a chance to compete in the world. My 
brain seems dead, and I am nothing but a parasite” (23). This is one of 
several examples Friedan chooses to include in her piece as a way of 
demonstrating the crippling experience of thousands of women unhappy in 
their roles as wives and mothers restricted to the home, and links back to 
discussions of April Wheeler and her eventual suicide in Chapter One.  
This particular woman’s likening of herself to a brain-dead appliance, 
or an automaton, is especially revealing, and connects her diatribe directly 
both to Laing’s idea of the schizoid self as well as to Esther’s reading of 
Dodo as inherently robotic. James, the aforementioned case study from The 
Divided Self, had, according to Laing, “allowed himself to become a ‘thing’ for 
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other people" (most predominantly his mother) because his mother failed to 
"recognised his freedom and right to have a subjective life of his own from 
out of which his actions would emerge as an expression of his own 
autonomous and integral self being” (97). Denied this freedom of personal 
expression, James experiences himself as "mechanical" and "robotic", terms 
that are also reminiscent of Maya Abbott in Laing's later work, Sanity, 
Madness and the Family (1964). Laing and Esterson describe Abbott as 
“experience[ing] herself as a machine, rather than a person” (16). James’s 
and Maya's comprehension of themselves as objects rather than people 
mirrors the experience of the housewives Friedan gives voice to. Rather than 
autonomous individuals, they have been reduced by their apparent biological 
destiny to perform household and reproductive functions, largely for the 
benefit of others. It is interesting that, although James is male, he has fallen 
into such a stereotypically feminine role, but his understanding of himself 
within that role as an “object” ultimately reinforces that conservative gender 
roles – particularly the feminine role in this instance – can be related to 
Laingian ideas of the false-self and ontological insecurity.  
Janet Malcolm made this connection in her book, The Silent Woman 
(1994), which explored the difficulties surrounding the unavoidably subjective 
and impartial considerations to be confronted within biography and non-
fiction writing more generally. Malcolm touches upon the idea of woman as a 
socially divided being when she discusses Plath’s visceral, and barely 
tempered, anger at a trio of young women gleefully looting armfuls of blooms 
from a public park (this incident, Malcolm recounts, would later become the 
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inspiration for Plath’s poem “Fable of the Rhododendron Stealers” (158)). 
Plath, in her journal, marvelled at her “split morality” on this occasion, since 
she too had been gathering flowers in the park, but Malcolm expands upon 
this statement, moving from Plath’s individual response, to a wider political 
statement that claims women are forced into assuming a mask of 
acceptability by society, and that Plath’s underlying anger, barely concealed, 
offers a glimpse into her human reality (or true self). She argues that 
the true self [which Plath marvels at but cannot expose] 
is aggressive, rude, dirty, disorderly, sexual; the false 
self, which mothers and society instruct us to assume, 
is neat, clean, tidy, polite (159).  
Indeed, it is significant that mothers are specifically painted as central to this 
continued conformity to socially expected behaviours in Malcolm’s account 
since this corresponds with Esther’s own reported experience, most 
obviously in the article recommending chastity sent to her by Mrs 
Greenwood. It is this carefully constructed, always socially sanctioned, vision 
of woman that Esther rails against in The Bell Jar, and it particularly 
appropriate therefore that her breakdown and suicide attempt occur within a 
suburban neighbourhood suffocating in its own “motherly breath”.    
As Esther’s psychiatric well-being crumbles further in the 
claustrophobic suburbs, her disengagement with her physical self similarly 
continues to rupture until she understands her “true” self as entirely separate 
from her physical body and false-self system. Esther monitors her body’s 
actions from a distance, as during Marco’s assault, and is powerless to take 
command. After she cancels plans with a friend, she instantly regrets her 
decision, and tries to call her back without success:  
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My hand advanced a few inches, then retreated and fell 
limp. I forced it towards the receiver again, but again it 
stopped short, as if it had collided with a pane of glass 
(114).  
Here, the glass metaphor reminds the reader once more of the bell jar itself. 
That same day, when Esther calls the Admissions Office about her summer 
school plans she recalls that “I dialled… and listened to the zombie voice 
leave a message” (115). This starkly dichotomous self-conception is 
precariously close to Laingian psychosis, reminiscent of Esther’s state of 
mind on the train back to the suburbs: a state that occurs when the false-self 
system can no longer offer a protective shield to the inner “true” self and its 
vulnerable core.  
As a result of this process, connections are severed between the inner 
self of the individual and others around them, until the inner-self is 
experienced as dead or unreal. This notion derives directly from Sartre’s 
assertion that interaction between individuals is crucial to self-knowledge: he 
claims that “I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever about myself, except 
through the mediation of another” (39). Individuals experiencing the schism 
of ontological insecurity seek to segregate their interiorities for protection 
purposes, as already discussed. In this vein Laing argues that “in a world full 
of danger, to be a potentially seeable object is to be constantly exposed to 
danger” (109). But, as Sartre’s assertion demonstrates, it is equally perilous 
to the continued existence of the self to allow the division to intensify. The 
schizoid individual, in Laing’s conception, is trapped therefore in a double 
bind of their own making: as Laing argues, “for the schizoid individual, direct 
participation ‘in’ life is felt as being at the constant risk of being destroyed by 
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life” (1976, 90). Simultaneously however, in performing this metaphorical 
rupture, the individual necessarily cuts themselves off from nurturing and 
necessary communion with others. In Esther’s case, as the chasm between 
inner and outer widens, the innermost self is experienced as dead, and 
becomes entirely disconnected from a reality fuelled solely through 
interaction with others. Without meaningful connection with the outside world, 
the inner self suffocates in the confines of what Esther describes as the bell 
jar. 
Dr Gordon, Electroshock Therapy and Psychiatry as Readjustment  
As her mental state continues to crumble, Esther is eventually referred 
to a private psychiatrist, Dr Gordon. Despite his relatively minor role in the 
narrative, Gordon has been understood as fundamental to the tensions 
surrounding psychiatric diagnosis, treatment, and gender politics in The Bell 
Jar. Linda Wagner-Martin, one of Plath’s many biographers, argues that 
Gordon represents “the patriarchy and its pervasive misuse of power” though 
his “abuse of Esther [which] occurs in the malfunctioning of the 
electroconvulsive shock he administers to her” (48). Gordon’s prescription 
(and delivery) of ECT to treat Esther’s mental distress is important and 
develops upon the understanding of the procedure as a punitive measure 
carried out to repress and force adjustment of the difficult individual, as 
discussed in my consideration of Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. 
On this occasion, however, the gendered impetus behind the diagnosis and 
so-called treatment become very apparent. Upon entering Gordon’s office, 
Esther notices a photograph of his young family on the Doctor’s desk:  
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Doctor Gordon had a photograph on his desk, in a 
silver frame, that half faced him and half faced my 
leather chair. It was a family photograph, and it showed 
a beautiful dark haired woman… smiling out over the 
heads of two blond children… For some reason the 
photograph made me furious (124). 
Esther’s anger over the photograph is partly fuelled by the way it is 
deliberately turned to face the patient – in this case Esther herself. Despite 
her declared uncertainty over why the photograph provokes such a strong 
emotional response, it is clear to the reader that, as MacPherson points out, 
the portrait represents far more than just a family snapshot. She argues that 
the photo of the wife-and-kids on the psychiatrist’s desk 
does all the talking for Doctor Gordon during Esther’s 
sessions… When that fails to enable Esther to snap out 
of it, he applies his ‘private shock machine’ (54).  
The picture represents the idea of the highly normative, patriarchal, nuclear 
family based around the institution of marriage and traditional gender roles, 
and Doctor Gordon’s placement of the photograph therefore reinforces the 
connection between psychiatry as a discipline, and the enforcement through 
psychiatric treatment, of traditional social structures such as the patriarchal 
family.  
Esther has already explicitly rejected marriage, describing matrimony 
entirely in terms of female servitude: “in spite of all the roses and kisses and 
restaurant dinners a man showered on a woman before he married her, what 
he secretly wanted… was for her to flatten out underneath his feet” (80). For 
Esther, marriage and housewifery represents a “wasted life” characterized by 
drudgery, a never-ending domestic routine, and a squandering of academic 
achievements and intellectual potential (80). While Esther’s disgust could be 
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overlooked as singular and therefore insignificant, others have suggested 
that the housewife/mother position does in fact lead to psychological 
difficulties for some women who perform these roles. In 1973, Walter Gove 
and Jeanette Tudor published a report arguing that these traditional female 
sex roles often lead to a sense of claustrophobia, frustration, and even 
psychiatric breakdown that corresponds directly with Esther’s assessment of 
her future. Gove and Tudor argued that women are “more likely to have 
emotional problems” because they are “restricted to a single major social role 
– housewife”, while their husbands “occupy two such roles, household head 
and worker” (814). Therefore, if the wife “finds her family role unsatisfactory, 
she typically has no major alternative source of gratification”, while her 
husband is free to concentrate his attention more on work or home if he is 
dissatisfied with either (814). Women, as tied to the home, are unable to 
distract themselves from any domestic displeasure in the same way as their 
husbands, with meaningful outside employment. Gove and Tudor continued, 
stating “that a large number of women find their major instrumental activities 
– raising children and keeping house – frustrating. Being a housewife does 
not require a great deal of skill” (814).  
It is important here to acknowledge that, although most women 
functioned primarily as housewives and mothers at this time, some women 
did find employment outside the home (albeit in highly limited 
circumstances). As Helena Lopata explains, for “young American woman [of 
the mid-twentieth century] … a career [was] viewed only as an intermediary 
state being education and homemaking” (31). This is evident in The Bell Jar 
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in characters like the secretarial students and graduates who were 
“secretaries to executives and junior executives and simply hanging around 
in New York waiting to get married to some career man or other” (4). Other 
than working before marriage, some women worked from financial necessity, 
like Mrs Greenwood, who teaches shorthand at a community college. 
Women like Jay Cee, who refuse to “regard housework as a challenging 
career” were, according to Warren, “viewed as at least troublesome… 
unfeminine, and perhaps… crazy” (52-53). This idea of the working woman 
as unfeminine is curiously reflected in Esther’s own view of Jay Cee, her 
New York editor, a view that complicates the feminist politics of Plath’s novel. 
As a career woman, Esther perceives Jay Cee to be sexless and, indeed, 
asexual, despite being married. Esther reflects that “I tried to imagine Jay 
Cee out of her strict office suit and luncheon-duty hat and in bed with her fat 
husband, but I just couldn’t do it” (6). Whilst it could be, as Esther points out, 
that she can never imagine couples in bed together or that she, as an 
adolescent, finds the thought of an “old lad[y]” like Jay Cee engaged in a 
sexual act distasteful, this statement reveals a possibly deeper held 
suspicion on Esther’s part, despite her own creative desires, that there is 
something fundamentally unnatural about working women (6).  
This, along with Esther’s obsession with losing her virginity as an 
emancipatory experience, her casual mention of having had a baby after the 
events of the novel had taken place, and her visceral disgust for Joan, a 
lesbian fellow psychiatric patient, adds complexity to the gender politics of 
the text. These complicating factors force readers to pause and reflect upon 
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the veracity of regarding Plath’s text without caveat as what Lauretis calls “a 
feminist manifesto” (173). Instead, a subtler reading reveals, as Tim Kendall 
argues, that 
Feminist readings of The Bell Jar tend to side with 
Esther against her society, although they rarely 
acknowledge the difficulty of their allegiance. Accepting 
Esther’s vision of society too credulously entails sharing 
her distaste at the successful, strong, professional 
women around her [like Jay Cee], and sharing too her 
attitudes towards heterosexual and lesbian 
relationships (54).  
While Plath’s text largely supports a feminist agenda, there are stark 
contradictions throughout that ally Esther’s perspective with Plath’s similarly 
ambiguous position on gender. This complexity, Rosellen Brown has pointed 
out, is equally evident in Plath’s short stories like “Sweetie Pie and the Gutter 
Men” where the female characters are both “harsh and honest” and more 
complex that in other stories like “Day of Success” in which Plath writes “out 
of the sunny side of her own daydream of simple domesticity” (118).  
Esther’s ambiguities however could be argued to accurately reflect 
contemporary anxieties regarding women’s place in society during what 
Beauvoir had labelled as a transitional historical period. 
Nevertheless, the novel depicts psychiatry, particularly in Esther’s first 
encounter with the discipline, as unequivocal in its view that the patriarchal 
family consisting of husband, wife and children represents the epitome of 
health and as a medically sanctioned lifestyle. Doctor Gordon’s photograph 
of his wife and family as mentioned above may initially appear innocuous 
enough, but in fact it reinforces these heteronormative gender relations and 
the oppression that exists and is perpetuated therein. Lisa Appignanesi 
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agrees, arguing that given the restrictive nature of traditional roles for 
women, females were particularly likely to be coerced into assimilation with 
“the neat fit of family and doctors’ expectations of fem[inine] behaviour”, and 
to be diagnosed as mentally ill if they did not (354). It is significant that, as 
Phyllis Chesler has pointed out, “ninety per cent of all psychiatrists during the 
1960s were men” so one could therefore legitimately argue that these 
doctors would be unlikely to comprehend the gender related traumas 
imposed on women through the continued application of social norms, 
leading to further female oppression (122). Women like April Wheeler in 
Yates’s Revolutionary Road, and Plath’s Esther Greenwood were viewed as 
socially dangerous and were disproportionately treated for psychiatric 
conditions.  
To this end, Chesler has suggested that “Perhaps what we consider 
‘madness’… is the total or partial rejection of one’s sex-role stereotype”. 
Therefore, “Women who reject or are ambivalent about the female role 
frighten both themselves and society so much so that… [they] are… assured 
of a psychiatric label” (116). Women unable to play the traditional nurturing 
mother role are viewed as pathological, rather than as protestors unwilling to 
comply with the narrow confines of their socially defined position. Psychiatry, 
Plath’s novel suggests, functions by punishing and readjusting these women, 
releasing them when they are, like Esther, “patched”, “retreated”, and willing 




First Experience of Electroconvulsive Therapy  
As a result, Plath directly connects the treatment prescribed to Esther 
with violence, and a homogenising political agenda. When Doctor Gordon 
administers Esther’s first ECT treatment, Esther experiences a great deal of 
pain, and wonders “what terrible thing it was that I had done” (138). The 
“treatment” is understood as punitive, just as in Kesey’s One Flew over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest as discussed in Chapter Two, and in other contemporary 
texts like Jennifer Dawson’s The Ha-ha (1961) (which Plath read just before 
her suicide in 1963) and Janet Frame’s Faces in the Water (1961). This view 
was also propagated outside the realm of fiction however: Robert Whitaker 
wrote that, “One physician told of using it to give women a ‘mental spanking’” 
(106). In addition, researchers like Carol Warren noticed that many of the 
schizophrenic women she interviewed understood ECT as a form of 
punishment. One in particular, Eve Low, claimed that she was being 
“punished for her offences by ECT” and that she was the victim of a “master 
conspiracy to rob her of control of her own life” (58). This theme of female 
self-governance and psychiatric intervention is one that arises many times 
throughout Warren’s study, and beyond.  
Plath takes this one step further and directly connects the use of ECT 
as a medical “treatment” with electric shock as punishment for political 
crimes. She describes the visceral experience of shock as  
[L]ike the end of the world. Whee-ee-ee-ee-ee, it 
shrilled, through an air cracking with blue light, and with 
each flash a great jolt drubbed through me till I thought 
my bones would break and the sap fly out of me (138). 
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This description highlights the barbaric nature of ECT treatment and tallies 
Esther’s experience with that of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, executed by 
electrocution in June 1953 in retribution for espionage activities assisting the 
Soviet Union. In the opening page of The Bell Jar, Esther comments that “I 
couldn’t help wondering what it would be like, being burned alive all along 
your nerves”, connecting her own eventual treatment with the plight of the 
spy-couple, something she returns to and re-emphasizes on several 
occasions (1). To this end, Marta Caminero-Santangelo argues that this 
comparison between Esther and the Rosenbergs “marks Plath’s critique of 
electroshock as a means of ideological control on a par with political 
execution” (emphasis mine, 22-23).  
Interestingly, this comparison between ECT, capital punishment and, 
implicitly, the Rosenbergs, had also been made two years earlier in 1961 by 
Janet Frame in Faces in the Water. Istina, Frame’s protagonist, relentlessly 
connects death, punishment and ECT, characterizing the bed on which she 
received the treatment as her “coffin”, and the medical staff as “assassins” 
(17). She equates waiting for electroconvulsive therapy with death row 
patients awaiting their executions, and admits to “know[ing] the rumours” that 
shock treatments are   
[T]raining for Sing Sing when we are at last convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death and sit strapped in the 
electric chair with the electrodes touching our skin 
through slits in our clothing; our hair is singed as we die 
and the last smell in our nostrils is the smell of 
ourselves burning (16).  
Again, electroshock therapy is equated with electrocution as a method of 
capital punishment. What is particularly interesting here however is this 
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pairing of the electric chair and electroshock therapy in the specific context of 
the prison mentioned in Frame’s text. Sing Sing is a nineteenth century 
correctional facility located near New York City where, until 1963, death row 
prisoners were put to death by electric chair.  
Frame’s specific mention of Sing Sing, where Julius and Ethel 
Rosenberg were executed for being Soviet spies, offers a direct point of 
connection with Plath’s text and hints at the underlying politics of shock 
therapy in both works, as well as recalling the undercurrent of concern over 
communism in both Yates’s and Kesey’s texts. Plath’s continual revisiting of 
the Rosenbergs’ electrocutions, coupled with the horrific description of 
Esther’s first treatment, places ECT patients in the same bracket as those 
convicted of posing a danger to the American state. Since, in the 1950s, 
“electroconvulsive therapy was… used with greater frequency on women 
than on men”, one might posit that women who, like Esther, are shocked as 
a result of their failure to adapt without complaint to their limited feminine 
roles, were understood as just as much of a threat to national security as 
those suspected of spying for the Soviet enemy (Warren 129).   
ECT, if understood in this highly-politicised way, represents a tool by 
which problematic selfhood can be eradicated and troublesome individuals 
subdued. As Peter Breggin has pointed out, the purpose of ECT is to make 
“‘patients become more compliant and acquiescent”, and this is precisely 
what is depicted in Plath’s narrative (244). Esther’s statement that she 
thought the “sap [would] fly out of [her]” is immediately relevant here. The 
patients she sees at Doctor Gordon’s mental facility all appear to have 
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undergone this treatment, for they, like Kesey’s Chronics, look like “shop 
dummies” in “stiff postures”, with a “uniformity to their faces [that made them 
appear] as if they had lain for a long time on a shelf” (136). These 
mannequin-like entities are undergoing (or have unsuccessfully completed) a 
process of readjustment that seeks to draw the “sap” of resistance or 
personal autonomy from them, and return them to society as more compliant 
citizens, personal sovereignty removed. Breggin describes recent ECT 
patients as “so organically impaired following ECT that they will sit around 
apathetically on the ward, unable to engage in any activities”, which tallies 
closely with Esther’s first reported asylum experience noted above (232).  
R. D. Laing, along with others grouped together (however 
uncomfortably) underneath the antipsychiatry umbrella, was fundamentally 
against methods of psychosurgery like lobotomy or ECT, which Breggin has 
referred to as an electrical lobotomy (237). Supporters of electroconvulsive 
therapy, on the other hand, like Rael Jean Isaac and Virginia C Armat, have 
described the procedure as “a miracle” (212). Historian Edward Shorter and 
psychiatrist David Healy also lauded its effectiveness, calling ECT “the 
penicillin of psychiatry”, and one of the “most effective interventions in mental 
medicine” (2007, 32). While Laing’s position softened on some forms of 
psychiatric intervention in later years, including perhaps most shockingly his 
statement that “[t]o say a locked ward functions as a prison for non-criminal 
transgressors is not to say that it should not be so”, his feelings on the 
utilization of the most invasive treatments like ECT never wavered (1985, 8).  
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As Burston has pointed out, although Laing’s attitude “to psychiatry 
became less adversarial” as the years progressed, his “antipathy to lobotomy 
and electroshock continued unabated” throughout Laing’s career (235). 
Indeed, in conversation with Robert Mullan shortly before his death Laing 
called these procedures “crude and barbarous”, and despite admitting that 
he had in fact carried out these treatments (as well as insulin therapy) during 
his early years of training with the army and at Gartnavel Hospital, he 
claimed to have “a gut reaction against [them]” (262). Given the emphasis in 
The Divided Self upon empathy and understanding as curative, and on 
schizophrenia as both comprehensible and non-organic in etiology, this 
stance is unsurprising. Laing even goes as far as to label orthodox 
psychiatric treatments including ECT, insulin coma therapy, and lobotomy as 
a “gross violation of primitive human decency in the way we treated people”, 
highlighting the troubling medical ethics behind ECT’s and lobotomy’s 
application (1976, 175). 
The appearance of the hospital where Esther first experiences 
electroconvulsive therapy reinforces this suggestion by Laing and others 
(including Szasz and Frame) that psychiatry is divided between a 
respectable frontage as a legitimate branch of medical science, and a dark 
underbelly in which treatment functions as an attempt to destroy patients 
characterized by “wretched mind[s]… and rejected conduct” (Laing 1985, 
12). At first, Esther is surprised that the “house” (the hospital setting, 
according to Esther, is reminiscent of a guest house) “seemed normal, 
although I knew it must be chock-full of crazy people. There were no bars on 
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the windows that I could see, and no wild or disquieting noises”. Instead, 
“[s]unlight measured itself out in regular oblongs on the shabby, but soft red 
carpets, and a whiff of fresh-cut grass sweetened the air” (135). Esther 
expects the madhouse to conform to the gothic stereotypes laid out before 
the reader (the barred windows, the screaming patients), something Joanne 
Greenberg also utilizes ironically in I Never Promised You a Rose Garden. 
By their absence, these tropes are exposed as artifice and the real terror, 
Esther comes to realize, lies not with the patients who seem stopped in time 
like “shop dummies… propped up in attitudes counterfeiting life”, but in the 
treatment facilities located in the basement (another familiar trope) (136).  
As Esther follows Dr Gordon downstairs, the comfortable (and 
comforting) carpet ends and a 
 plain, brown linoleum, tacked to the floor, took its place 
and extended down a corridor lined with shut white 
doors. As I followed Doctor Gordon, a door opened 
somewhere… and I heard a woman shouting (137).  
The change in flooring may seem insignificant, but it indicates to the reader 
that the veneer of gentility on the upper floor is simply that: a façade 
constructed to hide the darker goings-on in the basement occupied by 
distressed and disembodied voices. Furthermore, Plath is keen to make 
clear to readers that the windows in the basement are barred and all the 
doors locked, to prevent patients from escaping (or jumping to death and 
freedom, as one patient tries to do). To that end, a grotesque-looking nurse 
with a “wall-eye” hisses at Esther on her way down the corridor that “[s]he 
[the screaming patient] thinks she’s going to jump out of the window but she 
can’t… because they’re all barred!” (137). The shouting, suicidal patient 
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foreshadows Esther’s own horrific experience of ECT, and her future suicide 
attempt, but also connects psychiatry to the limitation of patient freedom and 
self-determination. As mentioned previously, Szasz believed that the 
suspension of patient liberty was a criminal act, and even that those who 
wanted to commit suicide should be allowed to make that choice without 
psychiatric intervention.  
The “shut white doors” are significant also, since, in much of Plath’s 
work, colours are fundamentally important to her aesthetic (perhaps because 
Plath was also an artist). Throughout Ariel (1965) for instance, white is 
associated with death, bone, absence or vacuum, and sterility in a variety of 
ways: in “The Moon and the Yew Tree”, Plath describes the moon as “white 
as a knuckle and terribly upset”, and as an “O-gape of complete despair” (L 
9, 11). In “Cut”, the speaker describes cutting her thumb, watching the red 
blood swell from the “Dead white” of the skin flap (L 7). In “The Surgeon at 
2am”, Plath writes that “The white light is artificial, and hygienic as heaven. / 
The microbes cannot survive it”, as well as commenting on the effacement of 
the individual-as-patient, “As usual there is no face. A lump of Chinese white 
/ With seven holes thumbed in” (L 1-2, 7-8). 
In a poem titled “Tulips” written around the time of The Bell Jar, 
however, the tension between white-as-death and gaudy red-as-life most 
vividly come to the fore. Interestingly, although white often signifies death, 
facelessness, and sterility in Plath’s writing, it also, in “Tulips” connotes 
peacefulness and release in a way that Plath’s speaker finds comforting and 
attractive, while redness is too vital and “excitable” (L1). She writes,  
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Look how white everything is, how quiet, how snowed-
in 
I am learning peacefulness, lying by myself quietly 
As the light lies on these white walls…  
I am nobody; I have nothing to do with explosions. 
I have given up my name and my day-clothes up to the 
nurses 
And my history to the anaesthetist and my body to the 
surgeons (L 2-6). 
Just as in The Bell Jar’s early pages, after Esther bathes in a scalding bath 
to purify herself and “dissolve” the world around her, then wraps herself in a 
“big, soft, white, hotel bath towel”, whiteness in “Tulips” relates to an 
emancipatory experience of self-effacement (“I am nobody”). Ferretter has 
also drawn similar comparisons between “Tulips” and The Bell Jar: he writes 
that “the speaker of “Tulips” finds great relief in the process of ceasing to be, 
just as Esther does”, both literally through her suicide attempt, and more 
metaphorically by discarding her clothes, for instance (2010, 80). Ferreter 
has also pointed out adopting the patient role can be read as a strategy for 
this desired state of self-effacement or restorative suspension of 
responsibilities: the speaker “ceases to be herself in her role as patient, and 
she finds this process a relief from the burden of living in the world. The 
peace she feels in her hospital bed is an image of the peace of death” (2010, 
80). Death here can be understood as the ultimate form of protective 
isolation, akin to Laing’s theories of engulfment in the ontologically insecure.  
In this episode of The Bell Jar, however, the “shut white doors” do not 
represent a metaphorical death characterized by tranquillity and isolation, but 
a violent assault upon Esther’s troublesome subjectivity that makes cogent 
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the “birdlike” stilted appearance of the other patients. Plath, like Laing, is at 
pains throughout the text to demonstrate the comprehensible nature of 
descent into, and expressions of, “madness”, and to reject the binary 
conception of madness and sanity in the patients Esther finds herself 
amongst when she regains consciousness. She writes,  
I was sitting in a wicker chair, holding a small cocktail 
glass of tomato juice. [My] watch had been replaced on 
my wrist, but it looked odd. Then I realized it had been 
fastened upside down. I sensed the unfamiliar 
positioning of the hairpins in my hair (138). 
The sluggish, disconnected manner of Esther’s narration here mirrors the 
slow recovery of her senses, and suggests that the other mental patients, 
who horrify Mrs Greenwood because of their supposed difference, are more 
akin to Esther than first assumed. This could be interpreted as indicative that 
it is the electroconvulsive therapy causing the patients to appear like shop 
mannequins, devoid of animation or personhood, rather than a 
neurochemical flaw or other psychopathology.  
Suicide, Rebirth, and False Recovery 
After her disastrous encounter with shock therapy, Esther turns her 
attention more fully to the question of suicide, which is again considered as 
part of the struggle for an autonomous, yet feminine, identity. Esther is 
meticulous in her search for the perfect method for self-murder. She attempts 
to drown herself at sea, but each time her body “popped up like a cork” 
(154). She tries to hang herself (using the tie from her mother’s bathrobe in 
an obvious allusion to the suffocating nature of female domesticity) but finds 
the suburban home offers nowhere to suspend oneself from, so she “sat on 
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the edge of [her] mother’s bed and tried pulling the cord tight” without 
success (152). She thinks about slitting her wrists but rejects this idea since 
she lacks a warm bath in which to do it (146). Eventually, Esther decides to 
hide in the crawl space underneath the family home and take an overdose of 
sleeping tablets, but, again, her attempt fails.  
Esther’s attempts at suicide, as several critics have pointed out, are 
consciously constructed not in negative, fatalistic terms, but through the 
framework of a restorative rebirthing process. Lauretis has read the 
description of Esther’s rescue as a “literary simulation of birth” as Esther’s 
body is dragged from the crawlspace like a baby’s journey through the birth 
canal (178). Perloff, in similar terms, argues that by 
returning to the womb in the shape of the basement 
crawl space at her mother’s house and then gulping 
down a bottle of sleeping pulls does [Esther] hope to 
find… the darkness of death (510).  
Darkness offers a protective, isolating shield that keeps the ontologically 
insecure self hidden; this is why Esther prefers staying indoors, with her 
shades drawn, avoiding social contact. A symbolic return to the womb offers 
Esther the chance to enact a break with her crumbling false-self system, in 
the hopes of either self-destruction or autonomous self-creation. 
Esther understands death, therefore, as the ultimate separation 
between her increasingly fragile authentic self, and the superficial cast of 
false-selves required to function in everyday life. Since Esther internalizes 
the conflicts inherent in the divided feminine self, seeing herself as flawed for 
being unable to choose between the mutually exclusive options open to her 
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(as demonstrated in the fig-tree analogy), violence against the self can be 
read as both punishment for, and relief from, this seemingly personal failure. 
Suicide, like the hot baths Esther routinely utilizes to figuratively cleanse 
herself of the residue of the false-self system, becomes a method (albeit in 
the extreme) for sloughing off the residual female identity matrix provided to 
her by her mother and society that she cannot assimilate herself into.  
When Esther awakens, she has, according to Lauretis, freed herself 
from the strictures of her golden-child past:  
[w]ith rebirth a new life begins in which Esther, no 
longer the repressed dutiful daughter and straight-A 
scholarship winner, expresses herself, her violence and 
aggression, by openly hostile acts (178). 
Lauretis is accurate, to some degree, since, when Esther regains 
consciousness, she reacts honestly for the first time in the text, with 
aggression and unbridled hatred, to those who come to visit her in her 
hospital bed. Firstly, to her mother’s hopeful statement that “They said you 
wanted to see me”, she responds “I didn’t think I said anything”, and then 
coldly states that she feels “the same” as when she tried to kill herself, 
thereby refusing her mother any comfort (166). Similarly, although she 
notices her “disgusting and ugly” legs exposed on the bed, with flabby, 
wasted muscles and “a short, thick stubble of black hair” she fails to conceal 
them when visited by an old college acquaintance working at the hospital 
(166-167). Furthermore, she even tells this young man to “Get the hell out” of 
her room, and not to come back (167). This is a complete shift in attitude 
from the behaviour Esther had exhibited prior to her suicide attempt, when 
she appeared meek and, at least outwardly, at pains to be agreeable to 
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others. For example, when Buddy presents Esther with a poem he wrote 
called ‘Florida Dawn’, Esther calls it “not bad”, though she really thinks it was 
“dreadful” (87). Likewise, when Buddy asks Esther if she has ever “seen a 
man” naked, and if she would like to, Esther reacts passively, thinking “I 
didn’t know what to say”, before responding “Well, all right, I guess” (64). For 
Scholes, by “[p]assing through death [Esther] is reborn” (131).  After her 
suicide attempt, Esther rejects this feminine, submissive role, and instead 
becomes defiant and assertive, refusing to hide her “true” self beneath a 
socially compliant false-self.  
While this may appear as a conclusive rejection of the false-self 
system in place of a more authentic selfhood, Esther’s second bout of 
psychiatric treatment adds to the complexity of the novel’s politics rather than 
simplifying them. Although Esther initially displays a sense of defiance 
conferred by her new attitude, by the end of the narrative, her recovery and 
state of mind, according to Tim Kendall, “equate… to conformity” with the 
society that Esther “blames for her breakdown” since she has become a 
mother (and, presumably, a wife) (58). What further complicates feminist 
readings of the text, especially those framed by challenges to psychiatric 
legitimacy, is Esther’s apparently successful course of electroconvulsive 
therapy the second time around, as well as her treatment by a female 
psychiatrist who, amongst other things, prescribes Esther birth control to 
allow her to explore her sexuality outside the confines of marriage. 
Controversially, with regards to her second course of ECT treatments, 
Scholes has argued that the “same electrical power which destroys the 
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Rosenbergs restores Esther to life. It is shock therapy which finally lifts the 
bell jar” (131). While Esther does admit that after her second treatment “I felt 
surprisingly at peace” as the “bell jar hung, suspended, a few feet above my 
head” (206), she also states that as her treatment begins, “darkness wiped 
me out like chalk on a chalkboard” suggesting an assault on selfhood that 
contributes towards the novel’s ambiguity towards the therapeutic method 
(205)18.  
Caminero-Santangelo has acknowledged the problematic nature of 
these two statements, and of aligning Esther’s second, more positive, 
experience of ECT with an unequivocally feminist reading that views shock 
therapy and psychiatry as patriarchal. While she acknowledges that “perhaps 
electroshock can lift the bell jar”, she suggests that this can only be done by 
“‘wiping out’ a part of Esther herself, her memories; perhaps electroshock 
provides peace in exchange for ‘forgetfulness’” (31). This statement certainly 
tallies with testimony from patients who have experienced ECT, including 
Leonard Roy Frank who describes himself as an “electroshock survivor” 
(157). Frank has argued vehemently against the therapeutic benefits of ECT, 
stating that the procedure “causes a cumulative eradication of memory” and, 
although “in time some memories are recovered… [those] lost during the 
                                                          
18 Plath’s journals and letters suggest that she too was conflicted about the 
experience of ECT. For example, Plath wrote to Edward Cohen on 28 
December 1953 that I need "someone to... be with me at night when I wake 
up in shuddering horror and fear of the cement tunnels leading down to the 
shock room", demonstrating the lingering trauma caused by ECT. 
Conversely, however, Plath also wrote in her journals in 1959 that shock 
therapy had caused her to “rocket uphill” after only “three or so shock 
treatments” (455). Given Plath’s highly polarised experiences of ECT, it is 
easy to comprehend why her protagonist would experience the procedure in 
the same way.  
254 
 
treatment period are usually gone for good” (160). Since the reader never 
learns details of Esther’s life after she leaves the private hospital (except that 
she has had a baby), it is impossible to judge the longer-term relevance or 
applicability of these claims in Esther’s case.  
If ECT, as I have argued alongside Kendall, “is designed to make 
[Esther] conform to the same social structures which are responsible for her 
breakdown”, then, at first glance this apparently more satisfactory course of 
treatment, in tandem with psychotherapy, is effective in achieving these aims 
as Esther becomes a mother (56). The treatment on this occasion is 
overseen by Dr Nolan, Esther’s psychotherapist at the elite psychiatric facility 
to which Esther is admitted by her novelist benefactor, Philomena Guinea. 
Nolan, based on Plath’s own therapist, Dr Ruth Beuscher, functioned in real 
life as a “permissive mother figure”, according to Plath’s journals, and this 
descriptor also matches the relationship between the two women in The Bell 
Jar (429). It is Dr Nolan, for example, who provides the medical authority for 
Esther to access birth control after Esther tells her “What I hate is the thought 
of being under a man’s thumb” and describes the article her mother sent her 
titled “Defence of Chastity”, to which, significantly, Dr Nolan “burst out 
laughing” (212). Dr Nolan also allows Esther to voice her real feelings for Mrs 
Greenwood when she tells her that she “hate[s]” her mother, and rather than 
contradicting her, Dr Nolan listens and responds, “I suppose you do”, taking 
her statement seriously, thereby respecting Esther’s autonomy (195).  
These two instances set Doctor Nolan up as the antithesis of Mrs 
Greenwood, who Gentry claims 
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is one of those women who sacrifice everything for their 
children and in return expect their children to perfectly 
fulfil their fantasies for them… this expectation puts 
tremendous pressure on the child to perform…As The 
Bell Jar develops, it becomes clear that her mother’s 
unrealistic expectations for Esther are contributing to 
Esther’s breakdown (57).  
Because of this pressure, Esther finds her mother’s presence suffocating, as 
dramatized by her attempts to strangle herself using the tie from her mother’s 
bathrobe and her desire to strangle her snoring mother as she sleeps: “it 
seemed the only way to stop it would be to take the column of skin and sinew 
from which it rose and twist it to silence between my hands” (118-119). 
One could argue that Mrs Greenwood falls into the category of 
overbearing mother figure characterized by Philip Wylie in Generation of 
Vipers, first published in 1942; a book that, Plath’s journals show she was 
aware of, and that had, according to Rebecca Jo Plant, sold more than 
“180,000 [copies by 1955]”, as well as being “named one of “the most 
important non-fiction works of the first half of the twentieth-century” (19). 
Although what Wylie termed “momism” was not the book’s only concern (he 
was also worried about women’s power as primary consumers), Wylie was 
deeply anxious about the impact overbearing mothers were having upon 
American culture, and upon future generations (of men in particular). The 
chapter “Common Women” deals most directly with the danger of momism, 
which Wylie views as a direct threat to the masculine power and potential of 
the American nation. He writes that “our land, subjectively mapped, would 
have more… apron strings crisscrossing it than railroads and telephone 
wires”, suggesting that rampant momism halts national progress, since men 
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have become, according to Wylie, a “slave population” under the dominance 
of their wives and mothers (185).  
This is clearly relevant to both Revolutionary Road in the character of 
Mrs Givings, and One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest, since Kesey’s ward is 
depicted as a microcosm of society and described explicitly as a “matriarchy” 
dangerous to men. Plath’s novel, on the other hand, suggests that this 
circumscribed feminine role, with strict adherence to a code of behaviour 
based upon abstinence and the primacy of marriage, is equally crushing to 
the development of young women who long for a more permissive society to 
match their higher levels of education and drive for autonomy. This concept 
of the overbearing mother as damaging to their children (and to the family in 
general) was ingrained into American culture by the time Plath’s novel was 
published, and so would have been recognizable to readers.  
The idea that overbearing mothers could cause mental illnesses in 
their children was an extension of this, and was famously raised by Dr Frieda 
Fromm-Reichmann, to be discussed in Chapter Four. Fromm-Reichmann 
wrote in 1948 that psychosis could be caused by “schizophrenogenic 
mothers” and the “severe early warp and rejection that [the child] has 
encountered in… his infancy and childhood” at their hands (164). Laing also 
touched upon this in The Divided Self, most clearly in his case study of 
patient Julie. Perloff has drawn connections between Esther and Mrs 
Greenwood, and Julie and her mother: Julie’s mother told Laing that she 
"was never a demanding baby” and that “she was weaned without difficulty… 
[She] had no bother with [Julie] from the day she took off nappies completely 
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when she was fifteen months old. She was never 'a trouble'" (qtd Perloff, 
509). In comparison, Esther writes that her mother visits her “with a sorrowful 
face”, telling her that  
she was sure the doctors thought she had done 
something wrong because they asked her a lot of 
questions about my toilet training, and I had been 
perfectly trained at a very early age and given her no 
trouble whatsoever (195). 
Esther’s compliance, along with Julie’s, suggests when taken together that 
these children had failed to develop the kind of autonomous selfhood (or 
even sense of self) in their young years: a product, perhaps, of an 
overbearing mother. 
Furthermore, Julie repeatedly tells Laing that a “child has been 
murdered” (whom Laing interprets as Julie herself), and that her mother “was 
smothering her” and would “not let her live”, so that Julie felt “unreal” (1976, 
179). These comments can be read as analogous to Esther’s experiences, 
particularly in her sense of disconnection, and her corresponding resentment 
of her mother based upon her rigidity and her lack of authenticity, believing 
her to be heartless and a martyr to her suffering. In describing her father’s 
death, for example, Esther states that  
My mother hadn’t cried… She had just smiled and said 
what a merciful thing it was for him he had died, 
because if he had lived he would have been crippled 
and an invalid for life (161).  
This kind of triteness, an indication of a protective false-self, excludes the 
authenticity of experienced grief. While the reader can rationalize Mrs 
Greenwood’s response as designed to shield her children from the 
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misfortune that has befallen the family, Esther rejects this as an indication of 
her mother’s stiff frontage and lack of vitality. 
Dr Nolan, in direct comparison to Mrs Greenwood, allows and 
encourages Esther to experience her emotions and to explore her desires. 
Alongside gender, this is also the most prominent difference between 
Esther’s two psychiatrists, Doctor Gordon and Doctor Nolan. Gordon 
objectifies and belittles Esther, by asking her at her most suicidal if there was 
a WAC station at her college during the war, and commenting to himself, 
“My, they were a pretty bunch of girls” (126). Esther’s presence and situation 
are irrelevant to Gordon, but Doctor Nolan listens to her patient and 
encourages her to engender a sense of autonomy through the development 
of a therapeutic relationship more akin to that central to Greenberg’s I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden, than those unavailable to patients in state 
facilities like in One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest. This alternate feminine 
presence allows Esther to develop a separative self from her mother and her 
mother’s expectations of her that reflects more accurately the “true” self that 
had been repressed by the overly-compliant false-self system. For Perloff, 
“Dr Nolan serves not as model [for Esther] but as anti-model; she is the 
instrument whereby Esther learns to be, not some other woman, but herself” 
(521).  
While the relationship between the two women is undoubtedly 
instrumental in Esther’s re-integration into society, the novel’s ending 
remains ambiguous with regards to the security or veracity of her recovery. 
Plath’s own suicide unavoidably lingers in the background in any discussion 
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of Esther’s recovery, but even if one attempts to focus exclusively on the 
narrative itself, the text suggests an underlying anxiety that points towards 
Esther’s rehabilitation as false. To this end, as Esther waits to meet the 
discharge committee, she refers to herself as “patched, retreaded and 
approved for the road” (233). This metaphor refutes suggestions by critics 
that Esther has recovered to full health: for example, Lauretis has written that 
Esther’s recovery is characterised by “self-unity and freedom” (173). While 
Esther may find herself “free” as in released from the asylum, her description 
of herself as reconstituted falsifies Lauretis’ optimism regarding her state of 
mind, especially since Esther remarks that “all I could see were question 
marks” (233).  
Esther remains fragile and vulnerable to the return of her schizoid 
selfhood: as Kendall remarks 
the metaphor of Esther patched like an old tyre 
suggests the need to continue with the battered old self 
rather than acceding to a glorious new one… the novel 
offers her no form of reconciliation with society (56).  
Indeed, while Esther may have developed what Gentry terms a 
“reconstructed personality” during her time within the elite asylum, the social 
zeitgeist, which she rejected unequivocally before her suicide attempt, 
remains the same on the outside (51). This suggests that if we accept the 
pressure of society’s gender expectations as the underlying cause of 
Esther’s breakdown, that this recovery can be likened to what Ronald W. 
Maris calls a “resignation to prison [rather] than [an] escape from it”. For 
Maris, then, Esther’s “recovered sanity seems a depressing return to her old 
best self because nothing better has been found” (130).  
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As Caminero-Santangelo has argued, given the seemingly ambiguous 
nature of Plath’s feminist politics and position on psychiatry at the novel’s 
end, “there is virtually no discussion of these passages in any of the feminist 
studies of madness in literature” (32). While the text is as ambiguous as its 
author’s gender politics, I would argue, one can, for the most part, trace 
these complexities into an overarching thread that connects female 
compliance, control, and psychiatry.  
Laing wrote in 1985 that psychiatry has a “two-fold mandate” that 
includes the need to “keep [the mentally ‘ill’] excluded from the ordinary 
outside world” while “the second mandate is to stop, if possible, to change, if 
possible, their conduct and states of mind from undesirable to desirable” 
(13). While Esther is encouraged to develop an autonomous selfhood by Dr 
Nolan, she is ultimately transformed from a defiant agent of protest into a 
wife and mother, albeit one who can author her own narrative; a change 
compliant with psychiatry’s second mandate, according to Laing. 
Furthermore, although Dr Nolan permits Esther to openly experience hatred 
of her mother, she does not (at least as far as the reader is aware) explore 
the roots of this hatred in social, rather than individual terms. This means her 
anger is directed towards Mrs Greenwood as both a mother and an 
individual, rather than towards the role of gender in American culture that 
underpins this situation and traps her mother, just as it confines her. In 
Chapter Four I consider how Joanne Greenberg’s text, I Never Promised 
You a Rose Garden seeks to redress this balance by emphasizing the 
importance of the wider family and social context to the mental health of its 
261 
 
members and, like the other chapters herein, positions biomedical psychiatry 








I Never Promised You a Rose Garden: The “thorn in psychiatry’s side” 
Greenberg’s novel, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, is perhaps the 
least well-known of the four texts under consideration here, despite regularly 
featuring as part of American school and college curricula and being adapted 
into a film of the same name in 1977. Written in 1960, and published in 1964, 
upon release it received muted praise from critics: Kelsey Osgood wrote in a 
50th anniversary commemoration that the novel’s impact was “fairly quiet. No 
excerpts were placed in periodicals; reviews, though complementary, were 
printed in the back pages” (par. 1). The narrative is a thinly veiled account of 
Greenberg’s own diagnosis of schizophrenia and treatment at Chestnut 
Lodge, Maryland, from 1948 to 1952, under the care of renowned 
psychiatrist Frieda Fromm-Reichmann.  
In the fictionalized account, Joanne Greenberg becomes Deborah 
Blau, a damaged and increasingly psychotic adolescent who, to escape her 
troubled and splintered reality, creates a fantastical other universe to which 
she can retreat, called Yr, complete with its own language system, Yri. In the 
early stages of the novel, Deborah is committed to an unnamed psychiatric 
facility after a suicide attempt crystalizes her parents’ nebulous unspoken 
anxieties about her increasingly threatened mental health.  From here, 
Greenberg tracks the development of a remarkable therapeutic relationship 
between Blau and Dr Clara Fried (Fromm-Reichmann’s fictional counterpart) 
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from their first meeting until Deborah’s gradual rehabilitation into the 
community after several years of intensive psychodynamic analysis19.  
Psychiatric Response to Greenberg’s Text 
Remarkably, despite its low-key literary reception, the novel has had a 
demonstrable impact on the psychiatric community. Various medical scholars 
and professionals, including Lawrence Kubie, Carol North, and Remi Cadoret 
have attacked Greenberg’s novel, seeking to discredit or destabilize its 
portrayal of schizophrenic diagnosis as well as the successful treatment 
methodology at its core. In 2009, Greenberg told Claudia Cragg that one of 
her objectives behind penning I Never Promised You a Rose Garden was to 
demonstrate that recovery from schizophrenia was possible without 
psychopharmaceuticals (00:08:43); and that, in Greenberg’s opinion, 
psychotropics represent not “treatment” but “control” (00:09:30-32). These 
were two key reasons for psychiatry’s rejection of the text. For example, 
although psychiatrist Lawrence Kubie admitted that Greenberg’s novel was 
“helpful, both intellectually and emotionally, to certain patients and to [their] 
families”, he caveated this statement by arguing that when the text was 
                                                          
19 The term “psychodynamic”, Windy Dryden and Jill Mytton explain, “is a 
combination of two works… ‘Psyche’ originally meant soul but is now often 
translated as mind… ‘Dynamic’ conveys the idea of forces, often moving in 
different and opposing directions” (18). Psychodynamic therapy therefore 
looks for the unconscious motivations for actions and thought-patterns rooted 
in past, repressed experiences of patients and seeks to uncover the ways 
these forces act upon the individual under analysis. The focus of 
psychodynamic therapy sessions, as apparent throughout Greenberg’s 
novel, is the exposure and eradication of these hidden traumas to alleviate 
distress (in this case without medication or other biomedical treatments). 
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“used with families, however, they usually need psychiatric guidance in 
digesting and understanding its implications” (190-191).  
Kubie’s reservations towards Greenberg’s novel and its depiction of 
schizophrenic treatment rests upon his rejection of Blau’s character as 
schizoid, and the hope that therefore is generated in sufferer-readers from 
her purported recovery. Kubie claims that Deborah’s symptoms are more 
“typical of the bright hysteric” (192), and even gives credit to the “remote” 
possibility that a “low-grade delirium may have occurred in [Deborah’s] early 
childhood, perhaps attending the operations on the urethra [that she 
underwent] at the age of five” that may be the root cause of the later 
hallucinations that Dr Fried treated as schizoid in nature (193). Kubie further 
reiterated these points in later correspondence with Greenberg, telling her 
that “Many of your ‘experiences’ do not seem to me to be the manifestation 
of a so-called schizophrenic psychosis, but more like the experiences of 
delirium, perhaps partly on a toxic-infectious basis” (Kubie to Greenberg, 28 
November 1967). Kubie’s statements seek to locate Greenberg’s purported 
illness as squarely biological in etiology, refusing the possibility of any 
interpersonal or social causation that would validate the efficacy of 
collaborative psychotherapy instead of the utilization of medication or 
psychosurgery.  
In an extraordinary study published almost two decades after 
Greenberg’s text, medical student Carol North and physician Remi Cadoret 
also rejected the schizophrenic diagnosis and treatment depicted not only in 
Rose Garden, but in a selection of narratives including The Eden Express 
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(1975) by Mark Vonnegut and Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl (1950) 
by Margureite Sechehaye. North and Cadoret compared the symptoms 
depicted or reported in each narrative to those listed in the DSM III (the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; a classification guide 
to psychiatric disorders utilized to standardize diagnosis of mental illness) 
and concluded that schizophrenia was absent in each of the five texts under 
examination. In Greenberg’s case, like Kubie, North and Cadoret argued that 
Deborah’s illness could be more accurately described as hysteric in nature: 
the “symptoms of Deborah Blau… actually were closer to the DSM-III 
classification of somatization disorder (previously known as hysteria…) than 
to the classification of schizophrenia” (136). It could be argued however that 
this necessity to match the DSM-III’s diagnostic standards of schizophrenia 
is an unrealistically high standard, since Greenberg was diagnosed before 
the DSM was first published in 1952.  
What is striking about this study however is North’s and Cadoret’s 
acknowledgement of the unreliability and incomplete nature of the data they 
used to reach their purportedly accurate diagnoses, alongside their 
simultaneous assertion of confidence in their results. They recognize 
limitations in their methodology, for instance, rightly including an 
acknowledgement that “this method of gleaning details from the context of a 
book is no substitution for careful interviewing of the patient” (133). More 
troublingly, they lament that “most of these personal accounts were written 
by the actual patients rather than the psychiatrist, and thus relevant 
symptoms might have been omitted” (133). This secondary statement 
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demonstrates a lack of interest in the patient’s descriptions of their own lived 
experience out-with the psychiatric framework of a diagnostic classification. 
This presents a delegitimizing situation that demarcates patient experience 
as of secondary, or of little importance, in comparison to that of those in 
positions of medical authority. Regardless of these obstacles to the gathering 
of empirical data in their research, North and Cadoret claimed to have 
arrived at an “unquestionable diagnosis” or, at the very least, to have 
gathered enough data to be “strongly suggestive of a diagnostic category” 
(133).    
North’s and Cadoret’s drive to debunk these literary cases of 
schizophrenia derived from a concern over lay knowledge of the condition 
and efficacy of treatment methods depicted therein. They concluded that 
these purported recoveries were dangerous, since “[d]ramatic accounts of 
cures or remissions in schizophrenia help perpetuate the concept that certain 
treatments [i.e. psychotherapy] are efficacious” (133). It stands to reason 
therefore that “if the illnesses depicted are not really schizophrenia, then the 
public is being confused” (133). This statement, and that the research was 
carried out in the first place, reveals a split in psychiatric approaches to 
serious mental illnesses like schizophrenia between those who favoured 
psychotherapy and exploration of the familial and social patient context, and 
those who rejected these methods outright in favour of administration of 
psychopharmaceuticals, shock therapies, and even lobotomy. To that end, E. 
Fuller Torrey, a one-time protégé of Szasz who became an unlikely but 
outspoken proponent of the biomedical approach to psychiatry, wrote that to 
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treat schizophrenics with psychoanalysis “is not only negligent, it is 
malpractice" (223). 
In Greenberg’s novel on the other hand, the depiction of the fictional 
Dr Fried’s therapeutic methodology was so positive that, as Osgood 
comments, “for years she received letters from struggling fans desperate to 
track down Dr Fried and to undergo analysis with her” (par. 7). This is the 
reason that Hornstein has referred to Greenberg’s text as the “thorn in 
psychiatry’s side” since it directly challenges biomedical psychiatry’s 
monopoly on the treatment of serious mental illness (382).  
Position in Relation to Texts by Yates, Kesey and Plath 
This anti-drug, anti-shock therapy, and anti-psychosurgery position 
might suggest that Greenberg's novel approaches diagnoses and treatment 
of mental illness in the same way as texts by Yates, Kesey and, however 
ambiguously, Plath. Instead, this would be an overly simplistic assumption. It 
should be acknowledged that Greenberg’s text occupies a unique position in 
the context of the aforementioned novels. The differences between these 
texts arise in two distinct areas. Firstly, Greenberg’s text refuses to reject or 
destabilize psychiatric sicknesses as genuine illnesses in the medical model, 
amenable to medical intervention. This contrasts directly with the ideologies 
underpinning works by Laing, Cooper, Szasz, Kesey, Plath, and Yates, who 
each, to varying degrees, repudiated or destabilized these diagnoses as 
labels used to stigmatize social agitators. In Rose Garden, Deborah is 
understood to be suffering from an iatric illness, and her hallucinations 
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represent genuine symptoms of that sickness (although Fried/Fromm-
Reichmann simultaneously understood these symptoms to serve a protective 
function for the sufferer, something that Laing also acknowledged in The 
Divided Self). It is no surprise therefore, that Fried tells her patient that: “the 
thing that is so wrong about being mentally ill is the terrible price you have to 
pay for your survival” (Greenberg, 59). Symptoms such as visual and 
auditory hallucinations are understood as manifestations of mental illness, 
but also as the attempt of the sick person to survive what they perceive to be 
a hostile environment.  
Mental illnesses, therefore, were for Fromm-Reichmann (and Dr 
Fried) caused by a combination of biological and environmental factors, in a 
way rejected by Kesey, Plath and Yates, who each supported the view of 
madness-as-social-protest. Fromm-Reichmann never discounted the 
possibility of biology playing a role, however slight, in the development of 
psychiatric illness: she understood biological factors as one aspect in a 
spectrum of elements, including interpersonal relationships and childhood 
development that could cause mental illness to occur. For example, she 
wrote in her introduction to Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy (1950) that 
the 
psychotherapeutic process is designed to bring about 
understanding for and insight into the 
historical…features which, unknown to the patient, are 
among the causes of the mental disturbance” (1950, 
emphasis mine, ix).  
This statement does nothing to delegitimize the argument that biology is, at 
least partially, responsible for schizophrenic illnesses in tandem with 
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something like an early traumatic event; or that psychiatrists are ill equipped 
to assist their patients (as suggested by Yates, Laing, and to some degree, 
Plath). Indeed, six years later, in 1956, Fromm-Reichmann wrote that the 
“conceptual dichotomy” of biology vs. culture in the psychiatric context was 
“unfortunate”. Instead of taking one side against the other, she stresses the 
importance of both in the development of a mental disorder, arguing for an 
“interlinkage between the biologic and the cultural approach” (1956, 33-34).  
This middle-ground ideology was something that Fromm-Reichmann 
believed in resolutely. Accordingly, Greenberg sought to explore this 
connection between the physical and the psychiatric in her text through 
Deborah’s obsession with the significance of a tumour she had removed as a 
young child, and other forms of hypochondrial complaint. When Deborah first 
meets Dr Fried for instance, she categorizes herself as a “liar” as a result of 
her complaints of “false blindness, imaginary pains causing real doubling-up, 
untrue lapses of hearing, lying leg injuries, fake dizziness, and unproved and 
malicious malingerings” (20). Instead of rejecting these apparent cries for 
help as false indulgences (as other doctors have done), Dr. Fried tells 
Deborah that she is “very sick indeed” understanding these apparent 
illnesses and pains as the physical manifestations of her psychiatric disorder 
(21). This demonstrates the inextricably linked nature of the mind and body 
to Fried, and Fromm-Reichmann herself, and also rejects Szasz’s assertion 
that “malingering is impersonating the correctly sick person” (1975, emphasis 
mine, 227). Fromm-Reichmann, on the other hand, understands mental 
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distress that manifests itself in physical pain to be just as legitimate as 
physiological illness without a psychological etiology.  
 The second major difference between the other texts already 
explored here and Greenberg’s novel is the understanding that psychiatric 
hospitalization was potentially of therapeutic and protective value to the 
patient, if undertaken in a humane manner with an emphasis upon patient 
self-determination. Indeed, following a particularly violent bout of self-
harming behaviour Dr Fried tells Deborah that she “needs [the] hospital” to 
alleviate her fear of “the terrible forces that seem to have been opened in 
you” (175). Fromm-Reichmann believed that the correctly administered 
hospital offered a sense of peace to those who struggle to assimilate with the 
outside world. “To patients” she explained, “admission to an institution is 
frequently a great relief from the unbearable burden of managing their lives 
independently, and of making decisions” (1946, 326). This is certainly 
depicted in Greenberg’s novel where individuals (including Deborah) held in 
a closed ward for the most psychotic patients experience their surroundings 
as both protection from themselves, and as a liberation from the falsities of 
the outside world in a way reminiscent of John Givings in Chapter One.  
From the patient’s perspective, this transfer to ward ‘D’ (also known as 
‘Disturbed’) is understood as an emancipatory experience. Both Deborah 
and her friend Carla spend time in ward ‘D’, and Carla tells Deborah, upon 
moving back to Disturbed, that  
‘I had enough of hate all boxed in. I decided to come up 
here where I can yell and yell until I get hoarse’. They 
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looked at each other and smiled, knowing that ‘D’ was 
not the ‘worst’ ward at all, only the most honest (67). 
 Although Deborah is afraid when she first moves to Disturbed, she 
acknowledges, like Carla that there are benefits to this kind of facility. The 
narrator claims, for instance, that the ward was “somehow terrifying and 
somehow comforting” at the same time because it forced the patient to 
acknowledge their own damaged mental state and the need for rehabilitation 
(49). When she arrives at the ward, another patient, who Deborah mistakes 
for an attendant, declares that she is “psychotic like you… Yes, you are; we 
all are” (49). The openness of this statement is highly significant and 
corresponds with the idea that Carla and Deborah agree upon about the 
ward: that Disturbed is somehow the “most honest” area of the hospital, 
perhaps even of society itself (67).  
To that end, Deborah quickly comes to the realization that in 
Disturbed there would be “no more lying gentility or need to live according to 
the incomprehensible rules of Earth” (50). Deborah knows that when her 
hallucinations become unbearable, “no one would say, ‘What will people 
think!’ [or] ‘Be ladylike!’” (50). Patients here are free to act out without having 
to repress or hide their more bizarre behaviours, because the ward offers 
relief in the form of sanctioned safe space for their madness since it is both 
expected and tolerated within the ward’s locked confines. Being placed in 
ward D can therefore be understood as a profound reprieve from trying to 
maintain the façade of normality in social and familial situations. For this 
reason, Margaret Cooke has interpreted Greenberg’s novel as sounding “a 
very clear warning against abolishing mental hospitals”, and furthermore, she 
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argues “that hospitalization looks very different to those who are truly sick 
than to those who are well” (70). While overall this statement, in the light of 
Greenberg’s narrative, seems superficially uncontentious, one must 
remember that the hospital setting in the novel is highly unusual in its 
collaborative ethos and psychotherapeutic methodology. Deborah’s asylum, 
and its real counterpart, Chestnut Lodge, are shown to be fundamentally 
different from (even at odds with) other mental hospitals, especially those 
that practice what the narrative refers to as “mechanical psychiatry”, in 
reference to treatment with drugs, shock therapies, and psychosurgery 
(Greenberg, 220). 
Chestnut Lodge: Madness and Money 
Fromm-Reichmann’s understanding of the hospital setting as positive 
for the selfhood of individual patients rests upon a financial privilege that 
cannot be ignored, since, as Orna Ophir has pointed out, treatment at 
Chestnut Lodge cost “three times” that of other facilities of the time (41). 
Indeed, Greenberg has Dr Fried muse on this early in the text, pondering 
whether it’s “fair to take private patients when any real improvements may 
take years, and when thousands and tens of thousands are clamouring… 
and begging for help?” (15). Fried's rumination instantly alerts the reader to 
the unusual, and highly elite, nature of treatment being undertaken there and 
of the facilities themselves.  
The asylum where Greenberg was treated and that she fictionalized in 
Rose Garden was a world apart from the crumbling and fetid standard of 
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state funded, or Veteran Affair run facilities occupied by a huge majority of 
psychiatric patients. Two years before Greenberg began her treatment at 
Chestnut Lodge in 1948, Albert Maisel published a shocking expose of the 
state asylum system titled Bedlam 1946, in which he blamed "public neglect" 
and "legislative penny-pinching" for the chronic underfunding and related 
understaffing that resulted in "institutions for the care and cure of the 
mentally sick to degenerate into little more than concentration camps on the 
Belsen pattern" (1).  
In the same vein, Jack Pressman has argued that in many state-run 
asylums of the 1940s: “Patient contact for the most part was provided… by 
attendants on the lowest rung of the staff ladder”, mostly “workers drawn 
from a pool of uneducated transients. Known as the ‘bughousers’, such staff 
drifted from hospital to hospital, moving on whenever their alcoholism, 
idleness, or brutality became too blatant to ignore or hide” (150). These 
individuals were largely untrained and were often violent to patients, 
triggered by vast overcrowding and chronic understaffing, something Maisel 
is at pains to point out in his article. He writes that at Cherokee State 
Hospital in 1945 that of a projected 20 nurses required for patient care, only 
two were “on the rolls”, whilst of the required 130 attendants, only “62 were 
actually employed” (5). These unbearably strained conditions precluded the 
possibility of effective treatment and were instead a recipe for violence and 
neglect.  Pressman asserts that reports “of rape, sodomy, and even death at 
the hands of sadistic attendants and incompetent doctors, whose 
275 
 
prescriptions for nightly sedatives occasionally proved fatal” were not 
uncommon (150).  
There is little indication of these problems on a systemic scale at 
Chestnut Lodge (although Deborah does highlight isolated incidents of 
violence against patients by ward staff), and instead of being financially 
constrained, the Lodge was far better appointed than most contemporary 
healthcare facilities. The exclusive asylum began life as The Woodlawn Hotel 
in the 1880s, and by the early 1900s featured electricity and indoor plumbing 
in every room. As a result, the lodge was described as palatial in comparison 
with the “county poorhouse” which at that time housed local mental patients, 
demonstrating the stark dichotomy between standards of care for the affluent 
and those without the means to fund better treatment (Hornstein 88). The 
extra resources of Chestnut Lodge allowed psychotherapists to engage with 
their clients on a one-on-one basis several times a week, and the course of 
patient therapy was often many years in duration. Greenberg received 
treatment for three and a half years both as an in-patient and out-patient, 
which was quick even by Fromm-Reichmann’s own admission. Some 
patients, such as Miss N, remained at the Lodge for long periods of time: in 
some cases, up to twenty years (Hornstein 245).  
This method of in-patient care was far beyond what state facilities 
could hope to offer then, and psychodynamic therapy has come under fire for 
being both expensive and impractical. Edward Dolnick, in his acerbic 
criticism of Fromm-Reichmann, wrote that  
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It took eighteen months, for example, before one 
patient at Chestnut Lodge would stop shouting ‘You 
dirty little sticking bitch’ and ‘You damned German Jew; 
go back to your Kaiser’ at the doctor (85). 
Pressman has also acknowledged that “Intensive psychotherapy of any kind 
was rarely an option” in public funded institutions, since “the delivery of such 
labor-intensive services was far beyond [available] resources” (156). This 
became Chestnut Lodge’s unique selling point: as Cooke asserts, the Lodge 
was “the only [American] asylum to rely [exclusively]… on psychotherapy in 
the late 1940s, at the time of Greenberg’s hospitalization” (71). Even rival 
elite asylums like McLean Hospital in Massachusetts used electroshock 
therapy and lobotomy on occasion (indeed, this is where Sylvia Plath was 
treated with ECT during her spell as an in-patient). The use of lobotomy at 
the mid-century was so widely accepted and celebrated as treatment for 
psychiatric disorders that one commentator claimed the procedure was so 
routine by 1951 that “Its nonemployment in any hospital… would ‘require an 
explanation’” (emphasis mine, Pressman 147-148). Chestnut Lodge’s 
decision not to practice psychosurgery was therefore considered both 
pointedly deliberate and unusual. 
The Lodge as a “Psychoanalytic Hospital”: Methods and Theory 
Fromm-Reichmann referred to the Lodge specifically as a 
“psychoanalytic hospital” where treatment was provided through the 
ideological framework of the therapeutic community, in addition to the 
development of a (generally long term) therapeutic relationship between the 
analyst and analysand. Fromm-Reichmann’s use of the term 
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“psychoanalytic” is somewhat confusing however, since she broadened the 
scope of traditional psychoanalysis significantly in her therapeutic approach. 
As Ophir has pointed out, during Fromm-Reichmann’s tenure, Chestnut 
Lodge’s treatment methodology was “an ambitious attempt to use the 
psychodynamic approach to psychiatry, preserving the framework of analytic 
treatment while altering the technique as necessary” (emphasis mine, 37). 
This broadening of the traditional analytic approach can be seen in Fromm-
Reichmann’s clinical writings and in Greenberg’s narrative since, despite her 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, Deborah is treated via psychodynamic therapy. 
This demonstrates Fromm-Reichmann’s break away from Freudian 
orthodoxy since, as Ophir points out, Freud believed that schizophrenics 
were “unsuitable for psychoanalytic treatment” given the underdevelopment 
of the ego (something Freud believed was irreversible) (3).  
Instead, Fromm-Reichmann argued that “anyone who consults a 
psychiatrist about marked emotional difficulties in living of which he wishes to 
be freed” would benefit from therapy; a category that includes “neurotics 
and… also psychotics” (1950, emphasis mine, 55). For Fromm-Reichmann, 
neurotics and psychotics (as well as ‘sane’ individuals) occupied not binary 
positions on the ‘mad’/ ‘sane’ dichotomy (with psychotics at an unreachable 
extreme) but sat within a common spectrum of behaviours. Treatment of the 
schizophrenic/psychotic individual was therefore possible, although more 
challenging, using an adapted psychoanalytic method based on close 
therapeutic collaboration between patient and doctor.  
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  Fromm-Reichmann also rejected Freud’s limited and limiting 
conception of the sex and death instincts as singular motivating factors in her 
patient’s lives, positing in their place a drive towards health, as well as 
rejecting the Oedipal sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex. 
Fromm-Reichmann suggested that these childhood desires for “closeness 
and tenderness” were more commonly non-sexual in nature but also 
demonstrative of a need for emotional connection and love (1950, 99). This 
assessment tallies with her view of schizophrenia (and psychosis more 
generally) as primarily rooted in early traumatic experience as well as 
childhood “misery in interpersonal contacts” (1954, 198). These, taken 
together, cause  
partial regression into an early state of ego 
development and of autistic self-concern.... This early 
traumatization and the partial regression make for a 
weak organization of the schizophrenic’s ego” (1954, 
198).  
Each of these occurrences play a significant role in Deborah’s eventual 
treatment, unfurling as the novel progresses. 
Deborah’s misery in interpersonal contacts is clear through references 
to childhood ostracism and to divisions within the family, particularly through 
her family’s reaction to her rejection of her baby sister. Deborah recalls 
feeling that the baby was nothing more than “an intruder” and a “red-faced, 
puckered ball of squall and stink” (46). When she articulately made her 
feelings known, in a way both “clever” and “precocious”, her family began to 
feel a “discomfort about her” that led to them, in Deborah’s opinion, pulling 
away from her, being “proud but not loving” towards the older daughter (46). 
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This sense of wrongness and rejection was also compounded during 
Deborah’s time at school and summer camp, where she was bullied for being 
both different from other children and Jewish. One incident Deborah recalls 
was when “a riding instructor mentioned acidly that Hitler was doing one 
good thing at least, and that was getting rid of all the ‘garbage people’” (47). 
Deborah’s sense of shame, cursedness, and isolation grew during these 
experiences, until she began to retreat from her fragile ego, into a 
hallucinatory state seeking relief and belonging.  
Deborah’s feelings of ostracism are directly related in Greenberg’s 
text to the development of her hallucinatory alternative universe, where she 
(at least temporarily) appears to find some serenity and acceptance. Fromm-
Reichmann wrote in 1941 of the “other powerful drives and desires” at play in 
patient’s lives, illustrated in Deborah’s desire for acceptance. These, she 
asserted, including those  
used by persons, individually, as a defense, in their 
efforts to adjust to a competitive world and to gain self-
assertion among their fellow men; examples are the 
need for love and dependence… the quest for power, 
the need for prestige and perfection, and reactive 
hostility and resentment against those who frustrate the 
realization of these and other drives” (emphasis mine, 
50). 
The widening of factors included here as potential driving impulses 
drastically broadens the scope of traditional psychoanalytic therapy. Instead 
of reductive Freudian explanations based upon the sex and death drives, this 
position considers the patient’s continued (and continuing) struggle for self-
realization and allows for consideration of the influence of the social context 
upon the individual’s well-being. 
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Great emphasis was placed upon developing the patient’s autonomy 
and self-determination at Chestnut Lodge. This ethos was guided by Fromm-
Reichmann’s belief, later mirrored in R. D. Laing’s concept of ontological 
insecurity and Cooper’s idea of the overbearing parent, that mental illness 
was frequently triggered by the “undue curtailment of the patients' freedom 
i.e., misuse of authority by previous authoritative figures…in the patients' 
childhood and by their later representatives in society” (1947, 325). The 
therapeutic solution, therefore was “to give the patients as much freedom 
and as many privileges as possible, and… the least number of regulations 
and restrictions” (1947, 325). This emphasis upon patient autonomy again 
reveals the great privilege that the elite private facility and its patients 
enjoyed, including plentiful time with, and access to, medical personnel 
invested in the establishment of a therapeutic, not punitive or custodial, 
atmosphere.  
Therapeutic Motherhood? 
Fromm-Reichmann’s therapeutic approach concentrated on 
developing the individual’s sense of self in a way that Ophir, quoting Fromm-
Reichmann, terms as “mothers raising children” (qtd. 37). This maternal 
approach was something that Fromm-Reichmann recognized as at least 
partially beneficial, reflected in her support for the first English publication of 
Gertrude Schwing’s A Way to the Soul of the Mentally Ill in 1954, which, in 
her foreword, she called a “truly human document of skill, knowledge, 
intuition and wisdom in the therapeutic approach” (9). Schwing’s book 
recounted her experiences nursing psychotics and schizophrenics, and very 
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much advocated a maternal approach to patients during their treatment since 
she understood a lack of maternal love to be the root cause of later psychotic 
disturbance. Schwing wrote in her prologue that her method “was successful 
most likely because I gave instinctively to the patient... that which was 
lacking in the child-mother relationship: motherliness” (24). Lack of mother-
love was blamed for the child’s failure to develop a cohesive sense of self, in 
a way again comparable to Laing’s concept of ontological insecurity.  
However, while Fromm-Reichmann approached her patients with an 
attitude of respect and equality, she did not advocate the maternal approach 
in the wholehearted way that Ophir suggests, or that Schwing did in her 
book. Instead, Fromm-Reichmann wrote in her foreword to A Way to the 
Soul of the Mentally Ill that while she admired the book’s humanity, she did 
not believe that the therapist or other medical professional should occupy a 
“specifically motherly” role (9). Instead, she admitted that “suffering from lack 
of love in early life cannot be made up for by giving the adult what the infant 
has missed”, i.e. in providing a kind of motherliness to patients, as Schwing 
advocates, since “It will not have the validity now that it would have had 
earlier in life” (1949a, Fromm-Reichmann, 203). Instead, Fromm-Reichmann 
argues that, through the therapeutic process, “[p]atients have to learn to 
integrate the early loss and to understand their own part in their interpersonal 
difficulties with the significant people of their childhood” (1949a, 203). Instead 
of mothering patients, Fromm-Reichmann defined the therapeutic process at 
Chestnut Lodge as one of respectful, “collaborative guidance” between 
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adults, where she assisted patients to uncover the past traumas that led to 
their development of psychosis (1950, 17).  
Fromm-Reichmann has been heavily criticized for her purported 
position towards mothers and motherhood, predominantly for her coining of 
the phrase “schizophrenogenic mother”, which she used for the first (and 
only) time in 1948. The term instantly made mothers of schizophrenic 
children, as primary caregivers, responsible for their offspring’s psychological 
difficulties because of what Fromm-Reichmann described as the “severe 
early warp and rejection that [the patient] has encountered in… his infancy 
and childhood” (1948, 164). She argued that those who experienced 
parental, and particularly maternal, rejection at a young age were vulnerable 
to a schizophrenic:  
partial emotional regression and… withdrawal from the 
outside world into an autistic private world [where] 
specific thought processes and modes of feeling and 
expression [are] motivated by [the schizophrenic’s] fear 
of repetitional rejection, his distrust of others, and 
equally so by his own retaliative hostility, which he 
abhors, as well as the deep anxiety promoted by this 
hatred (1948, 164). 
In this depiction, the schizophrenic is emotionally paralyzed by his or her fear 
of revisiting this initial trauma, and so instead retreats inside themselves, 
becoming withdrawn from external reality (as Deborah does with Yr).  
However, as Stephanie Coontz has shown, anxiety over the influence 
of mothers on their children’s (especially their sons’) mental health was 
already ingrained in American culture by the time Fromm-Reichmann coined 
the phrase “schizophrenogenic mother” in 1948. Coontz writes that, after the 
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publication of Philip Wylie’s Generation of Vipers in 1942, “‘Momism’ became 
seen as a threat to the moral fibre of America on a par with communism”, 
and that by 1945  
the psychiatrist Edward Strecher argued that the 2.5 
million men rejected or discharged from the Army as 
unfit during World War II were the product of overly 
protective mothers (par. 7).  
The general idea these disparate writers proposed - of dysfunctional familial 
relationships being the cause of mental disease, and the harmful potential to 
children and even the nation from the “schizophrenogenic mother” - became 
wildly popular in the post-war period, to such an extent that Dolnick 
commented that “in one short phrase tacked on at the end of a long 
sentence, Fromm-Reichmann coined a phrase that would reverberate for a 
quarter century” (94). In Fromm-Reichmann’s defense, however, it has been 
asserted that her intention was not to, as Michael Staub has argued, “feed a 
postwar frenzy that ‘bad’ mothers caused mental illness” but instead to 
support mothers of mental patients to better understanding of their children’s 
illnesses and to help them recover (45).  
What is certain however is that Joanne Greenberg’s representation of 
motherhood in her narrative rejected the suggestion that mothers were 
consistently and perniciously to blame for their child’s maladjustment. 
Accordingly, Michael Staub has argued that throughout Rose Garden, 
Greenberg “sought to emphasize [that]… not once… are [her] parents judged 
responsible” by her doctor, and indeed Greenberg even dedicated her book 
“To My Mothers” (perhaps even including Fromm-Reichmann in that 
category) (45). Instead of locating blame for her schizophrenia with 
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Deborah’s mother, Greenberg goes to great lengths to demonstrate the 
multifaceted causes of her character’s breakdown, including her social 
environment, family background, and previous traumatic experiences 
(particularly of deception). While Paul Bail states that “in real life, Dr Fromm-
Reichmann viewed severe mental illness as due to a failure in early 
mothering”, Greenberg’s novel steadfastly refutes this claim (152).  
In Rose Garden, for example, Esther Blau is often portrayed as a 
sympathetic and loving mother to her troubled daughter, who tries her best to 
support and encourage Deborah as much as possible. After a meeting 
between Esther and Dr Fried early in the text, Fried reflects that there was an 
“honest love” from mother to daughter, but that love had been misunderstood 
by Deborah as “pity”, since she was ashamed of her own strangeness (60). 
The bond between mother and daughter remains strong regardless, and 
Deborah asks to see her mother, but not her father, during her stay at 
Chestnut Lodge. While Esther is characterized by a need to project a perfect 
façade of herself and her family that could be argued to have some negative 
impact on her daughter (since lies and superficiality are partly to blame for 
Deborah’s mistrust of the ‘real’ world), the presentation of a polished veneer 
is understood as a defense mechanism against her own anxieties and is 
presented as one aspect of a litany of causes for Deborah’s sickness. 
Esther’s fears, the narrative suggests, are primarily derived from her 
own family background: her father, for example, a Latvian immigrant to 
America with noble blood, detests Jacob, his son-in-law, since he is 
‘beneath’ Esther on the social spectrum (not being descended from a noble 
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family), and since he fails to make enough money to sustain his family 
without support from his father-in-law. In these arguments, Esther, the 
narrative points out, “consistently side[d] with her father against her husband” 
because of her “own fear” and her understanding of herself as a “prisoner of 
her own past” (32). Esther’s passivity and inability to express herself here is 
analogous to the experiences her daughter faces in her illness: passivity and 
retreat, although not to the same degree. The legacy of her grandfather’s 
cruel and unyielding expectations is also heavy on Deborah’s shoulders: she 
states that “[t]he shadow of the grandfather dynast was still dark over all the 
houses of the family” (91). That Greenberg has chosen to include this 
portrayal of Esther’s own life as a young woman lessens the charges against 
her fictional mother figure by demonstrating the complex nature of 
interpersonal relationships, particularly in a familial sense. This ultimately 
destabilizes charges made against the “schizophrenogenic mother” and 
locates the etiology of disease within a multifaceted and complex social, 
familial, and personal history that also includes painful childhood surgeries, 
sibling resentment, and anti-Semitic bullying.  
Rejection of Shock Therapies, Psychosurgery, and Psychopharmaceuticals 
In order to most effectively try to untangle the complex causes of 
Deborah’s trauma, psychotherapy was the primary therapeutic method used 
at Chestnut Lodge. There was, however, a corresponding, and almost 
complete, antipathy towards the administering of drugs to patients at the 
facility (with the exception of sedatives, which Fromm-Reichmann viewed as 
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necessary in situations like patient insomnia) in order to make this 
therapeutic exchange as effective as possible. As explained in 1947,  
[h]ospitalization should provide … the opportunity of 
going through… disturbed episodes with as little 
restrictive interference as possible; hence it follows that 
a minimum of chemical sedation is desirable (Fromm-
Reichmann, 44). 
 Clouding the patient’s ability to work through underlying motivations and 
causes for his or her illness, sedation or treatment with anti-psychotic drugs 
was, for Fromm-Reichmann, counter-productive to the therapeutic process.  
Again, this reinforces the privileged nature of care at Chestnut Lodge, 
since in the State and VA hospital systems medication was relied upon as 
part of an arsenal of control with the double function of subduing patients and 
lessening the pressure in overcrowded and understaffed wards. As Rael 
Isaac and Virginia C. Armat have confirmed, mid-century tranquilizers 
“transformed the atmosphere of mental hospitals. The fighting, kicking, 
headbanging and cursing vanished” (20). While Isaac and Armat position this 
as a positive change, at Chestnut Lodge patients had the freedom (as 
discussed in relation to the disturbed ward) to experience, rather than 
repress, their psychoses as part of a movement towards self-realization. 
Even psychopharmaceutical medications like Chlorpromazine, which, by the 
mid-twentieth century represented the vanguard of medical responses to 
schizophrenia (despite being termed a “chemical lobotomy” due to the 
apathetic state it produced in patients) were not utilized at Chestnut Lodge 
during Greenberg’s time there, according to Mimi Neathery (22). Since 
patients often came to Chestnut Lodge as a last resort when treatment at 
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other facilities had failed, ex-Lodge therapist Thomas McGlashan told Mark 
Moran, “[d]rugs were viewed as the enemy because they dulled the mind and 
inhibited feelings that were necessary to access in therapy”, and “[i]t was 
rationalized that most of the patients had [previously] been overmedicated” 
(par.13).  
The only drugs regularly used at Chestnut Lodge at the time of 
Joanne’s treatment were sedatives to help patients sleep, but even taking 
these, as Hornstein points out, was at the patient’s discretion. She explains 
that “No patient – even on the disturbed ward – was forced to take sedation”. 
If a patient refused to comply, 
a second attempt was made; if he refused again, the 
nurse was instructed to make a notation on the chart 
and to record the reason for the refusal... (This clearly 
assumed… that there was a reason) (197).  
Allowing for the possibility of patients’ ability to reason and to make decisions 
for themselves was a radical act within the context of a mental hospital 
where patients were generally not consulted on their treatment plans, or 
whose protests and terror were routinely ignored. Mr Taber’s punishment in 
One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest for daring to ask what medicine he was 
being forced to take, and Chief Bromden’s terror at being forced into shock 
therapy, both function as examples of this refusal of patient autonomy with 
the framework of a traditional psychiatric facility.  
Furthermore, in contrast to most state or VA facilities, Chestnut Lodge 
rejected shock therapies and psychosurgery in the form of lobotomy. This 
was such a mark of pride for staff that the avoidance of these highly invasive 
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treatment options formed a key part of the Lodge’s identity. Staff even 
performed a song as part of a play that contained the emphatic lines: “To 
death we stand, as one strong band/Against shock therapy” while another 
verse ended, “We will always be/’Gainst those who hack, the frontal tract/By 
psychosurgery” (Hornstein 205). In 1950 Fromm-Reichmann wrote of these 
procedures that though they may superficially appear to “help to relieve the 
suffering of… patients”, this reprieve comes “at the expense of the emotional 
integrity and further development of the patients’ personalities” (61). Equally, 
the efficacy of these treatments (especially electroconvulsive therapy, which 
opponents argue causes either short-term or permanent amnesia) are 
questioned directly in I Never Promised You a Rose Garden. For example, 
one patient describes herself as having been “shocked, jolted, revolted, 
given Metrazol... All I need is a brain operation and I’ll have had the whole 
works. Nothing does any good” (44); while another is defined as a “veteran of 
mechanical psychiatry in a dozen other hospitals [where] her memory had 
been ravaged, but her sickness was still intact” (220). The phrase 
“mechanical psychiatry” is significant here, allying biomedical approaches to 
mental health treatment with industrial, technological solutions that remove 
or mitigate the humanity of the patient under its care, reminiscent of Plath’s 
depiction of obstetrics and gynecology in The Bell Jar. These invasive 
treatment methodologies are ultimately understood as inherently damaging, 
without long-term therapeutic value for the patient. 
Although Fromm-Reichmann acknowledged the potential of 
techniques like shock therapies or lobotomy to superficially assuage patient 
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distress, she more importantly believed that these procedures are performed 
“at the expense of the emotional integrity and further development of the 
patient’s personality” (1950, 61). The dislocating of patient memory or sense 
of self caused by ECT meant that success in a psychoanalytic or 
psychodynamic based treatment was made even more difficult to attain. 
Deborah explains, for instance that, due to her friend’s experiences with 
“mechanical psychiatry” she can no longer remember her family background, 
making exploration of early experiences (where Fromm-Reichmann believes 
much trauma stems from) almost impossible. The room-mate creates 
sets of wildly divergent parents. ‘It was always a 
musical family…’ she would say vaguely. ‘My father – 
he’s Paderewski, and my mother is Sophie Tucker. It’s 
why I’m highly strung (220). 
This, in a way, also acts as a parody of psychoanalysis, locating the entirety 
of one’s predicament at the feet of unusual or unconventional parents, as 
well as demonstrating the extent to which the brain is ravaged by exposure 
to electroshock.  
Hydrotherapy: A Treatment Apart? 
One treatment method that is used in addition to psychotherapy in 
Greenberg’s text is the cold wet sheet pack. This is a form of hydrotherapy 
that represents, according to Donald Ross et al., a “non-pharmalogical” 
response to acute patient distress or extreme excitement (242). With this 
treatment method, patients are required to lie on a table and be tightly 
swaddled like “an infant”, in cold, wet sheets (as the name suggests) for a 
number of hours until the sheets have warmed through (Ross 242).The cold 
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wet sheet pack seems to offer a unique position within the supposedly 
therapeutic methods available at the mid-twentieth century, such as shock 
therapies and psychosurgery, due to its non-invasive or chemical basis, and 
since patients often reportedly found the process enormously beneficial.20 
Packs were found to be particularly helpful to patients when experiencing the 
onset of a psychotic disturbance, something that Greenberg depicts on 
numerous occasions in her text.  
Regularly after making a therapeutic breakthrough with Dr Fried, 
Deborah suffers acute psychotic episodes that terrify her. On one occasion, 
after a particularly revelatory therapy session, she returns to the ward in 
distress and a quick-thinking attendant, seeing her anguish, asks her  
Do you know what a cold-sheet pack is? I’m going to 
have one set up for you. It’s kind of uncomfortable at 
first, but when you’re in it a while, it may calm you down 
(53).  
Trying to reassure her, he states “[i]t doesn’t hurt – don’t worry”, words which 
remind Deborah of the painful operations she experienced as a child, which 
her doctors told her would not hurt in order to placate her (53). She thinks to 
herself, “watch out for those words… they are the same words. What comes 
after those words is deceit, and… A bursting vein of terror released itself” 
                                                          
20 While it would be wrong to argue that shock therapy patients have never 
found ECT, Metrazol therapy, insulin shock, or lobotomy helpful, there have 
been large numbers of highly vocal protests against these forms of treatment 
since the mid-century. Although cold wet sheet packs, or CWSP, have been 
criticized as a form of restraint, particularly when used punitively, patients in 
surveys by Ross et al have found a high proportion of individuals 
experienced a “calming effect” through swaddling (243). This, and the fact 
that the packs are non-invasive in terms of chemical alterations in the brain, 
sets this treatment method apart from those mentioned above, suggesting 
this is why they were utilized at Chestnut Lodge. 
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(53). Deborah’s mistrust of medical staff, and her fear over the excruciating 
pain she remembers from her childhood surgeries, cause her to lose 
consciousness but when she awakens, to her surprise, she feels as “clear as 
morning” (53). She has been rendered passive by her immobility and is 
“amazed that she had been able to come from the deepest place [her 
psychosis] without the anguish of rising” (53).  
Deborah is returned to rationality by her experience, exemplified by 
her acerbic engagement with a fellow patient immediately after she is 
released. The narrator tells us how Deborah’s “world-self had risen”, 
meaning the ‘sane’ aspect of her character, and immediately, as if to 
emphasize her sanity, contrasts Deborah with one of the more recognizably 
insane fellow patients. This patient, known as the “unsecret unwed unwife of 
the abdicated King of England”, interrupts Deborah on her way to her bed to 
introduce her to her “phantoms” with whom she chatters away in a “parody of 
all the gentility’s gossip”, and to tell Deborah that the doctor had “violated” 
her while she was unconscious (54). Deborah’s sarcastic response, “What a 
prize!”, to the woman’s delusions demonstrates her increased trust in the 
medical staff after her experience, and also functions to differentiate her from 
the other patients on the ward as a ‘saner’ individual following her exposure 
to hydrotherapy. 
Pack becomes an integral yet mostly positive part of Deborah’s 
therapeutic treatment at Chestnut Lodge, so much so that she experiences it 
“gratefully” (70). Moments of clarity or therapeutic insight often occur 
immediately after treatment for both Deborah and her fellow patients such as 
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Carla, who awakens with sudden realizations about what has been causing 
increased levels of distress on the ward, while Deborah similarly experiences 
what she terms that “ancient and fearsome… word: Truth” (71). Deborah 
comes to trust the cold wet sheet pack process so much that she eventually 
requests it for herself in times of particular distress, the exact inverse of the 
torturous situations depicting patients being forcibly treated with electroshock 
therapy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest or Faces in the Water, where 
patients hide and cry in fear to avoid treatment.  
On one occasion, after revealing more about Yr to Dr Fried, Deborah 
is overcome with a terror that threatens to engulf her, so she reaches out to 
one of the ward nurses stating that “It’s going to hit – please – it’s going to hit 
harder than I can stand up under. I should be in a pack when it hits” (128). 
This is a remarkable and highly significant moment in the text, demonstrating 
the cultivation of patient trust in the medical team, as well as the importance 
of patient self-determination. Deborah asks for the treatment because she 
trusts it as a genuine therapeutic support structure, rather than as a 
punishment, as other therapies like ECT are regularly depicted as in 
literature of this period (such as when Esther Greenwood wonders what she 
has done to deserve her shock treatment). By engaging with the treatment 
as a positive part of her therapeutic journey towards recovery, Deborah is 
demonstrating a self-determination that matches Fromm-Reichmann’s 




The Importance of Self-Determination 
This prioritization of patient autonomy and the cultivation of selfhood 
was something Fromm-Reichmann emphasized as one of the ultimate goals 
of psychotherapy and this concept is profoundly important to Greenberg’s 
text. Defined as the “ability to form independent evaluational judgements” 
and the “capacity… [to establish] durable relationships of intimacy”, this 
process of development towards self-realization (or what one could term 
social autonomy) underpins the entirety of Deborah’s treatment (1949a, 90-
91). Instead of mirroring Esther Greenwood’s experience of being “re-
treaded” and “patched up” as she leaves the asylum, Deborah is understood 
to be facing the outside world with a more robust conception of herself both 
as an individual experiencing what Laing would term as ontological security), 
and in her relationships with others. Although Deborah returns to the hospital 
for an overnight stay after her initial release, she does so at her own 
choosing when she recognizes the need for assistance, and after her arrival 
realizes how different she has become to the other patients. She thinks,  
with her acceptance as a member in the world, a 
person with a present and a possible future, a 
Newtonian, a believer in cause and effect, the final lines 
of choice were drawn (251).  
Her recovery is framed in terms of rationalism, autonomous choice, and a 
robust personal confidence rather than an unconvincing adjustment to a 
problematic social structure as in The Bell Jar.  
Positioning adjustment as the ultimate therapeutic objective, rather 
than the development of personal growth and autonomy, was something that 
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Fromm-Reichmann rejected unequivocally. In Principles of Intensive 
Psychotherapy (1950), she criticizes psychiatrists and psychotherapists 
(such as Plath’s Doctor Gordon) who seek to mould patients into model 
citizens. Fromm-Reichmann argues that: 
[P]atients cannot and should not be asked to accept 
guidance toward conventional adjustment to the 
customary requirements to our culture.... The 
psychiatrist should feel that his goal in treating schizoid 
personalities is reached if these people… are able to 
find for themselves the sources of satisfaction and 
security in which they are interested… [T]hese patients 
[will] have acquired, through inner freedom and 
independence from public opinion under the guidance 
of their psychiatrist, the ability to live their own lives 
irrespective of the approval of their neighbors” 
(emphasis mine, 1950, 32). 
In addition to this startling comment that demands the psychiatrist respect 
the individual desires, capacities, and expectations held by their patient, 
Fromm-Reichmann also wrote that “schizophrenic patients can get well 
without adherence to the accepted mores of our culture and society” (1949a, 
104). This position is somewhat problematic however, giving rise to the 
question of why psychiatrists engage in treatment at all if discouraging anti-
social behaviour is not the eventual objective. One could posit in response 
that the therapeutic process seeks to alleviate symptoms that upset or 
distress the sufferer, rather than those around him or her. Regardless, that 
Fromm-Reichmann’s statements were made at the turn of the mid-century 
seems remarkable: this was more than ten years before Szasz, Scheff, 
Goffman, Cooper, Laing and the rest of those labelled “antipsychiatrists” 
(however problematically) came to the fore during the 1960s, arguing along 
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similar lines that traditional psychiatric treatment should be understood as a 
coercive form of social policing.  
Fromm-Reichmann’s emphasis upon the development of the 
individual under her care, rather than adherence to a doctrine of 
psychotherapy as a restorative form of social policing, aligns her partially 
with Thomas Szasz. Like Szasz, Fromm-Reichmann was highly aware of the 
need for patients to maintain a semblance of personal autonomy and she 
consistently emphasizes the importance of individual integrity throughout 
patient analysis and general hospital treatment. In 1947, for example, she 
wrote that in the case of a patient refusing food, force-feeding should not be 
employed “unless there is an actual danger of starvation” (342). Instead, she 
suggested that the patient’s dinner tray be made to appear “especially 
attractive” and left with them “indefinitely”, regardless of inconvenience to 
staff in the hopes that the patient might change their mind of their own 
accord (342). Fromm-Reichmann even suggests that in the case of patients 
who fear their food is being poisoned, that by sharing a meal with the nurse 
or psychiatrist, the patient may be encouraged and reassured enough to eat 
(342).  
Szasz too believed in the fundamental importance of individual 
autonomy as discussed in Chapter Two, claiming in 1988 that “autonomy is a 
positive concept” since it represents “freedom to develop one’s self, to 
increase one’s knowledge, improve one’s skills and achieve responsibility for 
one’s conduct… it is freedom to live one’s own life” (22). This for Szasz, as a 
libertarian, represents the ultimate expression of human potential. The ability 
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to make one’s own choices therefore was crucial to this ideology, so Fromm-
Reichmann’s desire for patients to decide for themselves over issues like 
medication and feeding (unless their life was in danger) tallies largely with 
Szaszian politics. The difference between the two here lies in the extremity of 
their views: Fromm-Reichmann would allow medical force to be utilized in the 
case of near starvation, but Szasz viewed the right to die as an inalienable 
individual right even to the extent of appearing as a pitiless ideologue.  
Collaboration as Key 
 Fromm-Reichmann’s overarching respect for the patient on the other 
hand, and her emphasis on collaborative care as the key to successful 
psychotherapy is reiterated throughout her works. In a 1948 paper 
discussing the treatment of schizophrenics with psychotherapy, Fromm-
Reichmann wrote that once 
[I]nitial contacts with the patient have led to the 
establishment of a workable doctor-patient relationship, 
the attempt is made with the articulate schizophrenic to 
establish a consensus about the need for treatment and 
its reasons. The patient will then be guided with the 
psychoanalyst as a participant-observer into 
collaborative efforts and understanding, working 
through, and gaining insight into the genesis and 
dynamics of his mental disturbance, until constructive, 
lasting, and therapeutically valid insight becomes his 
(emphasis mine, 166). 
For Fromm-Reichmann, collaborating with the patient as part of a partnership 
towards health was the basis of her therapeutic ideology. The term 
“participant-observer” is important here as lays bare the importance of Henry 
(or Harry) Stack Sullivan’s theories to Fromm-Reichmann’s work. As Mabel 
Blake Cohen writes, Sullivan was the first to assert that the analyst was not 
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“merely an observer but quite specifically a participant observer” in the 
therapeutic process, demonstrating the importance of collaboration in the 
course of treatment (xi). Sullivan was a major influence on both Fromm-
Reichmann and staff at Chestnut Lodge more generally: although never 
directly employed there, Sullivan (encouraged by Fromm-Reichmann) held 
“twice-weekly seminars” at Chestnut Lodge between “October 1942 and April 
1946”. He was so influential that his theories became the “dominant 
ideology” of the Lodge, especially with regards to his belief in the singular 
importance of the development of strong interpersonal relationships to the 
recuperation of patient health (Hornstein, 179).  
Fromm-Reichmann also emulated Sullivan in the physical 
arrangement of her analytic space. Rather than utilizing the traditional 
Freudian analytic set-up, with the patient lying down and the analyst facing 
away, Fromm-Reichmann believed that it was far more “desirable to have an 
arrangement which makes it possible for both the patient and the therapist to 
look at each other or not, as the occasion may warrant” (1949b, 69). Indeed, 
as an indication of her emphasis upon flexibility and individuation in 
treatment, Fromm-Reichmann not only met with her patients face to face 
either in her cottage or in the main building at Chestnut Lodge, she allowed 
them “to sit, lie down, or walk around the room as they wished” (Neathery 
51). This physical shift in the therapeutic setting may not seem at first glance 
to be particularly note-worthy, however the subversive implications are great. 
Instead of the doctor retaining an aloof and neutral position indicating 
omnipotence, dynamic therapists like Fromm-Reichmann and Sullivan 
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rejected these boundaries and instead sought to engage with their patients 
on a more equal footing to encourage a collaborative relationship. Greenberg 
found this approach particularly valuable as she told Thomas McGlashan 
and Christopher Keats, “it was helpful that Dr Fromm-Reichmann always 
insisted that the treatment was a collaboration”, since, as a result, “I don’t 
have much trouble with authority because I see things basically as 
collaborative. This began with my collaboration with Dr Fromm-Reichmann, 
with whom I worked against the illness” (63-68). 
Sullivan and Fromm-Reichmann’s acceptance of patient agency was 
therefore an indicator of the ideological emphasis placed upon individual self-
determination at Chestnut Lodge, and of the medical staff’s desire not to 
diminish their patient’s symptoms (psychotic or otherwise) by surgical or 
chemical means. Individual creativity and the imaginative potentiality of 
patients were especially protected at Chestnut Lodge for their therapeutic 
value, which again places the Lodge in direct opposition to other, more 
orthodox, bio-medical facilities. For example, a patient quoted by 
psychopharmaceutical advocate E. Fuller Torrey complained that the 
antipsychotic drugs she was given to ameliorate her schizophrenia effectively 
dulled her mind and negated her previously heightened levels of aesthetic 
originality. She claimed that “Whereas before I lived in a fascinating ocean of 
imagination, I now exist in a mere puddle of it. I used to write poetry and 
prose because it released and satisfied something deep inside myself". After 
being given antipsychotic drugs she reports instead that, "I find reading and 
writing an effort and my world inside is a desert” (qtd. 121).  
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Similarly, in 1950 Freeman and Watts, the American pioneers of 
lobotomy, wrote that 
to relieve a confirmed schizophrenic [,] prefrontal 
lobotomy has to be done far back enough so that 
practically the whole imaginative life of the individual 
has to be sacrificed… to get rid of the pathologic 
fantasy… The prerequisite for success in this case is 
destruction of the fantasy life” (emphasis mine, 131). 
This positioning of the patient’s creative potential as inherently corrupting 
was something Fromm-Reichmann rejected. Instead, she encouraged 
patients to express themselves artistically through dancing, writing poetry, or 
drawing to allow a greater exploration of the psyche. In Greenberg’s novel, 
for example, Deborah spends her most intensive months of recuperation 
“working on a series of pen-and-ink drawings” whose creation coincided, not 
coincidentally, with the “world [beginning] to gain form, dimension, and 
colour” (227). This draws an explicit connection between Deborah’s creative 
output and her recovered relationship with reality, something that seeks to 
debunk the common association between madness and creativity. In an 
interview in 2009, Greenberg reinforced this position, telling Claudia Cragg 
that mental illness represents the “opposite” of creativity since creativity 
“makes bridges, bonds, links. Mental illness cuts, surrounds, makes a fort 
which turns out to be a prison” (00:06:39). 
Accordingly, encouraging patients to engage in artistic endeavours 
was crucial to Fromm-Reichmann, since understanding the motivations of 
the unconscious was intrinsic to psychodynamic therapy. Fromm-Reichmann 
wrote of one patient in 1946 that  
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It seemed important in the process of this recovery… to 
have her find valid means of artistic expression [since] I 
did not consider it the goal of treatment for the young 
woman to learn to lead a conventional life with the 
standard means of social adjustment (3).  
Instead, the cultivation of self-development and understanding were the goal 
of treatment at Chestnut Lodge. To curtail creative potential would therefore 
impede the progress of individual self-development and self-comprehension 
during the therapeutic exchange, and, to Fromm-Reichmann, set patients on 
the path to passive conformism.  
Interpreting Psychosis 
These priorities are equally reflected in Greenberg’s novel since Dr 
Fried not only understands creative expression to be intrinsic to self-
development and revelatory for the therapeutic process, she also 
understands schizoid speech and symptoms to be meaningful and mostly 
intelligible to the attuned physician. This was a fundamental shift in how 
psychotic communications were viewed at the time, and one which Laing 
would later adopt and expand upon in his own theories. Fromm-Reichmann 
claimed in 1946 that “the psychiatrist has to listen to the communications of 
the mentally disturbed and try to understand them, irrespective of whether or 
not he can always grasp their meaning” (21). She continues,  
If [the psychiatrist] cannot understand them, he still 
owes the respect to the mentally disordered person to 
know that his communications are practically always 
self-meaningful (21).  
Here, Fromm-Reichmann is re-enforcing the notion that the “mad” and the 
“sane” occupy different positions on the same spectrum of human 
behaviours, and that respect should be maintained for patients regardless of 
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the apparent incomprehensibility of their speech and/or actions. Just 
because one individual involved in the therapeutic partnership cannot 
deduce meaning in the other, this, Fromm-Reichmann suggested, was not 
the fault of the speaker but a failure of understanding in the listener.  
Fromm-Reichmann ultimately understood schizophrenic symptoms, 
no matter how incongruous they appeared at first, to serve a protective 
purpose to the afflicted individual. She argued that anxiety formed the root of 
psychiatric distress, and seemingly bizarre behaviours performed by 
sufferers were decipherable if the avoidance of this original anxiety was 
understood as cause (1954, 197). One example Fromm-Reichmann provides 
of this is of a patient with an obsessive- compulsive disorder that manifested 
itself in repeated hand washing, to avoid contaminating others or being 
contaminated himself. “Should this person… resist his compulsion”, she 
writes “then his fear of being contaminated… would become so severe that 
that in turn would interfere even more with healthy interpersonal 
adjustments” (1946, 6). In Greenberg’s novel, this understanding of 
symptoms as serving a protective function of residual value to the patient 
becomes clear in Dr Fried’s approach to Deborah’s symptomatology, as 
does Fried’s desire to collaborate with her patient in order to alleviate them. 
During one therapeutic dialogue Dr Fried tells Deborah that 
‘When it is over you can still choose [psychosis] if 
you really wish it. It is only the choice which I wish to 
give you; your own true and conscious choice’. 
‘I could still be crazy if I wanted to?’ 
‘Crazy as a fruitcake… if you wanted to’ (emphasis 
mine, 108).  
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This scene neatly communicates both to Deborah and the reader the 
importance of patient self-determination as part of the therapeutic exchange, 
and demonstrates Fried’s belief in the functionality of Deborah symptoms, 
most prominently with regards to her created fantasy land, Yr.  
Yr: Retreat from Reality 
Derived from Greenberg’s own analogous hallucinatory realm, Iria, Yr 
represents a complex hallucinatory world-system into which Deborah can 
withdraw from the outside world, initially in sporadic times of crisis, before 
increasing in regularity until the fantasy land becomes an omnipresent fixture 
of her troubled interiority. Deborah had been bullied for several years at 
school and summer camp for being Jewish, so her flight into Yr can be 
understood as a strategy for relief from the overwhelming pressures of her 
fraught actuality. Accordingly, psychiatrist Dr Michael Robbins has 
commented that in his experience working with psychotic patients, they 
“retrospectively describe the psychotic state as a painfree one” to which they 
often seek return, rather than experience “the painful state of self-awareness, 
thinking, and feeling they have learned to tolerate” (442). This accurately 
represents Deborah’s position, and she reflects upon this directly when she 
considers that in the early days of Yr, the Yri gods “had been companions…  
sharers of her loneliness. In camp, where she had been hated; in school, 
where strangeness had set her apart…; Yr had grown wider and wider” (51).  
Indeed, Yr becomes so all-encompassing that it eventually begins to 
encroach into Deborah’s life in the ‘real’ world; something that is profoundly 
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threatening to Deborah, and that again reflects R. D. Laing’s idea of 
psychosis as the breaking down of the false, outer self as discussed in 
Chapter Three. For example, early in the text Deborah recalls an incident 
that occurred several years ago, during a lesson at school. Deborah was 
startled out of Yr and realizes she has written “NOW JANUCE” at the top of 
her work, with her teacher asking what it means (17). Januce is a clear 
reference to the two-faced Roman deity, Janus, commonly associated with 
doorways, passages, and transitions. Deborah’s labelling herself in the god’s 
name demonstrates her (increasingly tenuous) position as gatekeeper 
between Yr and reality, while also alerting the reader to the split nature of the 
schizophrenic self.  
Yr is introduced in the first pages of the novel and is immediately 
established as a direct juxtaposition to the lived reality of Deborah’s strained 
family life. From the beginning of the text, its use to her as an emotional 
defense is obvious, and she often spends several days in Yr when reality 
becomes too difficult to bear. For example, after arriving at Chestnut Lodge 
and her initial interview with admissions staff, she retreats into her fantasy 
land for peace and comfort: “That day and the next she spent on Yr’s plains, 
simple long sweeps of land where the eye was soothed by the depth of 
space. For this great mercy, Deborah was grateful to the Powers” (13). 
Furthermore, on the long journey to the asylum with her parents, Deborah 
reports that the kingdom of Yr has a particularly special place named “the 
Fourth Level”, which periodically and unpredictably opens up to her as a 
“neutral place” where there was “no emotion to endure, no past or future to 
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grind against” (9). This comforts Deborah as the “real” world recedes, 
becoming “shadowy” in contrast with Yr, where she feels “unencumbered” 
and “without the slightest concern” (9). One could understand this retreat into 
a safe interiority as analogous to a Laingian psychotic state, as discussed in 
Chapter Three, since Deborah’s false-self system is eventually cast aside as 
her interiority comes to dominate her consciousness.  
Given the fraught nature of the Blau family’s journey to the institution, 
Deborah’s retreat into Yr is an understandable reaction to readers that can 
be interpreted sympathetically. Greenberg’s omnipotent, and alternatively 
temporally synchronous or disjointed narrative perspective allows access into 
Deborah’s experiences, effectively removing the terrifying mystery 
surrounding psychiatric symptoms in the novel. As Evelyn Keitel has noted, 
this form of narrative structure allows “the reader [to] experience some - not 
all – of the emotional elements inherent in psychotic personality dissolutions: 
pleasure…creative playfulness [or] a sense of paralysis or oppression” (107). 
Both Plath and Greenberg’s novels utilize their particular narrative styles to 
undermine the conception of mental illness (and schizophrenia in particular) 
as incomprehensible to those understood to be ‘sane’, allowing the reader a 
privileged insight into the motivations and experiences underpinning 
“psychotic” actions.   
   Yr is ruled by an assortment of gods, including Lactameon and 
Anterrabae, who become more aggressive over time as their grip on 
Deborah’s consciousness begins to loosen as her therapy progresses. Her 
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divulgences of Yr to Dr Fried are monitored by what she terms the Censor, 
whom Deborah describes as being  
given the task of keeping the world of Yr from blowing 
its secret seeds to ground on Earth, where they would 
spring up wide open to flowering lunacy for all the world 
to see and recoil in horror (51).  
The momentary breach between Yr and the real world is what particularly 
frightens Deborah during the classroom incident where she calls herself 
“Januse”: she describes how “some nightmare terror” had come “to life” then, 
in the “day-sane classroom” (17). The Censor is a great terror to Deborah, 
and regularly punishes her whenever she allows Dr Fried to follow her 
metaphorically into Yr. When she first meets Dr Fried, for example, the 
Censor “growled Take Care… Take Care” in Deborah’s mind, sensing the 
imminent danger posed by the doctor, despite her diminutive appearance 
(20). This warning represents a form of therapeutic resistance, which 
Fromm-Reichmann may have interpreted as arising from a “fear that the 
anxiety… originally barred from awareness may be reactivated by the 
interpreted dissolution of the dissociations and repressions” (1950, 110). In 
Deborah’s case, this means that the Censor represents the internal defense 
system that supports the preservation of her fantasy land, and therefore 
protects her from confronting the conflicts and anxieties that exist at the 
basis of her hallucinations. 
Yri: a Metaphorical Language System 
As with Greenberg’s fantasy land Iria, where she and the gods 
communicated in Irian (a secret language designed to prevent outside 
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comprehension), Deborah has also created an analogous private language, 
Yri. Yri is communicated in both spoken and written forms, which Deborah 
uses to craft poems without anyone else being able to read her work, as was 
also the case with Greenberg. According to McGlashan and Keats, as a 
young teenager “[Greenberg] withdrew increasingly to her room” where her 
father would attempt to “spy on her” from the doorway. In order to “keep him 
from reading the poetry she wrote, [Greenberg] invented a language of her 
own. She called it ‘Irian’… and she spoke it fluently”. However,  
[w]hen her father saw something written in Irian in 
English letters… [Greenberg] invented symbols, like in 
Chinese or Japanese, in which to write (44-45).  
While many children create imaginary worlds and their own words, the extent 
of this fantasy land, and its attendant linguistic system, is what delineates 
Greenberg’s and Deborah’s behaviour as pathological. This situation again 
emphasizes the falsity of the binary between madness and sanity: as 
Fromm-Reichmann stated in 1950, “the problems and emotional difficulties of 
mental patients … are…rather similar to one another and also to the 
emotional difficulties in living from which we all suffer at times” (emphasis 
mine, xi).21This is a particularly striking statement that demonstrates Fromm-
Reichmann’s view of psychiatric patients and their symptomatology as part of 
                                                          
21 Szasz terms psychiatric conditions “problems in living” in The Myth of 
Mental Illness to delegitimize the idea that these illnesses are akin to somatic 
or physiological conditions such as cancer or heart disease, for example. 
Unfortunately, I have been unable to find any evidence of correspondence 
between Fromm-Reichmann and Szasz, but there is archival evidence of a 
relationship between Szasz and Fromm-Reichmann’s estranged husband, 
Erich Fromm, who also utilized the term in his 1955 text, The Sane Society. It 
could therefore be assumed that Szasz adopted the phrase from Fromm, 
who may have picked it up from his wife, Fromm-Reichmann, who wrote in 
1950 that “psychiatric services” could be defined as “the attempt to help a 
person overcome his emotional difficulties in living” (67).  
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spectrum shared with the “sane” population. Dr Fried understands Deborah’s 
retreat into Yr, and the development of the Yri tongue, as desperate 
protective strategies to shield Deborah from her internal trauma. This retreat 
can be understood therefore as the extension of a normal childhood activity 
into the realm of the socially undesirable, and therefore pathological. 
Yri, as Wolfe and Wolfe point out, is a private language based wholly 
“on metaphors” and symbols (899). For example, when Deborah first tells Dr 
Fried about her fantasy land, and the language used therein, she reveals that 
there is both a “Latinated cover-language” that she “uses sometimes” as a 
“fake”, but the real Yri language remains assiduously hidden underneath 
since, she believes, it is too powerful to be shared (52). To express this 
power, Deborah resorts to simile, stating that speaking in the secret 
language of Yr would be like “powering a firefly with lightning bolts” (52). 
English, Deborah tells her therapist, “is for the world – for getting 
disappointed by and getting hated in” while Yri, in contrast, “is for saying 
what is to be said” (52).  
This is ironic, however, since Deborah’s attempts at communication in 
Yri necessarily flow inwards rather than out, referring only to herself and her 
created realities. This prevents the creation of a strong interpersonal bond, 
something that Fromm-Reichmann and Dr Fried both believe to be crucial to 
patient recovery. Indeed, Fromm-Reichmann wrote that psychiatry and 
psychotherapy represent “the science and art of interpersonal relationships”, 
therefore the creation of robust connections between individuals (i.e. the 
patient and their therapist) was crucial to individual recovery (1950, xiv). 
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Laing also pointed out the importance of empathy and personal connection 
to patient recovery in The Divided Self under the auspices of a “physician’s 
love” that “recognizes the patient’s total being, and accepts it, with no strings 
attached” (165). Deborah’s use of Yri in her inner dialogues with her created 
gods rejects this idea of love or connections, and instead maintains her 
separation from ‘normal’ society. 
According to The Divided Self, much schizophrenic speech is 
“necessarily difficult to follow” since “if the self is not known it is safe” (163). 
In addition, Laing argues that “A good deal of schizophrenia is simply 
nonsense, red-herring speech, prolonged filibustering to throw dangerous 
people off the scent” (164). These statements relate directly to Fried and 
Fromm-Reichmann’s conception of symptomatology as serving a protective 
function to the ‘sick’ individual; however, if the individual speaks it seems 
reasonable to assume that there is some desire to communicate some 
aspects of inner experience, which could potentially be deciphered by the 
astute or empathetic listener. Metaphor performs this communicative function 
in schizophrenic speech (sometimes known as schizophrenese) by 
shrouding the explicit message of the utterance, while simultaneously 
attempting to communicate a personal experience of sickness that cannot 
necessarily be understood by non-sufferers. Wolfe and Wolfe have written 
that schizophrenic use of metaphor  
often represent[s]… an attempt to communicate the 
emotional quality of the illness [but also] to some extent 
its structure as well. It is not surprising that the most 
common metaphors are… of darkness and confusion: 
fog, mazes, labyrinths, tunnels, pits, water, caverns, fire 
and ice (899).  
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Greenberg utilizes these kinds of metaphor to allow readers a fuller 
comprehension of Deborah’s emotional and psychiatric recovery, most 
prominently through the metaphor of the arduous journey. It has been 
argued, for instance, that Deborah’s reference to her “gasps of exhaustion as 
she climbed an Everest that was to everyone else an easy and a level plain” 
(207) offers a dramatization of her “struggle for sanity” (Wolfe and Wolfe, 
903).  
The restrictive and claustrophobic nature of Deborah’s sickness is 
also communicated via imagery of coffins, death, and of failing vision that 
clouds Deborah’s perceptions of those around her (particularly in moments of 
crisis). Early in Dr Fried and Deborah’s therapeutic relationship, Deborah 
reluctantly unpacks a Yri metaphor to aide Dr Fried’s comprehension, 
touching upon these themes as she does:  
‘It’s a metaphor – you wouldn’t understand it’ 
‘Perhaps you could explain it then’. 
‘There is a word – it means Locked Eyes, but it implies 
more’. 
‘What more?’ 
‘It’s the word for sarcophagus’. It meant at certain times 
her vision reached only as far as the cover of her 
sarcophagus; that to herself, as to the dead, the world 
was the size of her own coffin. 
‘With the Locked Eyes – can you see me?’ 
‘Like a picture’ (45).  
This example underlines the multiple layers of both separation and meaning 
present in Deborah’s created language since we are told what the word 
directly translates to, as well as what it implies, but we never discover the Yri 
word itself.  
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Therapeutic Experience and Psychosis 
Throughout I Never Promised You a Rose Garden, Deborah is 
encouraged to experience rather that to repress or attempt to hide her 
symptoms to facilitate interpretation. In 2008, Joanne Greenberg told 
filmmaker Daniel Mackler that Fromm-Reichmann would ask her to “take me 
along, take me along” whenever her patient experienced her hallucinations of 
Iria during their meetings, and this is equally present in Greenberg’s novel 
(00:28:17). Dr Fried similarly encouraged her patient in Rose Garden to 
share her hallucinatory experiences as directly as possible. During one later 
session, for instance, as the tension between Deborah’s two realities 
reaches its climax, Dr Fried can see that her patient has become distant and 
asks, “Where have you gone… Take me with you”, repeating almost 
verbatim what Fromm-Reichmann asked Greenberg (237). Through her 
therapist’s quick perception and receptiveness, Deborah is encouraged to 
reveal to her doctor the growing crisis between earth and Yr that she is 
experiencing as she moves towards recovery, a request that threatens 
Deborah’s interior world and comes with a cost. To that end, Deborah tells Dr 
Fried that “you made me care and as soon as I did, Yr punished me and I got 
desperate with it” (237).  
Patients undergoing intensive psychotherapy at Chestnut Lodge were 
encouraged to fully engage with and explore their symptomatology in an 
attempt to interpret the underlying cause. This would often take a very long 
time, and patients would appear to deteriorate rather than improve during the 
foundational period of their treatment, when they began to confront their 
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delusions and break down their hallucinatory defenses. Catherine Penney, 
another recovered schizophrenic whose treatment forms the focus of Daniel 
Dorman’s account of the therapeutic process, Dante’s Cure (2003), 
experienced a similar degeneration as part of her recovery trajectory. 
Catherine’s treatment with Dr Dorman bears marked similarities to that 
undertaken by Fromm-Reichmann and Greenberg in the late 1940s, and in 
his account of Penney’s therapy, Dorman admits being “intrigued” as a 
young physician by the treatment approaches of Fromm-Reichmann, Stack 
Sullivan, and those that followed, including Harold Searles, all of whom 
refused to treat patients with psychopharmaceuticals (63).  
In the early stages of Greenberg’s novel, this seemingly 
counterproductive movement deeper into madness as part of the treatment 
process becomes apparent, particularly when Deborah is moved to a locked 
ward for greater protection. Dr Fried sends an update to the Blaus that Jacob 
Blau, Deborah’s father, interprets as saying that “certain hates, violences, 
and terrors that had been deep inside his well-beloved daughter had erupted. 
She had been transferred to ‘greater protection’” (73). What the report does 
not convey, however, is the reason for Deborah’s transfer. The reader is 
informed that this occurs after Deborah engages in violent self-mutilation by 
dragging the “rippled and sharp” edges of a tin can repeatedly across her 
arm, brought on by heightened tension between Yr and reality (48). 
Greenberg’s narrator makes clear to the reader that this act is triggered by a 
particularly revealing therapy session with Dr Fried, where Deborah first 
confides in her therapist about her troubled upbringing. By the time Deborah 
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returns to her ward, the narrator tells us that “Yr was massed against her”, 
and Anterrabae tells Deborah that, through her therapy, she is “walking 
around your destruction and poking a little finger at it here and there. You will 
break the seal”, and most terrifyingly, that she “will end” if she continues to 
participate in this therapeutic action (48). Deborah is therefore moved to 
ward D for her own protection following her apparent deterioration. 
By allowing her patient to metaphorically enter her fantasy land, Dr 
Fried gives Deborah the opportunity to discuss the positive aspects of Yr 
during their therapy sessions. In one momentary fugue state Deborah 
explains she was with “Anterrabae”, one of the Yri gods, who asked her 
“Could you ever hope or imagine to be so sharing with anyone of earth?” 
(emphasis original, 237). This question frightens Deborah and demonstrates 
the supportive nature of the symptom in protecting the patient from the 
underlying sickness. She becomes tearful when she tells the doctor that 
Anterrabae is “right”. She states that the real 
world may have law and logic, even if it is dangerous 
and twisted sometimes. It has challenge too, and things 
I don’t know to learn, like mathematics, which the gods 
can’t teach me (237). 
Most importantly, Deborah asks “where else… is there the sharing that I 
have with them?” (237). This question reveals the lonely emptiness that Yr 
replaced in the real world, where Deborah, like Greenberg, had a troubled 
relationship with both family and peers. The close therapeutic relationship 
that Deborah develops with Dr Fried becomes the antidote to this loneliness, 
as Dr Fried explains “You see… it can be as clear between the two of us as 
with your gods” since she is “and ha[s] always been a representative of and 
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a fighter with you for the present world” (237). This openness and respect for 
the importance and inherent meaning of patient symptoms, including 
hallucinations as involved and deep-rooted as Deborah’s, is key to the 
therapeutic relationship between the two women, and the success of their 
joint venture towards health.  
Narrative Difficulties 
While Greenberg’s novel has created an effusive and enduring 
narrative of hope for sufferers of mental illness, there are a number of 
problems with her depictions of treatment that must be addressed. For 
example, although she cannot be accused of romanticizing mental illness 
through her depiction of Deborah’s suffering and non-linear progress towards 
health, it could be argued that her representation of the treatment 
administered is both necessarily simplified and overly idealized. This is 
partly, as Edward Dolnick reminds us, a result of the creative process since 
the “mere act of providing an understandable description imposes an artificial 
order” upon the intrinsically chaotic experience of psychosis Greenberg 
describes (87).  
Accordingly, despite the omnipotent narrative style employed in 
Greenberg’s novel, the reader is always one step removed from the 
therapeutic activity taking place, although, for Freud, separation is to be 
expected in the case of psychoanalysis. In a lecture to laypeople, Freud 
admitted that the psychoanalytic practice could never be witnessed by 
outsiders to the therapeutic relationship, to which one could add readers of 
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Greenberg’s novel. Freud claimed that “the analysis will admit of no 
audience; the process cannot be demonstrated”, because the analysand will 
communicate with their doctor “only under the conditions of a special 
affective relationship to the physician; in the presence of a single person to 
whom he was indifferent he would become mute” (19). This is a practice that 
Greenberg dramatized in her text through Dr Fried’s refusal to allow others to 
overhear their therapy sessions, such as during their first meeting when the 
doctor sends Deborah’s nurse-escort away: “Can you come back for her in 
an hour?” (19). For the reader observing at a distance, the apparently 
privileged view of the therapeutic process in Rose Garden is complicated by 
its mediation through narrative framing, just as any description of the 
psychoanalytic process, according to Freud, must always remain second 
hand.  
 Greenberg’s biased view of her therapist also colours her fictional 
depiction, casting a semblance of doubt on the reliability of her reportage. 
Greenberg’s defense of Fromm-Reichmann and of psychotherapy-as-viable-
treatment has continued many decades after the termination of their 
therapeutic relationship and the doctor’s sudden death in 1957. In a letter to 
the editor of Psychiatric News in 2002, for example, Greenberg thanked the 
journal for a previous article on her old therapist. She wrote that the piece 
was “was very moving to me”, and that she was “deeply gratified” to learn of 
Fromm-Reichmann’s continued importance in her native Germany, since we 
“here in America have really repudiated much valuable psychotherapy in 
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favor of a pharmacological approach with minimal psychotherapeutic 
intervention” (“Psychotherapy”). 
Interestingly, however, Greenberg is not the only writer who could be 
accused of being overly-deferential towards Fromm-Reichmann and even of 
fetishizing her relationship with her star patient. Hornstein, Fromm-
Reichmann’s biographer frequently demonstrates outrageously hyperbolic 
praise of her subject’s work with Greenberg. She writes that they “took to 
each other in that way that people call chemistry but is really physics – the 
perfect alignment of minds magnetized by the force of each other’s need” 
(230). Even more sycophantically, Hornstein wrote that “[t]hey [Frieda and 
Joanne] have become a kind of icon, a psychoanalytic Madonna and child” 
(238). The strong relationship between Greenberg and Fromm-Reichmann 
has been acknowledged as a factor in Greenberg’s remarkable recovery by 
fellow psychoanalysts including Gerald Schoenewolf, who claimed that 
At [the] core [of their therapeutic success] was Fromm-
Reichmann’s realness and genuine respect and 
affection for Greenberg, an authenticity that was 
appreciated and, in time, returned (65). 
Since, in the novel, much of Deborah’s schizophrenic retreat from reality 
occurs through a lack of trust, this steadily established, and highly 
collaborative relationship, can be read as key to Deborah’s eventual recovery 
by helping to reverse her expectations of continual cruelty and deceit.  
The disastrous impact of a poorly or ill-conceived coupling upon 
patient progress is explored in Greenberg’s novel, when Dr Fried leaves for 
the summer and Deborah is temporarily left in the care of Dr Royston. 
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Royston is a male therapist who Deborah describes as “sitting stiffly”, “not a 
friendly person” and as violently demanding access into her thoughts, “like a 
pickaxe”, during the opening of their first disastrous meeting together (155). 
Significantly, during this initial consultation, Deborah makes up a Yri phrase 
and translates it into English on Dr Royston’s request, in order to deflect his 
probing into the real land of Yr as she conceives it. The phrase she proffers 
is “Don’t do brain surgery with a pickaxe”, which could be read as a 
reference to lobotomy, commonly performed at the time with an icepick like 
instrument inserted through the patient’s eye-socket (155). One could argue 
here, then, that Doctor Royston’s lack of empathy, understanding, or respect 
for the defense mechanisms constructed over time by his patient (i.e. the 
land of Yr and the linguistic system, Yri) connects him in Deborah’s mind not 
just with a metaphorical violence, but with a more coercive and authoritarian 
style of psychiatric treatment, of which Fromm-Reichmann’s style of 
interpersonal psychotherapy was the antithesis.    
Deborah’s experience with Dr Royston is one of only a handful of 
negative incidents with staff at the fictionalized Chestnut Lodge, including 
experiences with ward attendants who are depicted as cruel and even, at 
times, violent. Instead of appearing as part of a culture of abuse at the 
hospital these can, instead, be related to single, maladjusted individuals 
penalizing patients for their own fears rather than to the systemic 
understaffing and institutionalized brutality prevalent in narratives like One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. Nevertheless, in Rose Garden ward 
attendants including Mr. Hobbs and Mr. Ellis are both portrayed as 
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occasionally using force against patients. In the case of Hobbs, Deborah 
astutely surmises that his mean tempered and often forceful responses to 
patients is caused by his anxiety that the asylum’s patients are less ‘crazy’ 
than he expected, and therefore more like him than he could bear. Deborah 
reflects that: 
[Hobbs] wanted people to be crazier and more bizarre 
than they really were so that he could see the line that 
separated him, his inclinations and random thoughts, 
and his half-wishes from the full-bloomed, exploded 
madness of the patients (62).  
This can be connected to Fromm-Reichmann’s assertions that the mad and 
the sane are more similar than different and points out that the drawing of 
distinct lines between the two as binary states is nothing more than a 
comforting falsehood that crumbles easily. Hobbs is so affected by the lack 
of boundaries between the mad and the sane that he eventually commits 
suicide, demonstrating his affinity with the asylum patients whose presence 
so affected him.  
Mr. Ellis, on the other hand, is a conscientious objector, who came to 
the asylum as part of his punishment for not undertaking active service 
during the Second World War. His religious beliefs, we are told “made him 
see insanity as a just desert for its victims, as God’s vengeance, or as the 
devil’s work, and sometimes all three at once” (87). This interpretation of 
mental illness as moral punishment is reflected in jeering mockery of Ellis by 
the patients, who sense his hatred and fear as they did with Hobbs, but also 
in Ellis’s merciless violence against those in his charge. On one particularly 
striking occasion, Ellis attacks Helene, a fellow patient in the Disturbed ward, 
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while she is restrained in a cold wet sheet pack. Ellis, we are told, stands 
over Helene and “straightened a little, not angry, only deliberate and began 
to hit her in the face. The blows landed sure and hard” (98). Deborah 
understands this violent display against the restrained woman as “the symbol 
of the impotence of all mental patients”, acknowledging the helplessness of 
patients and their position at the mercy of their attendants. In contrast, the 
attendant that gets the best from the patients is the one who treats them with 
respect and equality. MacPherson delivers a harsh rebuke to Deborah one 
day, but underneath the abruptness she detects “the tone of simple respect 
between equals”, which fills her with “joy” (90).  
 Greenberg’s text occupies a unique position within the context of the 
four novels discussed in this thesis: unlike Kesey’s and Yates’s text in 
particular, it advocates for hospitalization as a positive experience for the 
mentally ill and it refuses to reject schizophrenia as a “real” illness that 
justifies medical intervention (albeit with a multifaceted etiology that includes 
social and familial causes). These positions are fundamentally different from 
those depicted in Revolutionary Road, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, 
and The Bell Jar. Greenberg’s text does however correspond with these 
texts through its unequivocal rejection of mid-century bio-medical treatment 
methodologies like electroshock therapy, lobotomy, and forced sedation for 
patient control. Instead, Greenberg’s text demonstrates the importance of 
allowing patients to develop a sense of self and autonomy, in order to 
recover their ‘real’ self from the fantasy lands depicted in the narrative.  
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While Greenberg’s novel was never intended to be read as a medical 
case file, it continues to be interpreted as such, leading to its denigration and 
rejection by those who subscribe to the bio-medical model of psychiatric 
treatment. Hornstein’s prologue, reproduced by the New York Times in 2000, 
touches upon this tension between those in the bio-medical camp, and those 
who believe that schizophrenia is curable with psychotherapy and the 
development of interpersonal relationships. Hornstein wrote that, when 
beginning her research for her biography of Fromm-Reichmann she was 
completely unprepared for the outpouring of intense 
feelings this project immediately began to provoke from 
the historians and psychiatrists I contacted — people 
taking weeks to decide whether to let me interview 
them, insisting that the tape recorder be switched off at 
key moments, or whispering revelations and unearthing 
boxes of materials they had kept secret for forty years 
(par.42).  
Fromm-Reichmann and Joanne Greenberg’s legacy, and that of I Never 
Promised You a Rose Garden is enormously problematic for a psychiatric 
system that rejects the possibility of treating a disease believed to be organic 
in etiology with psychotherapy rather than drugs. This was one of the 
reasons for Greenberg’s decision to write her novel in the first place since, as 
McGlashan and Keats have commented, after her course of therapy with 
Fromm-Reichmann, Greenberg made a full recovery and “never took 
psychoactive medication” nor was she ever again “readmitted to a hospital” 
(64).  
Many patients who have read the book find themselves hoping for a 
treatment experience like Greenberg’s fictionalized one; indeed, Rae 
Unzicker wrote that, upon admission to psychiatric hospital, she  
320 
 
expected – and wanted – an experience like I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden. I wanted a kindly and 
loving person who would be concerned with my needs 
and wishes (72).  
While Unzicker was profoundly disappointed with her subsequent treatment, 
her statement demonstrates the importance of respect and patient autonomy 
in Greenberg’s text. Despite being largely due to the elite nature of the 
hospital she attended, Greenberg’s narrative offers an alternative view of 
what psychiatric treatment could be, instead of being based on sedation, 
shock and restraint as demonstrated in the other novels considered herein. 
At one point in the text, Deborah and Carla share an important moment of 
human connection that demonstrates the basic importance of interpersonal 
contact to mental well-being: “Carla seemed particularly nervous. Her hands 
were shaking… Deborah took Carla’s hands and held them. The hands 
rested. Carla rested” (203). This poignant moment simply but effectively 
embodies the ideology of empathy, respect, and human dignity prioritized in 
Greenberg’s novel. This moment emphasizes the novel’s challenge to a 
biomedical psychiatric mode that, these texts have shown, consistently 
delegitimizes and dehumanizes patients in its care. These human qualities, 
Greenberg suggests, offer a kind of therapy that drugs, shocks, and 
lobotomies can never hope to achieve. 
 
 
Conclusion: Anti-Psychiatry After 1964 
In this thesis I have demonstrated the intricate, and often intimate, links 
between American novels published in the early 1960s and the counter-
321 
 
narratives that developed around biomedical psychiatric care, fuelled by 
those referred to as anti-psychiatrists. Each fictional text offers a thinly veiled 
critique of biomedical psychiatry that, when considered alongside works by 
Cooper, Szasz, Laing, and Fromm-Reichmann, comes to the foreground in 
original and illuminating ways. To that end, I have sought to make plain the 
political implications of diagnosis and treatments such as hospitalisation, 
shock therapies, psychosurgery, and psychopharmaceuticals, and argued 
that these methods are predominantly depicted not as therapeutic, but as 
punitive in my considered texts. 
In order to prevent falling into the same definitional pitfalls as the anti-
psychiatrists, I have avoided forcing these texts into a grouping that 
underplays or diminishes the ideological differences between them. This 
thesis consistently demonstrates both the similarities and the variances 
between the psychiatrists and the fictional texts: this is particularly apparent 
in the contrast between works by Yates, Kesey, and Plath when compared to 
Greenberg’s I Never Promised You A Rose Garden. Despite this, I have 
where possible worked to establish concrete connections between my 
chosen authors and their respective psychiatrist. This was unproblematic in 
the case of Greenberg and Fromm-Reichmann, since Greenberg has been 
so vocal in her support of her former physician; however I sought to bring a 
fresh perspective to the discussion in Chapter Four by comparing Fromm-
Reichmann’s positions to that of the other psychiatrists (Cooper, Szasz, and 
Laing). Furthermore, I was also successful in establishing a personal 
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connection in the case of Kesey and Szasz through their correspondence 
expressing mutual admiration.  
Although it has not always been possible to confirm a personal 
connection, I have nevertheless demonstrated an intellectual alignment 
where possible, such as between Laing and Plath, who shared interests in 
several subjects including existentialism (a concept which is integral to both 
The Divided Self and The Bell Jar). Establishing a personal connection 
between Yates and Cooper proved fruitless but reading Revolutionary Road 
through the prism of Cooper’s works emphasised the importance of 
interpersonal relationships and the socio-political context to diagnoses and 
treatment of mental illness.  
What is particularly interesting about these four authors, however, is 
the force of their anxiety towards biomedical psychiatry in this historical 
moment, as well as their subsequent abandonment of this theme in later 
works. Kesey’s subsequent novels, Sometimes A Great Notion and Sailor 
Song, for example, both moved away from the asylum and themes of mental 
illness but continued to probe the tensions between the individual and the 
collective. Joanne Greenberg, likewise, never returned to the topic of 
schizophrenia with such intensity after I Never Promise You A Rose Garden, 
preferring to write instead on themes like deafness and the environment. 
Plath died the month after The Bell Jar was published, although her Ariel 
collection, published posthumously, offers an intense view of her increasingly 
disturbed psyche.  
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Unlike the others, Yates did write novels that touched upon or 
engaged directly with psychiatric breakdown after Revolutionary Road, but 
books like Disturbing the Peace (1975) approach these difficult subjects in a 
profoundly different way. John Wilder, Yates’s protagonist in Disturbing the 
Peace does not function, as John Givings did in Revolutionary Road, as what 
Tran called “the novel’s dark hope”. Instead, Wilder increasingly loses touch 
with reality in a frightening and disorientating deterioration accelerated by 
alcoholism and a disastrous affair, before ending up in an institution without 
hope for recovery. There is little scope for suggestion in Disturbing the Peace 
that psychiatry occupies the political role of social oppressor, unlike in 
Yates’s first novel as discussed. Why Yates changed the way he depicted 
mental illness is uncertain, but it could be explained by his repeated 
instances of mental illness and hospitalisation throughout his life, particularly 
during the fourteen-year period between each novel’s publication 
(Revolutionary Road in 1961 and Disturbing the Peace in 1975).  
Likewise, anti-psychiatry itself began to lose any sense of credibility 
previously attributed to its key players throughout the 1960s and into the 
1970s. Cooper in particular became increasingly abstract and extreme, 
calling for the destruction of the family unit and for its replacement with 
communes. An ex-patient, David Gale, wrote an article describing therapy 
with Cooper as disquieting and bizarre, and ultimately more harmful than 
good. After Cooper described a particularly intense LSD trip to Gale, he 
reflected that  
You're supposed to be the patient, for God's sake. Do 
you really want your shrink to be so fascinating? No, 
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you don't. You want him to be reserved, poised in an 
attentive reverie. You don't want to know about his trips 
or his girlfriend's orgasms. But isn't that rather 
pusillanimous of you? I couldn't tell.   
While Gale’s comments reflect the influence of patient expectations of a 
psychiatrist – a benevolent, attentive, sage presence - they also demonstrate 
the conundrum of anti-psychiatry: namely, if mental illnesses do not exist, 
and unconventional behaviour is to be accepted rather than diagnosed, what 
does anti-psychiatry stand for and what does it aim to achieve through 
therapeutic intervention?  
Equally, R. D. Laing’s theories became more radical, and therefore 
less credible, throughout the 1960s. He began to argue, for example, in The 
Politics of Experience that schizophrenic psychoses represented voyages 
into inner worlds and that, with the therapist-as-guide, patients could return 
from these voyages enlightened by their experiences. Accordingly, Mary 
Barnes, a schizophrenic housemate at Kingsley Hall in the late 1960s, was 
encouraged by Laing and his associate, Joseph Berke, to “go down” (to 
regress into childhood) and fully immerse herself in her psychotic episodes, 
in order to engage with and ultimately free herself of symptoms apparently 
brought about through dysfunctional family relationships. In her book, co-
authored by Berke and titled Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness 
(1971), Barnes discusses being bottle-fed during these episodes, smearing 
herself in excrement, and demanding almost constant care from Berke – so 
much so that it caused friction between him and his wife.  
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Although Barnes recovered, even becoming a celebrated artist during 
her time at Kingsley Hall, Laing has been criticised for his treatment of 
Barnes, who has been widely regarded as his star patient but was ultimately 
handed-off almost entirely onto Berke. For instance, Elaine Showalter has 
claimed that “[a]lthough Laing made the most of Mary’s Barnes’ ‘recovery’, I 
suspect that her voyage was disappointingly unlike [Laing’s] expectations” 
(235).22 This, Showalter explains, is because it was “one thing to… be the 
manly physician-priest leading another explorer to the heart of darkness, or 
to the top of Everest,” but “quite another to spend three years changing 
diapers, giving bottles [to]… a noisy, jealous, smelly, middle-aged woman” 
(236). Indeed, the amount of time, resources, and attention required to carry 
out this form of therapeutic intervention was one of the primary reasons why, 
according to Adrian Laing, the Kingsley Hall experiment came to an end in 
1970. Laing wrote that: 
The lessons learned with Mary Barnes were very real… 
The irony was that although much had been learned 
from the experience… it was clear that the horror of the 
experience was not going to be an everyday event. 
Who had the heart for it? The amount of time and 
energy required (without pay) to facilitate the extreme 
degree of regression was, in itself, a prohibition on any 
serious repetition (142).  
After the closure of the Kingsley Hall experiment, Laing became increasingly 
separated from the Philadelphia Association’s everyday activities. Instead, 
he became preoccupied with mysticism, eventually spending a period of time 
travelling in both India and Sri Lanka before becoming involved in primal 
                                                          
22 Laing rejects this assertion fully, asserting that “There is nothing I have 
written about Mary Barnes. I’ve never gone around propounding Mary 
Barnes as an example of anything ever” (Mullan 185). 
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therapy on his return to the West, inspired by American therapist Arthur 
Janov.  
This interest in childbirth is significant since, Daniel Burston has 
argued, “as [Laing’s] preoccupation with birth… deepened” he was “drive[n] 
farther and farther towards the edges of the profession”, where “his attitude 
towards psychiatry became less adversarial” (236). This more accepting tone 
is reflected in Laing’s surprising assertion in Wisdom, Madness and Folly 
(1985) that psychiatry plays a necessary custodial role in social life by 
providing somewhere for those whom society does not want: 
To say that a locked ward functions as a prison is not to 
say it should not be so. Our society may continue to 
‘need’ some such prisons for unacceptable persons… 
such places are indispensable (8). 
One could postulate that this more ambivalent attitude towards the need for 
psychiatric facilities derived from Laing’s time and experiences at Kingsley 
Hall, in both the chaotic nature of life inside the facility, but also in the angry 
reception house members were given by neighbours who, Laing told Mullan, 
often smashed their windows and phoned the emergency services to 
complain about residents.  
 Szasz also became increasingly extreme in his ideologies surrounding 
psychiatry and individual freedoms as the 1960s and 1970s progressed, but 
his extremism represented a deeper entrenchment into his already existent 
criticisms of psychiatric practice. Furthermore, Szasz became evermore 
critical of others classed as anti-psychiatrists: as Laing, Cooper, and the 
wider Philadelphia Association became increasingly unconventional in their 
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approach to treating schizophrenia, Szasz became more and more opposed 
to their mission and to his continued but misplaced connection with it. In a 
scathing 1976 article in which he lambasted the Kingsley Hall project, Szasz 
wrote that Laing and his associates were no better than that which they 
purportedly stood against. They, Szasz argued, 
have accepted the central role of schizophrenia in 
psychiatry. What they have done, essentially, is to 
invert its position and significance, casting blame on the 
family and society instead of on the patient and his 
disease. They have thus argued that the schizophrenic 
is, at least sometimes, super-sane, in the sense that, 
because he is a 'victim', he is, ipso facto, more virtuous 
than his victimisers (9). 
This inversion of biomedical psychiatry represents, for Szasz, a similar dead-
end to that of what it seeks to replace. By understanding the ‘mad’ person as 
saner or morally superior to the ‘normal’ population, Laing, Cooper, and their 
associates simply flip the categories of sanity/insanity in a way that does not, 
according to Szasz, tackle what he takes to be the root of the problem: the 
fact that mental illnesses do not exist.  
While this statement is a general complaint against those classed as 
anti-psychiatrists, Szasz saves his most unflinching ire for Laing in particular, 
whom he describes as nothing more than a “base rhetorician”. This hatred 
for Laing came to a head in a 2008 article, where Szasz, almost twenty-years 
after Laing’s death, referred with surprising relish to Laing’s personal failings, 
such as his irresponsible attitude towards contraception (leading to his 
fathering of ten children), Laing’s abusive relationship with alcohol, and his 
propensity towards what Szasz views as “lying” (83). This piece is shocking 
in its vehemence and outright hatred, with Szasz abandoning any pretence 
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at scholarly detachment, commenting for instance that “Laing had no heart. 
He had long ago replaced it with self-interest, self-indulgence, and brutality” 
(88).  
Whilst the example of Szasz demonstrates the lack of harmony or 
unity within the so-called anti-psychiatry movement, it did, according to 
some, have a lasting impact on psychiatric care. For instance, Joanna 
Moncrieff et al. have suggested that the “development of diagnostic criteria, 
with which we are now so familiar, started in the 1970s, partly in response to 
the challenge posed by antipsychiatry” (157). This is particularly relatable to 
the Rosenhan experiment of 1973, according to Moncrieff, a research trial 
where eight sane “pseudopatients” tried to gain access to mental hospitals 
across America, where each were eventually, bar one, diagnosed as 
schizophrenic and retained in hospital for between “7 to 52 [days] with an 
average of 19” (Rosenhan 181). The experiment demonstrated the harmful 
propensity towards overdiagnosis within psychiatry, and the perceived all-
encompassing nature of mental health problems since everything the 
patients did was interpreted as caused by their ‘illness’. For instance, 
Rosenhan’s pseudopatients were asked to take notes throughout their stay, 
but this behaviour was interpreted by staff as indicative of their purported 
psychiatric conditions: “[n]ursing records for three patients indicate that the 
writing was seen as an aspect of their pathological behavior” (182).  Even 
once these individuals were released from hospital care, they were judged to 
be “in remission” rather than cured, suggesting that psychiatric labels remain 
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with individuals long after their recovery, something pointed out by writers 
like Scheff and Szasz during the 1960s (180).  
This pattern of overdiagnosis demonstrated firstly the zeal with which 
psychiatric teams labelled individuals brought before them, as well as the 
imprecise nature of diagnostic criteria, and the flimsiness of the sane/insane 
dichotomy as argued by Laing, Fromm-Reichmann, and others. It also 
showed that, as Rosenhan pointed out “physicians are more inclined to call a 
healthy person sick . . . than a sick person healthy” (181). This experiment 
caused a “furore” according to Moncrieff, and diagnostic criteria were 
tightened to counter the resulting assumption that “seemed to confirm the 
idea that psychiatric diagnosis had no objective validity”, something those 
labelled as anti-psychiatrists had asserted since the early 1960s (157). 
Attempts were made to rectify this through the publication of ever-more 
focused and exacting editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders in 1974, 1980, 1987, 1994 and so on, resulting in 
psychiatric diagnosis becoming an “increasingly detailed, quantitative and 
apparently objective exercise” (Moncrieff 157). While criticisms were levelled 
at psychiatry by anti-psychiatrists including Szasz, Laing, Cooper, and Scheff 
regarding the subjective nature of psychiatric diagnosis, this seemingly 
objective re-evaluation of mental health conditions carries its own problems, 
as made evident in the relationship between patient accounts like I Never 
Promised You A Rose Garden and medical professionals like Cadoret and 
North, who rejected Greenberg’s historical diagnosis, dismissing the validity 
of her account of her treatment and recovery.  
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Anti-psychiatry also had an impact, according to Rael Jean Issac and 
Virginia C Armat on deinstitutionalization as the 1960s and 1970s 
progressed, something which has been read as profoundly negative. Issac 
and Armat argue that, “[s]tate mental hospitals” represented “an easy target” 
for dissent in the 1960s since they functioned as “great warehouses of 
abandoned souls” and were therefore “hard to defend” (14). This attack, they 
argue, came from the “New Left”, and was part of their apparent “struggle 
against middle-class American culture” that centred around the denigration of 
various American institutions (14). While the 1960s were undoubtedly a 
decade characterized by protest against authority from the political left, this 
reading seems to selectively ignore or at least diminish the protest of those 
on the right, including libertarians like Thomas Szasz, as well as the obvious 
attraction to legislators and administrators, for whom deinstitutionalization 
represented a way to significantly cut financial costs.  
Novels like Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest certainly 
contributed towards the anti-institutional bent of 1960s ideology, both through 
its depiction of the institution as a cruel, custodial facility and of treatments 
like ECT as barbaric. As Shorter, an advocate of electroconvulsive therapy, 
has complained, Kesey’s novel, when adapted for the screen, was so 
effective that “patients and their families began to refuse electrotherapy on 
the grounds of having seen the film”, a result, he assures us, of Jack 
Nicholson’s “overacting” (152-153). Whilst this demonstrates a real 
connection between the cultural critique of psychiatry and the changing ways 
psychiatry was practised, to argue that the anti-psychiatrists played a major 
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role in deinstitutionalization seems unlikely. As Norman Dain points out, 
deinstitutionalization was already underway by the time the anti-psychiatrists 
were gaining popularity in the public domain (around 1964 in Laing’s case).  
The desire for deinstitutionalization, Dain explains, stemmed from 
psychiatrists’ wartime experiences, since “‘battle fatigued’ or ‘shell-shocked’ 
soldiers did best when not institutionalized” and therefore it was assumed 
that “the mentally ill amongst the civilian population… would equally benefit 
by being deinstutionalized” (429). This awareness, Dain continues, 
contributed to the eventual passing of the Community Mental Health Act in 
1963, whose advocates sought to “eliminate state mental hospitals in favor of 
community mental health centers” in an attempt to improve patient care 
(429). Nevertheless, whilst it is highly unlikely the anti-psychiatrists had much 
influence over this movement away from state asylums, their arguments did, 
as Despo Kritsotaki has pointed out, fuel “the desire of administrators to shut 
down institutions... if [they] were inhuman, oppressive and inefficient, there 
was no reason to spend so much money to keep them operating” (22). Each 
of these indictments recalled charges previously laid against psychiatric 
hospitals by those classed as anti-psychiatrists like Cooper, Szasz, Laing, 
and Goffman. 
Regardless, what seems clear from patient responses to texts like The 
Divided Self, is that there were positive aspects to anti-psychiatric theory. For 
example, anti-psychiatry could be argued to reflect the patient experience in 
new and potentially revolutionary ways by illuminating the political 
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underpinnings to psychiatric interventions. To that end, Nick Crossley has 
argued that the anti-psychiatrists  
questioned the status quo within psychiatry and their 
cultural and symbolic capital lent this questioning the 
authority…to be heard and taken relatively seriously. 
They cleared a space for the user voice (emphasis 
original, 887).  
To occupy this space, groups of ex-patients sprang up during this period to 
protest their treatment at the hands of psychiatry, sometimes labelling 
themselves psychiatric (or consumer) survivors. These groups protested the 
cruelty of psychiatric treatment as well as the lack of civil rights for patients 
and allowed a sense of community and grassroots advocacy to develop 
amongst those living with diagnoses of psychiatric conditions. The 
emergence of these ex-patient groups fighting for civil liberties again 
underlines the connection between anti-psychiatry and the atmosphere of 
protest in the 1960s. As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the 
novels discussed above, Revolutionary Road, One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s 
Nest, The Bell Jar, and I Never Promised You A Rose Garden shared this 
moment, and function as part of a wider pattern of cultural indictments 
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